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This thesis examines how companies deal with risk in business networks. Drawing on 
empirical evidence from German food retailer-manufacturer networks and existent research 
conducted at the intersection of business network and institutional research, this thesis 
examines two under-researched questions: What constitutes risk in business networks? And 
how do companies deal with risk in business networks?  
In answering these questions, this research refines our understanding of risk in business 
networks by proposing an uncertainty-based conceptualisation of risk and developing an 
institution-based explanation of how companies deal with risk in business networks. While 
network research provides a relevant ontological understanding of business interactions, this 
thesis draws on institutional research to explain how companies use institutional devices, 
including industry standards, General Terms and Conditions and framework contracts, for 
dealing with risk at three interdependent levels of interaction: Network, focal, and dyadic 
interaction. In this way, the thesis offers one of the first ventures developing an institution-
based explanation of how companies deal with risk in business networks. 
The institution-based explanation of how companies deal with risk is captured in the 
development of an integrative framework. This framework conceptually crystallizes the 
synthesis of network and institution-based research by mapping companies’ use of 
institutional devices onto the three levels of network interaction. The institution-based 
explanation illuminates how institutional devices facilitate dealing with risk interactively 
across direct and indirect interactions, because their manifestation in business artefacts 
enables transcending time and space. This contribution is informed by empirical analysis of 
business artefacts-in-use and is conceptually captured in extending the Actor-Resources-
Activities model.  
Methodologically, this thesis employs a critical realist epistemology and network ontology to 
underpin qualitative case study research in German food retailer-manufacturer networks. The 
empirical evidence involves data triangulation from 42 in-depth semi-structured interviews, 
participant observation and analysis of business artefacts-in-use, including documentation of 
the International Featured Standard, eleven General Terms and Conditions and six framework 
contracts.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines how companies deal with risk in business networks. This research 
emerged from the observation that while many companies face risks emanating from direct 
and indirect business interactions, there is limited research investigating how companies deal 
with risk. While risk is inherent to any economic exchange and is approached systematically 
by scholars in economics, behavioural science and operations research, research of how 
companies deal with risk in the context of business-to-business (B2B) marketing has received 
very limited attention. In fact, most handbooks on business marketing do not list the term ‘risk’ 
in their index pages, as if marketing management is immune to this challenge. However, a 
company’s ability to deal with risk is invaluable in reducing losses to key resources such as a 
company’s market share, brand value, company reputation, product quality and business 
relationships.  
To sustain in highly competitive markets, companies must engage in increasingly globalized 
markets spanning multiple regulatory systems and local business customs, leverage 
outsourcing, and make use of innovative technologies. Balancing between “lowest cost at any 
risk” and “no risk at any price” (Newing, 2012) becomes key to surviving in global networks, 
where even incremental cost savings are decisive. Specifically, companies must engage in 
complex, often international, business networks to deliver superior value at competitive 
prices: to meet shareholders’ requests for steady profit growth and the consumers’ and 
regulators’ demand for high and transparent social and environmental standards – whatever 
the number and origin of business partners. Inherent to operating in such complex business 
networks is the need to deal with risk. 
Marketing managers and scholars cannot overlook the relevance of dealing with risk. 
Traditionally, marketing has been concerned with strategies for creating and leveraging 
resources such as products, brands, sales, customer relationships and company reputation. 
Surprisingly, much less emphasis is given to understanding how these resources can be 
protected from risk. The limited attention to risk is even more surprising considering that key 
metrics for evaluating risk impact concern resources of crucial interest to any marketing 
manager, including, among others, sales, market share, business relationships and brand 
value. Therefore, this thesis addresses the void in research on risk in business marketing by 
investigating how companies deal with risk. 
Recent events, such as the horsemeat frauds (2013, 2015), the Escherichia-coli bacteria 
outbreak (2012), natural disasters or the financial crisis haunting companies beyond the 
financial sector since 2008, have several characteristics in common:  
First, such events propelled risk to the top of most companies’ business agendas (Stulz, 2009; 
Solman, 2012), regardless of the company’s industry, size or location.  
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Second, the nature and frequency of these events indicate that they are not of a limited edition, 
but inevitable elements of managing and marketing in complex webs of interdependent 
business relationships, and dealing with these risks will become more complex as business 
activities becomes more global and finely calibrated.  
Third, these events demonstrate that companies must be concerned with risks originating 
from anywhere in the business network, because even events in distant parts of business 
networks may have major repercussions for businesses at any ‘other end’ of the network – a 
phenomenon resembling ‘risk contagion’ or ‘risk migration’. Hence,  
‘risk’ is not confined to a single event in time. Instead, risk reflects a difficult-to-predict series 
of sudden changes, with potentially high negative impact on company resources.  
Fourth, the scale and complexity of each event rules out the possibility of any one company 
resolving the issue unilaterally by ‘imposing’ a pre-planned strategy for ‘risk management’ 
upon its ‘environment’. Similarly, any risk management strategy based on a single company 
perspective or accounting merely for risks from direct business interactions is of limited use 
when the company’s resources are embedded in, and potentially exposed to, risks originating 
from distant, indirect business interactions.  
Finally, the means for dealing with risk in business networks must be cost-efficient and 
parsimonious. Paraphrasing a passage from Andrew Haldane’s speech (the Bank of England’s 
executive director for financial stability at the Federal Reserve’s Annual Policy Conference in 
Kansas, August 2012) on the need for simplicity in addressing complex problems illustrates 
this final point: Complex environments call for simple rules…Modern business is complex, 
perhaps too complex. Regulation of modern business is complex, almost too complex. That 
configuration spells trouble. As you do not fight fire with fire, you do not fight complexity with 
complexity.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.1 introduces the new 
perspective suggested to inform research on risk in business marketing. Section 1.2 states the 
thesis’ research objectives and questions. Section 1.3 outlines the thesis’ structure.  
1.1 A new perspective 
Following a systematic examination of existent approaches to understanding risk, which 
includes economic, behavioural and operational approaches, this thesis develops an 
alternative perspective to explain how companies deal with risk in the context of business 
marketing: Grounded in the network approach to business markets that captures companies’ 
embeddedness and interdependency in direct and indirect relationships, this research 
considers insights from institutional research to explain companies’ use of industry standards, 
General Terms and Conditions and framework contracts as institutional devices for dealing 
with risk in business networks. The outcome of this empirically grounded synthesis is the 
Dealing with Risk in Business Networks 
[15] 
 
development of an institution-based explanation of how companies deal with risk in business 
networks.  
The purpose of introducing a new perspective to understanding risk in business marketing is 
to account more accurately for real-life complexities that companies face in dealing with risk. 
The new perspective departs from existent approaches to risk that typically adopt the 
perspective of a single firm and unilateral strategy. In a nutshell, the new perspective revolves 
around three interdependent observations: 
1) Risk in business marketing matters, because it has a potentially negative impact on key 
resources, and as a result may negatively affect company performance. 
2) Risk is inextricably linked with the embeddedness of companies, activities and resources 
in interdependent networks of direct and indirect relationships.  
3) The new perspective highlights that dealing with risk in business networks demands 
from companies the use of efficient and parsimonious processes that span geographic, 
time, legislative and organizational boundaries to interactively address risk. In 
explaining how companies accomplish this, the thesis draws attention to the use of 
institutional devices, including industry standards, General Terms and Conditions and 
framework contracts. Such institutional devices are structural arrangements that 
express shared, adaptable rules of behaviour to which individual and collective actors 
orient their interactions, regardless of geographical, legislative or organisational 
boundaries. In this way, the use of institutional devices responds to the limitations of 
risk management plans that focus mostly on the intra-organisational decision-making 
processes within single companies. In contrast, institutional devices transcend 
organisational (inter-)actions. This thesis aims to deepen our understanding of the use 
of institutional devices for dealing with risk in business networks. 
In the context of this thesis, an understanding of risk is adopted that defines risk as the product 
of two interrelated elements: uncertainty and impact (Miller, 1992; Zsidisin, Melnyk & Ragatz, 
2005). This definition follows an important development in thinking about risk in business 
research and practice that focuses less on identifying probabilities and emphasizes instead the 
uncertain nature of risk. In this definition of risk, uncertainty refers to the “state, even partial, 
of deficiency of information related to, understanding or knowledge of, an event, its 
consequences, or likelihood” (ISO 31000 Guide 73:2009).  
Typically, the definition of risk as a product of probability and impact (Brindley, 2004) is traced 
back to a reading of Frank Knight’s seminal work on ‘Risk, uncertainty and profit’ (1921), 
where he defines risk as events with known probabilities and uncertainty as events with 
unknown probabilities. While this is an accurate definition informing most economic research 
on probabilistic modelling of risk, it is important to recall that many risks in business 
marketing originate from a lack of knowledge about future interactions between purposeful 
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actors. It is the lack of knowledge about “the strategies actors will select and about the 
circumstances that will influence the course of the game” (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.42) that 
limit the usefulness of a probability-based conceptualisation of risk in this context. Frank 
Knight was not ignorant of this problem, and in fact, a closer reading of his work reveals that 
he warned of transferring a probability-based conceptualisation of risk to the context of 
business interactions: “The results of human activity cannot be anticipated and then only in so 
far as even a probability calculation in regard to them is impossible and meaningless” (1921, 
p.311). The changing understanding of risk in business, as a phenomenon approximating 
uncertainty rather than an event with assigned probabilities, is evident in the recent change 
to the ISO 31000 guide on risk management: The previous definition of risk as a ‘chance or 
probability of loss’ has been replaced, with risk defined as “the effect of uncertainty on 
objectives” (ISO 31000 Guide 73:2009, emphasis added).  
While thinking of risk in terms of probabilities remains useful for mathematical and software 
modelling, it is of limited relevance for understanding how companies deal with risk in the 
context of business networks for the following reasons:  
a) Even if it were technically possible to assign probabilities to all potential risks – which 
is prohibitive in terms of data and cost – ultimately, companies may not necessarily 
have the capacity to process this vast amount of information. As Mousavi and 
Gigerenzer note in their study, titled ‘Risk, uncertainty and heuristics’, “the knowledge 
of how people should make decisions cannot be studied without considering how 
people are able to make decisions” (2014, p.1627, emphases in original).  
b) Drawing on Knight’s insight from almost a century ago, strategic interaction between 
more than two purposeful actors eludes the accurate calculation of probabilities, 
because the actual behaviour may not necessarily comply with anticipated outcomes.  
c) To understand how companies deal with risk, one must gain an understanding of the 
manifestations of risk. The empirical research underpinning this thesis suggests that 
the understanding of risk is not easily confined to the technical assessment of ‘events 
with assigned probabilities’. Rather, risk is inextricably linked with uncertainty over 
future outcomes and the potential impact on resources.  
d) The assumption of risk as events with knowable probabilities tends to implicitly 
suggest that risks are extant threats that individual companies can identify in advance, 
and unilaterally address by means of implementing up-to-date risk management 
systems. Such risk management systems typically prescribe a linear process of risk 
identification, management and evaluation from the perspective of a single actor. 
However, as stated earlier, real-life risk events and subsequent effects rarely behave 
linearly, and few contemporary risks can be mitigated by any one company 
unilaterally.   
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These considerations highlight that companies must deal with risk that may originate beyond 
a company’s direct business interactions and which unilateral ‘risk management systems’ may 
not consider. In practice, this translates into the need for companies to adopt a “mega-scale 
view” (O’Marah, 2007) of their networking activities. In terms of research, this raises 
implications for the unit-of-analysis, which must capture how companies deal with risk beyond 
the single actor or direct relationship and instead consider a higher level of aggregation: the 
business network. 
By adopting the business network perspective (Ford et al., 2003), this research captures how 
companies deal with risk in webs of interdependent direct and indirect relationships, as well 
as the contextual embeddedness of these relationships. The interdependency of companies 
allows risk to migrate across a network, regardless of the actors’ geographic dispersion. As a 
result, interdependence and connectivity preclude any one company from addressing risk 
unilaterally, and consequently this requires investigation into how companies deal with risk 
in interaction with other actors. Therefore, this research captures a variety of actors involved 
in dealing with risk and investigates how companies create ‘islands of certainty’ across 
geographical and legislative borders while maintaining efficient, flexible and responsive 
interactions.  
The above considerations have informed the thesis’ research objectives and questions, which 
are introduced next. 
1.2 Research objectives and questions 
The thesis’ research objectives are to describe and explain how companies deal with risk in 
business networks. Grounded in the uncertainty-based understanding of risk, risk is defined 
as the product of two interrelated concepts: uncertainty and impact. The term business 
network is used as a metaphor to describe markets as complex webs of interdependent direct 
and indirect relationships between actors. Relationships in business networks are key 
elements that connect actors, resources and activities (Holmlund & Törnroos, 1997). The term 
actor captures business and non-business organizations, including companies, governmental 
regulators, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or industry associations.  
The thesis adopts the business network approach to markets to investigate how companies 
deal with risk in the empirical setting of the German food retailer-manufacturer industry. 
Although risk is surprisingly under-researched in existing business network literature, this 
approach promises to reflect more accurately how companies deal with risk in real-life in 
three ways: 
First, the network approach captures food retailer-manufacturer relationships as 
complex, embedded and interdependent webs of direct and indirect interactions 
between actors, resources and activities. 
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Second, the network approach considers that the “complexity of the network and its 
environment is greater than that which can be understood and responded to by an 
individual firm” (Wilkinson & Young, 2002, p.126). Therefore, the business network 
approach is suitable for understanding how companies deal with risk in interaction 
with each other.  
Third, the network approach provides conceptual tools for moving beyond the single 
company view as the unit-of-analysis that has informed most existent research on risk 
to date. Instead, the network approach enables the researcher to capture how 
companies deal with risk at three, interdependent levels of interaction: Network, focal, 
and dyadic interactions. 
To meet the objectives of describing and explaining how companies deal with risk in German 
food retailer-manufacturer networks, the following research questions inform the research 
process: 
RQ1: What constitutes risk in business networks? 
RQ2: How do companies deal with risk?  
Answering these research questions provides the foundation for the thesis’ theoretical, 
methodological and empirical contributions, which are discussed in Chapter Ten. A summary 
of these contributions is briefly presented below: 
The thesis’ primary contribution rests in the theoretical development: The findings present 
one of the first ventures to understanding risk as an important empirical and conceptual 
problem for marketing scholars. Taking existing critiques of probability-based approaches to 
risk seriously, this thesis proposes an empirically-informed uncertainty-based approach to 
risk that more accurately reflects real-life manifestations of risk in business networks. 
Building on this understanding of risk, the thesis’ theoretical contribution constitutes the 
development of an institution-based explanation of how companies deal with risk in business 
networks (see Figure 9.7), which illuminates for the first time in the literature on business 
networks how companies use industry standards, GTC and framework contracts as 
‘institutional devices’ for dealing with risk in direct and indirect relationships.  
The thesis’ secondary contribution is methodological: Acknowledging the limitations of 
research investigating network phenomena at one level of analysis, this thesis illuminates the 
benefits to be gained from adopting a multi-level approach that considers the 
interdependencies between interactions at the dyadic, focal and network level. Furthermore, 
the thesis highlights the value of analysing sets of business artefacts-in-use as primary empirical 
data informing qualitative case study research for a more accurate understanding of business 
network phenomena.  
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In empirical terms, the thesis adds to the limited body of empirical studies investigating how 
companies deal with risk in direct and indirect relationships. Building on a rich empirical 
dataset from examining German food retailer-manufacturer networks, the thesis illuminates 
to marketing managers the relevance of considering risk emerging beyond the ‘horizon’ of 
individual companies and how companies may consider standards, GTC and contracts as 
strategic, institutional devices to address uncertainty and impact of risk on key company 
resources.  
1.3 Thesis structure 
The thesis comprises ten chapters.  
Chapter One introduces the thesis’ research topic and articulates the rationale for the research 
objectives and question. This introduction serves two purposes: First, it illuminates the need 
for considering a new perspective to research risk in business networks in the context of 
existing research and empirical observations. Second, it positions the thesis in the field of 
business network research by highlighting the thesis’ contributions. 
Chapter Two builds the thesis’ theoretical foundation by charting how previous research 
addressed the research questions introduced above. Chapter Two starts with a systematic 
review of dominant approaches to researching risk, and then narrows the discussion to the 
areas relevant in understanding the observed empirical phenomena. The literature review 
establishes the theoretical synthesis between the network and institutional approaches to 
researching risk, which informs the data analysis and the development of the integrated 
framework discussed in Chapter Ten. 
Chapter Three describes the philosophical and methodological decisions underpinning this 
thesis. It justifies and explains the thesis’ grounding in critical realist epistemology, network 
ontology and discusses the implications for conducting case study research. These decisions 
significantly shape the combination of research methods, including the use of in-depth 
interviews, business artefact analysis and participant observation, as well as the employed 
data analysis and reporting practices. The chapter concludes with discussing ethical 
considerations, research quality and rigour.  
Chapter Four defines the empirical industry context, which is vital for understanding the 
reported empirical evidence presented in subsequent chapters.  The chapter discusses the 
economic, political, legal, social and industry-specific developments relevant to understanding 
German food retailer-manufacturer networks. 
Chapters Five to Eight report the empirical evidence of how companies deal with risk in the 
context of German food retailer-manufacturer networks. Chapter Five reports evidence on the 
loci and impact of risk in German food retailer-manufacturer networks.  Chapters Six, Seven 
and Eight systematically report companies’ use of three institutional devices for dealing with 
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risk: the international featured standard (Chapter Six), General Terms and Conditions 
(Chapter Seven) and framework contracts (Chapter Eight). The three chapters correspond 
with the three levels of network analysis, including the network, focal, and dyadic levels 
respectively.   
Chapter Nine answers the research questions by confronting the empirical evidence with 
relevant theoretical approaches. This discussion generates three important outcomes: 
Grounded in the uncertainty-based approach to risk, the chapter develops an institution-based 
explanation of how companies deal with risk in business networks (Chapter Nine, Section 9.3). 
The institution-based explanation captures companies’ use of institutional devices for dealing 
with risk in direct and indirect relationships. This discussion underpins the thesis’ theoretical, 
methodological and empirical contributions, which are presented in Chapter Ten. 
Chapter Ten concludes the thesis by articulating the thesis’ theoretical and methodological 
contribution in the field of business network research. Subsequently, Chapter Ten discusses 
relevant implications for practice and directions for future research. To conclude, the chapter 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the chapter is threefold: First, the literature review establishes the theoretical 
scope underpinning this thesis and prepares the foundation for its theoretical contribution 
discussed in Chapter Ten. Second, this chapter presents one of the first attempts at 
systematically reviewing and classifying existent research approaches to risk and how 
companies deal with risk. Following a critical discussion of probability- and uncertainty-based 
conceptualisations of risk in Section 2.2, the chapter systematizes existing research into 
economic, behavioural and operational approaches to dealing with risk in Section 2.3. 
Considering the limitations of existing approaches to risk, the remainder of the chapter 
suggests the development of an alternative theoretical perspective to how companies deal 
with risk.  
The alternative perspective to how companies deal with risk evolved through the iterative 
process of theory-data interaction and builds on the synthesis of the business network and 
institution-based approaches to risk. The network approach advanced by the Industrial 
Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) group provides an invaluable alternative ontological view of 
markets, which lays the foundation for a more accurate description of the locus of risk and 
how companies deal with risk in direct and indirect relationships. However, the network 
approach does not explain companies’ use of concrete institutional devices such as industry 
standards, General Terms and Conditions, or contracts for dealing with risk. Therefore, this 
research draws on relevant concepts from institutional research to enhance our 
understanding of how companies deal with risk in business networks. 
2.2 Defining risk 
Defining ‘risk’ is not a straightforward exercise.  There appear to be as many definitions of risk 
as attempts to study the phenomenon in different contexts. To complicate the matter further, 
there appear to be studies that take the definition of risk as given, and therefore not worthy of 
conceptual re-evaluation, or use the term ‘risk’ interchangeably with ‘uncertainty’ (Hallikas et 
al., 2004; Oke & Gopalakrishnan, 2009; Jung, Lim & Oh, 2011). Awareness of these problems is 
shared by key authors in the field of risk research across disciplines (Miller, 1992; Manuj & 
Mentzer, 2008; Marucheck, Greis, Mena & Cai, 2011a,b; Aven, 2012). To date there appear to 
be few attempts that have succeeded in addressing these problems despite its potential 
benefit: the development of a common basis for the comparison of assumptions and 
implications across existing and future research on risk. The following section introduces an 
attempt at reviewing existing research on conceptualising risk by differentiating between 
probability- and uncertainty-based approaches to risk.  
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Probability-based approaches to risk 
Probability-based approaches to risk originate from seventeenth century research of applying 
mathematics to the process of gambling by French mathematicians Pascal and de Fermat 
(Kahn & Burnes, 2007). Their work laid the foundation for probability theory, which later 
influenced economic research and the famous work of Frank Knight (1921). Knight 
conceptualizes risk – as distinct from uncertainty - as a “known chance” (p.21), or as future 
events and outcomes with known probabilities. The probability-based approach underpins 
most research on risk in the fields of finance and operations management (see, for example, 
Harland, Brenchley & Walker, 2003; Khan & Burnes, 2007) with one of the most cited 
definitions originating from Brindley (2004, p.18), who defines risk as the “probability (of 
events) × business impact”. 
What is the contribution of probability-based research on risk? Probability-based research on 
risk has generated various risk categorization tools, which typically distinguish between: (a) 
risk source (Das & Teng, 1999; Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Oke & Golapakrishnan, 2009); (b) 
impact or loss (Harland et al., 2003; Cavinato, 2004; Sheffi & Rice, 2005); or (c) severity 
(Hallikas et al., 2004; Brindley, 2004) or consider all three (Chopri & Sodha, 2004; Hendricks 
& Singhal, 2003, 2005; Wagner & Bode, 2006). Based on categorizations of risk, the 
probability-based research produced a considerable body of risk management frameworks 
(for example, Christopher & Lee, 2004; Blackhurst et al., 2005). A common characteristic of 
such frameworks is the development of a (linear) risk management process, including risk 
identification, analysis, control and evaluation (Kahn & Burnes, 2007; Knemeyer et al., 2009). 
While conceptualising risk in probabilistic terms remains useful for statistical modelling, this 
approach shows limitations when applied in the context of how companies deal with risk: 
First, even if it is technically possible to identify probabilities of ‘all’ potential risks, ultimately, 
companies may not have the capacity to process this data. As Mousavi and Gigerenzer note, 
“the knowledge of how people should make decisions cannot be studied without considering 
how people are able to make decisions” (2014, p.1627, emphasis added). Behavioural research 
has repeatedly demonstrated the influence of bias in distorting mathematically-derived 
probabilities. Beck (1986, p.30) supports this observation in maintaining that “what becomes 
clear in risk discussions are the fissures and gaps between scientific and social rationality in 
dealing with the hazardous potential”. A similar observation underlies Watkins’ and 
Bazerman’s work on ‘predictable surprises’, which happen “despite prior awareness of all of 
the information necessary to anticipate events and their consequences” (2004, p.1). 
Second, risk in strategic interactions between more than two purposeful actors evades 
accurate probability assessment, because probabilities are ‘snapshot measures’ assigned to 
future events at one point in time. Hence, in a context where risk arises from continuous 
interaction with multiple known and unknown actors, probabilities would need to be 
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continuously adjusted. This is prohibitive in terms of time and cost, and was recognised by 
Knight (1921) almost a century ago. 
Third, assigning probabilities presupposes that risk is a discrete event and overlooks that 
companies often deal with multiple, inter-related risks simultaneously. Instead of occurring 
as discrete events, risk may manifest as a disorganized sequence of contingencies that can 
migrate geographically. The danger of probability-based approaches lies in promoting a 
particularist view that may isolate attention to specific events. 
Fourth, approaching risk as events with knowable probabilities promotes the view of risks as 
‘extant’ threats that companies can anticipate, unilaterally attack and cope with by means of 
implementing sophisticated risk-management systems. However, real-life risks rarely behave 
linearly and few contemporary risks can be mitigated through unilateral action. 
Finally, this approach implies that risk can be objectively defined. However, probability- even 
in its simplest dictionary definition – remains “a measure of the degree of confidence one may 
have in the occurrence of an event” (Collins Concise English Dictionary, emphasis added). 
Confidence varies among actors, suggesting that probabilities may not be ‘objective’ but 
contested measures of risk. Contesting probabilities of events is known as ‘epistemic 
uncertainty’ (Dequech, 2004), which refers to the uncertainty about probabilities. 
Uncertainty-based approaches to risk 
Uncertainty-based approaches have been advanced in institutional and sociological 
treatments of risk (Beck, 1989; Zinn, 2008). ‘Uncertainty’ in management research refers “to 
the unpredictability of environmental or organizational variables…or the inadequacy of 
information about these variables” (Miller, 1992, p.312). Uncertainty arises from the 
“complexity of problems to be solved and the problem-solving software (to use a computer 
analogy) possessed by the individual [actors]” (North, 1990, p.25). Complex, incomplete, or 
ambiguous information regarding actors’ future interactions may confront companies with 
the need to engage with their counterparts (suppliers, customers, or even competitors) under 
conditions of uncertainty (Ford & Mouzas, 2010). In this context, uncertainty refers to the 
limited capacity to reliably predict the courses of future (inter-)actions. In relation to risk, 
uncertainty refers to the very inability to develop, assign and make decisions based on 
probabilities identified for discrete events. Risk therefore arises from the state of uncertainty 
over future events with potentially negative impacts. One of the most influential contributions 
in advancing the uncertainty-based understanding of risk originates from the recent change 
to the ISO Guide 73 on ‘Risk Management’. The recent revision of ISO31000 in 2009 witnessed 
a controversial change in the definition of risk, changing from “chance or probability of loss” 
to “the effect of uncertainty on objectives” (emphasis added).  
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In management research, the uncertainty-based approach has gained sporadic attention 
(McGoun, 1995; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2004; Mousavi & Gigerenzer, 2014) but has generated 
significant controversy over the validity of probability-based approaches in a business 
context. Mouasvi and Gigerenzer (2014, p.1572) capture this debate in ‘Risk, uncertainty and 
heuristics’: 
“Do we live in a world of [probability-based] risk? At the roulette 
table, yes; in the world of business, rarely. Observe, however, that 
most of decision theory is based on a risk characterization of the 
uncertain world. But can [probability] risk-based rules successfully 
apply to a world of uncertainty? It depends. The structural difference 
between risk and uncertainty calls for rules of dealing with 
uncertainty that are not compatible with risk calculations unless 
uncertainty can be reliably reduced to a form of risk. Unique 
situations, uninsurable risk, and lack of properties that satisfy 
mathematics of probabilities are all cases in point” (2014, p.1672, 
emphases added). 
As uncertainty cannot be ‘reliably reduced to risk’, so is replacing the term ‘risk’ with 
‘uncertainty’ not a viable option. Why? Because the concept of risk has important staying 
power: First, it has been repeatedly established that human cognition cannot act upon 
‘fundamental uncertainty’ and that we rely on risk as a “specific form of managing uncertainty” 
(Zinn, 2008, p.172). The concept of ‘risk’ appears as a heuristic for coping in an uncertain 
world. Second, uncertainty per se merely refers to the ‘state of lacking certainty’, which does 
not capture impact - a crucial element of risk.  
Therefore, it is vital to understand that risk and uncertainty are not interchangeable: Reducing 
uncertainty to risk leads to the isolated treatment of selected risks at the peril of overlooking 
other relevant risks. And collapsing risk into uncertainty overlooks a key purpose of dealing 
with risk: the mitigation of impact. As a result, risk in the context of this thesis refers to the 
combination of uncertainty and impact (Miller, 1992; Zsidisin, Melnik & Ragatz, 2005). This 
definition challenges ingrained thinking on risk and uncertainty as two disparate concepts, 
which originates from the perpetuated and uncritical adoption of Knight’s (1921) famous 
distinction between the two concepts without full consideration of his caution expressed 
regarding the limitations of probability-based risk approaches in a business context. 
Conceptualising risk as a combination of uncertainty and impact is particularly relevant in 
understanding how companies deal with risk in business networks: 
First, the uncertainty-based approach to risk captures the observation that companies may 
not anticipate all relevant risks, their location or timing in advance. Uncertainty encapsulates 
that companies face risks that may occur not one at a time and in sequence, but in hardly 
predictable patterns. Additionally, this approach addresses the dynamics of risk that may 
migrate across space and time and, hence, impact companies that appear ‘distant’ from the 
Dealing with Risk in Business Networks 
[26] 
 
original locus of risk. As a result, the uncertainty-based approach recognises that risk in 
modern business evades assumptions of linearity and sequential interaction. 
This is a critical conceptual turn, because it facilitates the practical shift away from the 
“management of dangers to the examination of different forms of uncertainty management” 
(Zinn, 2008, p.209). Hence, adopting the uncertainty-based approach requires the 
consideration of means for dealing with risk in business networks that are fit for addressing 
uncertainty, not discrete events with ex-ante known and stable probabilities. Since dealing 
with uncertainty in complex interactions with complex tools reflects ‘fighting fire with fire’ 
(Haldane, 2012), it is worth considering recent research directing our attention to “simple 
rules, which may outperform complex algorithms in real world situations” (Mousavi & 
Gigerenzer, 2014, p.1671). 
Second, the uncertainty-based approach to risk recognizes interactivity: Risk in business 
networks often originates from actors’ uncertainty over the strategic future actions of their 
counterparts, or their counterpart’s counterparts, and the respective impact these actions may 
have on the actors’ resources. This interactive nature of risk evades probability thinking, 
especially when more than two actors are involved and game theoretical approaches become 
prohibitively complex and impractical. Accounting for interactivity in dealing with risk 
requires corresponding choices in the unit of analysis: Instead of focusing on a single company, 
different levels of network interaction must be considered.  
Third, uncertainty-based approaches to risk reflect more accurately the dynamics observed in 
complex systems such as business networks. Complex, self-organising systems approximate 
the characteristics of chaotic rather than mechanistic systems: Complex systems display 
orderly disordered self-organizing “patterns of behaviour unfold[ing] in irregular but similar 
forms” (Burnes, 2004, p.314). In contrast, probability-based approaches built on “prescription 
and prediction imply perfect knowledge of the interrelationships between variables and their 
dynamics over time that we do not have” (Thietart & Forgues, 1995, p.28). 
The above discussion has explained why the uncertainty-based approach is more feasible in 
informing our understanding of how companies deal with risk in business networks: 
Companies operating in business networks of embedded direct and indirect relationships face 
nearly infinite combinations of strategic interactions that cannot always be reliably predicted 
in probabilistic terms. Actions may change in light of others’ anticipated actions, which 
constantly influences future courses of inter-action. Probabilities assigned at one point in time 
may lose validity after a certain set of interactions take place. Probabilities are ‘static’ but 
interaction is dynamic. Yet, simply collapsing risk into uncertainty would gloss over the crucial 
difference between risk and uncertainty: Risk is inextricably linked with impact, whereas 
uncertainty describes a state of ambiguity and limited knowledge of future events without 
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concern for impact. Hence, collapsing risk into uncertainty would lead us to ignore the key 
purpose of why companies are invested in dealing with risk: to mitigate risk impact. 
2.3 Current approaches to dealing with risk 
Building on the above conceptualisation of risk, this section systematically reviews existent 
economic, behavioural and operations research concerned with the question “How do 
companies deal with risk?” This classification is based on the distinctive means for dealing 
with risk identified within each approach, and not merely differences in conceptualising risk. 
While certain risk conceptualisations predominate within one particular approach, there is 
limited consistency in the application of a single conceptualisation, even within one field. 
Considering the limited research on dealing with risk in the business marketing context, the 
objective of this section is to assess the potential of each approach in enhancing our 
understanding of how companies deal with risk in webs of inter-organizational relationships. 
2.3.1 The economic approach 
Modern understanding of the economic approach to risk appears synonymous with statistical 
manipulation of probabilistic risk measures. However, this view conceals one of the most 
remarkable shifts in economic thinking about risk that culminated in vigorous debates over 
the validity of probability-based approaches to risk in the first half of the 20th century 
(Bernstein, 1998; McGoun, 1995; Boy, 2015). While one group of economists, including 
Keynes, Knight, Hardy and Fisher - trained in the school of American institutionalism - 
advocated uncertainty-based approaches to risk, a growing number of economists trained in 
statistics cemented the path for probability-based approaches to risk. While the implications 
of this debate are rarely revisited, they often significantly frame today’s understanding of risk 
and risk management tools in several fields of research. 
The shift from uncertainty to probability-based approaches to risk is often attributed to von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), which offered 
the first formal incorporation of risk as a measurable probability into a “predictive theory of 
choice under uncertainty” (Boy, 2015, p. 5). ‘Game theory’ marked the establishment of 
statistical approaches to modelling risk over advocacy for a more sociological approach to risk 
in business contexts. 
For the first time, game theory transformed the understanding of uncertainty as not merely 
limited to ‘external events’ but as attributed to the “true source of uncertainty to the intentions 
of others” (Bernstein, 1998, p.232), arguing that such uncertainty can equally be calculated 
and forecasted as a series of events with known probabilities. Despite the success of game 
theory research, Morgenstern himself notes the limitations of this breakthrough in the 
application of predicting business interactions in multi-actor settings: “Consumers, business 
managers, and policy-makers, [Morgenstern] argued, all take such predictions into 
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consideration and alter their decisions and actions accordingly. …. Hence, statistical methods 
in economics are useless except for descriptive purposes” (Bernstein, 1998, p.236). 
Moreover, Morgenstern insisted that no one “can know what everybody else is going to do at 
any given moment: ‘Unlimited foresight and economic equilibrium are thus irreconcilable with 
each other’”(Bernstein, 1998, p.236). Morgenstern’s stance generated approval from Frank 
Knight, who was one of the strongest proponents of the uncertainty-based approach in the 
business context. Knight shared this view with other economists, including Keynes (1921), 
Hardy (1923) and Fisher (1930). Closer reading of these economists reveals an unambiguous 
rejection of probabilistic risk measurement; they saw it as having “insurmountable problems 
[…] that would have to be ignored in making such a foolish simplification” (McGoun, 1995, 
p.513-520). While a critique of the statistical assumptions limiting the application of 
probabilistic risk measures is spared at this stage (see, for example, Bernstein, 1998), it is 
worthwhile revisiting why a probabilistic measurement was opposed in application to 
business contexts. Knight (1921, p.231) argues that: 
“[b]usiness decisions, for example, deal with situations which are far 
too unique, generally speaking, for any sort of statistical tabulation to 
have any value for guidance. The conception of an objectively 
measurable probability or chance is simply inapplicable.” 
Knight’s call for economic treatment of risk to bear “fidelity to the actual psychology […] the 
situation requires” (1921, p.227) is echoed by his contemporaries, suggesting that 
“calculations of mathematical probabilities are seldom of much importance in actual business” 
(Hardy, 1923, p.29). Similarly, Fisher maintains that “[w]hile it is possible to calculate 
mathematically risks of a certain type, like those in games of chance, most economic risks are 
not so readily measured” (1930, p.316). 
From the 1930s, the concern of ‘insurmountable problems’ of probabilistic risk measurement 
was silenced, as critics labelled such concerns ‘uneconomic’, suggesting that “economic theory 
of profit should be based on economics and not on metaphysics and psychology” (Hicks, 1931, 
p.171). Moreover, this period witnessed an increased replacement of economists trained in 
“non-mathematical American institutionalism” (McGoun, 1995, p.519) with trained 
statisticians who ventured into economics, reigniting the idea of probabilistic risk 
measurement. The long-term implications of the ‘victory’ of probabilistic measurement of risk 
resulted in the marginalization of “the vocabulary of genuine uncertainty, rules and norms that 
were still a common interest of Keynes and Hayek” (Kessler, 2007, p.118, emphases added) 
and the uncritical adoption of probability-based risk approaches across several disciplines.  
Justifying the use of probabilistic risk measures often implicitly reflects Domar and Musgrave’s 
(1944, p.393-394) view, who admit to using it: 
“[…] in absence of a better approach… Objections maybe raised to this 
assumption, as in fact, they may be raised against most any feature of 
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the ‘homo economicus’. For purposes of this paper, which does not 
discuss risk theory as such, the probability method is adopted, 
because no satisfactory alternative approach to the subject of risk 
theory has been developed.” 
Two Nobel-prize winning studies, modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) and capital 
asset pricing (Sharpe, 1964), advanced “the institutionalization of the probabilistic 
measurement of risk in finance and accounting” (McGoun, 1995, p.514), and simultaneously 
marked the genesis of modern finance theory. It is revealing that Bernstein (1998) leaves the 
discipline of economics in the 1950s and moves to finance when charting the history of risk in 
his book Against the Gods. For a similar reason, this section reviews the economic and financial 
approaches to risk together. As modern finance took the lead in becoming “the science of the 
quantification of uncertainty” (Boy, 2015a, p.6, emphasis in original), the probabilistic 
measurement of risk permeated research in other business fields, including operations and 
supply chain research. 
How has the probabilistic approach to risk in economics and finance research shaped the 
understanding of how companies deal with risk? At the heart of economic and financial tools 
for dealing with risk lies the principle of value maximization: Value is measured as profit and 
quantified as ‘utility’. To maximize value, actors rely on risk hedging techniques such as 
portfolio diversification, capital asset pricing, or scenario planning. Markowitz’s seminal study 
on ‘Portfolio Selection’ (1952) systematizes investments by distinguishing between risk 
values of individual stock and entire portfolios. The objective is to diversify assets and 
associated risks by balancing the covariance of assets. Despite its significance, ‘portfolio 
selection’ is often critiqued on the grounds of its assumptions1, which include: (a) actors’ 
rationality; (b) volatility as risk proxy; (c) reliance on past data; (d) negligence of self-
referencing behaviour.  
Human rationality has been widely critiqued as a distortive assumption underpinning risk 
research in economics and finance, and research of systematic deviations from rational 
behaviour in decision-making under uncertainty became a discipline of its own, called 
‘behavioural economics’.  
Volatility, as a proxy for risk, replaces in finance and economics research the notion of impact. 
However, the ‘volatility’ concept overlooks that risk becomes important to business actors 
only in conjunction with impact. Risk impact is inextricably linked to actors’ possession of 
resources, whereas “volatility per se, be it related to weather, portfolio returns, or the timing 
of one’s morning newspaper delivery, is simply a benign statistical probability factor that tells 
                                                                
1 The above critique leaves out complicated statistical assumptions and associated technical 
problems resulting from the need to generate accurate estimates of input data, including expected 
return, variance and co-variance. For details of a discussion of probability-theory assumptions in 
relation to risk, please see Bernstein, 1998 (pp. 48-52; 58-67) or Kessler, 2007 (pp. 115-118). 
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us nothing about risk until coupled with a consequence” (Robert Jeffrey, 1995, quoted in 
Bernstein, 1998, p.261, emphasis added).  Such ‘consequence’ is only of interest if it has an 
impact on (the value of) resources that actors possess: as Knight remarked, quoting Clark 
(1921, p. 38): “No man can carry risk who has nothing to lose”. This phrase summarizes the 
inextricable link between risk and resources. In turn, it implies that the ultimate aim of dealing 
with risk is the protection of resources from damages.  
Reliance on past data as proxies for future risks does not account for two caveats: First, actors 
may learn from experience and introduce measures to deal with similar risks in future. Second, 
past data raises the reference-class problem, which has been already critiqued by Haynes 
(1895) and Knight (1921). The reference-class problem describes situations where “there are 
economically important circumstances that are perceived as risky, but that are also perceived 
as being without relevant historical precedent” (McGoun, 1995, p.515). Knight (1921, p.226) 
maintains that: 
“[any] given ‘instance’…is so entirely unique that there are no others 
or not a sufficient number to make it possible to tabulate enough like 
it to form a basis for any inference of value about any real probability 
in the case we are interested in. The same obviously applies to the 
most of conduct and not to business decisions alone”. 
Self-referencing behaviour refers to dynamics where changes in behaviour to hedge against 
identified risk by one actor lead to a change in the behaviour of other actors. The impact of one 
actor’s behaviour on the future course of events evades foresight, based on past data 
probabilistic calculations. This critique echoes Knight’s observation (1921, p.237) that “[a]t 
the bottom of the uncertainty problem in economics is the forward-looking character of the 
economic process itself.” 
To avoid the reference-class problem, ‘scenario planning’ is a tool developed in finance 
research that suggests conquering “the unknown by means of imagination” (Boy, 2015, p. 23). 
Scenario planning does not aim for statistical precision, but focuses on developing plausible 
future narratives depicting responses to potential risks. Questions raised by this approach 
include: How many scenarios are ‘enough’? How are scenarios ‘ranked’ and how can 
companies justify investments in measures to address ‘imagined’ scenarios? Considering the 
complexity of business networks, numbers of actors and diversity of resources, the question 
arises: How many risks can a company realistically anticipate, ex ante? And how useful is it to 
plan for risk responses unilaterally when confronted with an almost unlimited number of 
future scenarios? 
The critical reflection on some of the key approaches to dealing with risk developed in 
economics and finance research highlights the limitations of transferring such tools to try and 
understand how companies deal with risk in business networks. Specifically, economics and 
finance research relies on the assumption that: (a) risk can be precisely pinpointed in advance 
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and addressed through unilateral action; (b) actors can act upon rational probability 
calculations; and (c) it is sufficient to consider individual actors as units of analyses. The 
probabilistic approach to risk has explicitly or implicitly permeated most business and 
management research on risk, which has profound implications for the predominant research 
methods and ‘tools’ suggested for dealing with risk. Similarly, key tools such as portfolio 
selection and scenario planning are translated in operations and marketing research in the 
form of product, market, or supplier diversification. To summarise, McGoun’s observation 
holds true that despite significant critiques of probabilistic approaches, “risk continues to be 
‘measured’ in a ‘common sense’ way it was once known made no sense” (McGoun, 1995, 
p.514).  
2.3.2 The behavioural approach 
The behavioural approach (also referred to as ‘behavioural economics’) to dealing with risk 
builds on the seminal works of Kahneman, Tversky and Thaler, among others, and 
encompasses to date a wide field of research concerned with cognitive psychology’s and 
neuroscience’s implications for understanding human decision-making under conditions of 
uncertainty and risk. While the discussion of economic and finance approaches to risk 
highlights how actors should make decisions under ‘uncertainty-as-risk’, based on 
assumptions of rational behaviour, the behavioural approach investigates individuals as 
subject to systematic biases and heuristics.  
Interest in the influence of cognitive biases on decision-making under risk was sparked in 
1979, when Kahneman and Tversky published Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under 
risk. Prospect theory highlights individuals’ susceptibility to biases such as reference 
dependence, loss aversion, non-linear probability weighting and diminishing sensitivity to 
gains and losses when making decisions under uncertainty. Such biases distort predictions 
made under assumptions of rationality, as individuals may overweight small and underweight 
large probabilities, or expose a remarkable aversion to loss. Asymmetry between individuals’ 
evaluation of potential future losses over future gains is one of the most remarkable findings 
of prospect theory. Tversky suggests that individuals are not so much risk averse as they are 
loss averse, and Bernstein adds that individuals hate not so much uncertainty as they hate 
losing (Bernstein, 1998, p.274). 
Hate for loss or damages to possessions underpins the ‘endowment effect’ (Thaler, 1980; 
Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1990), which refers to actors ascribing more value to resources 
they already own. This finding may explain why individuals and companies actively invest in 
mechanisms to reduce the negative impact of risk in terms of damages to resources, that is: 
loss. This finding also illuminates why it is crucial to consider impact when conceptualising 
risk. Relying on ‘volatility’ or ‘uncertainty’ in place of risk overlooks the driving force behind 
individuals and organizations’ efforts in dealing with risk: the protection of resources from loss.  
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The behavioural approach takes the individual as the main unit-of-analysis and relies 
primarily on experimental research to understand cognitive biases and heuristics that 
systematically affect human decision-making. While biases refer to cognitive distortions in 
perceiving and processing information, which leads to systematic deviations from rational 
decision making, heuristics refer to the (un-) conscious use of various ‘rules of thumb’ in 
decision making under uncertainty. Some of the most well-researched heuristics include the 
tit-for-tat heuristic (Axelrod, 1984), the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), 
the 1/N rule (DeMiguel et al., 2009) or the default heuristic (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). 
Heuristics become powerful tools in decision making, because uncertainty in real-world 
situations is not reducible to calculated risk, and because complex, uncertain situations call 
for simple and robust solutions. Mousavi and Gigerenzer (2014, p.1673) maintain that 
heuristics help solving “complex uncertain situations precisely because of their simplicity, not 
despite it.”  
Although the behavioural approach mostly focuses on individual cognitive processes, and the 
current research requires elevating the study of how companies deal with risk to a higher level 
of aggregation, there are two insights worth reiterating: the importance of considering ‘loss’ 
or ‘impact on resources’ and the direction of looking at simple rules as a means for dealing with 
risk. 
2.3.3 The operational approach 
The operational approach captures research from the fields of supply chain, logistics, 
production, manufacturing and procurement in order to understand the sources and impact 
of risk that companies face and the associated tools that companies (should) use to deal with 
these risks. The operational approach is characterised by mainly adopting a single actor unit-
of-analysis and a probabilistic conceptualisation of risk, which leads to a variety of risk 
categorisation frameworks (Jung, Lim & Oh, 2011). Risk categorisation typically considers: (a) 
risk as events based on different probability-categories depicting severity (i.e., low – medium - 
high) (Hallikas et al., 2004; Brindley, 2004); (b) risk source (Das & Teng, 1999; Svensson, 2002; 
Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Oke & Golapakrishnan, 2009); (c) risk impact (Harland et al., 2003; 
Cavinato, 2004; Sheffi & Rice, 2005) (d) or a combination of the aforementioned (Chopri & 
Sodha, 2004; Hendricks & Singhal, 2005; Wagner & Bode, 2006). 
While ‘risk management’ is a key term summarising operational approaches to dealing with 
risk, its assumptions and implications are rarely questioned. Yet, ‘risk management’ implies 
the possibility of control over the environment as well as independence and power over 
specific events being managed. Moreover, the term implies that risk is managed by an active 
actor, who can assume unilateral action and impose risk management strategies upon a 
faceless, or rather, hostile environment in order to reduce impact. Finally, ‘risk management’ 
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strategies often resemble linear, almost generic step-by-step management models, such as 
those proposed by Narasimhan and Talluri (2009, p.116, emphases added), who outline: 
“[…] four critical steps…: identification of key supply chain locations 
and threats, estimation of probabilities and loss for each location, 
evaluation of alternative countermeasures for each location, and 
selection of countermeasures…”. 
Similar risk management models maintain strong interest among academics (see, for example, 
Oke & Gopalakrishnan, 2009; Knemeyer et al., 2009; Jung, Lim & Oh, 2011) and consultants 
(see, for example, McKinsey Working Papers on Risk, 2007-2013). However, the finance-
inspired conceptualisation of risk as ‘discrete events’ attracted criticism in suggesting that 
such a view may encourage the mismanaging of risk. Stulz argues in his paper, Six ways to 
mismanage risk (2009), that reliance on historical data, focus on measures addressing one risk, 
and failure to manage risk dynamics are primary causes for mismanagement. Failure to 
account for risk dynamics appears as a direct consequence of conceptualising risk as discrete 
events and illustrates a case where academics and practitioners alike may “force the methods 
[or theoretical assumptions] to shape the subject matter rather than the subject matter to 
determine, or to least to suggest, the methods” (McGoun, 1995, p.520). 
To conclude the review of existing approaches to ‘dealing with risk’, the following section 
summarizes the limitations of these approaches and derives implications for the thesis’ 
research questions. The chapter proceeds with discussing the need for a new perspective that 
draws on the synthesis of the business network and institution-based approaches to risk. 
2.4 Limitations of current approaches to dealing with risk 
The review of economic, behavioural and operational approaches reveals two limitations, 
which influence our understanding of how companies deal with risk: First, risk is 
predominantly treated as an expected, single and isolated event with knowable probabilities. 
Second, the predominant unit-of-analysis is the single actor and its respective ‘actions’. 
Favouring this unit-of-analysis originates from the (implicit) assumption of ‘methodological 
individualism’ (Hodgson, 1993, p.54) that demonstrates “remarkable optimism about the 
possibility of the explanation of social phenomena in terms of individual [actors and actions] 
… The individual is taken as given, facing the world outside and reacting to it” (ibid.).  
Methodological individualism is not only a methodological, but also an ontological assumption 
that may significantly limit the research outcomes’ relevance and implications. Empirical 
observations of real-life events such as the horsemeat incident (2013) or General Motors’ car 
recall (2014) expose levels of complexity that question the validity of probability-based 
conceptualisations of risk and the capacity of single actors in addressing risk. Considering 
instead that risk emanates from the embeddedness of companies in complex webs of 
interactions implies the need to look beyond single actors and to consider actors’ interactions.  
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In response to these two limitations, this research takes the following steps: First, 
acknowledging the critique of probability-based approaches to risk, this research adopts a 
conceptualisation of risk that considers the interrelation of uncertainty and impact (Zsidisin, 
Melnyk & Ragatz, 2005). Second, this research adopts a multi-level unit-of-analysis that 
enhances our understanding of how companies deal with risk at the network, focal and dyadic 
levels of interaction. 
2.5 The need for a new perspective 
Addressing the limitations identified in existent research on risk, this thesis argues for the 
need to consider a new perspective that draws on the synthesis of the network and institution-
based approaches to dealing with risk in business marketing. The network approach functions 
as an analytical lens that captures the connectivity between actors and the environment and 
highlights the actors’ interdependency and embeddedness in direct and indirect relationships. 
This perspective acknowledges that risk in business networks is inextricably linked with the 
embeddedness of companies, activities and resources, which precludes any one company from 
effectively dealing with risk unilaterally.  
This perspective provides the groundwork for a more accurate understanding of companies’ 
efforts in dealing with risk, because it: (a) facilitates the identification of risks beyond a 
company’s immediate horizon; (b) captures how risk migrates across a business network; and 
(c) illuminates how companies interact with multiple direct and indirect actors in dealing with 
risk. Interaction through direct and indirect relationships forms the building blocks of 
networks, which is reflected in the interdependent units-of-analyses in network research: 
dyadic, focal and network units. 
However, while the network approach offers an invaluable alternative perspective on the 
ontology of business markets and helps in capturing more accurately the dynamics of risk, it 
does not explain how companies deal with risk in recurrent interactions. Therefore, this 
research complements the network approach with insights from institutional research. 
Institutional research contributes to explaining how companies deal with risk in direct and 
indirect business interactions by shedding light on the use of institutional devices such as 
standards and contracts.   
It is worth reiterating that the conceptual contributions of the business network approach to 
capturing the connectivity and dynamics of risk in business interactions, and the contribution 
of the institution-based approach towards explaining the use of institutional devices in dealing 
with risk, are most promising in their combination, rather than isolation, from each other. 
Since previous network and institutional research appears to have proceeded on parallel 
trajectories with few deliberate intersections, and even fewer attempts focusing on risk, the 
following sections argue for a synthesis of network and institutional research to enhance our 
theoretical and empirical understanding of how companies deal with risk. To achieve this, the 
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following sections start by introducing key concepts from network and institutional research. 
Following this, the chapter presents a synthesis mapping our current understanding of how 
companies use institutional devices for dealing with risk in dyadic, focal, and network 
interactions.  
2.5.1 The network approach to risk  
The business network approach advanced by the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group 
(IMP) since the 1970s provides an alternative view of markets that departs from traditional 
assumptions of completeness, independency, action and equilibrium, which underpin existent 
research on risk in business studies. Instead, this approach offers conceptual tools for 
capturing the complexity, interdependency and dynamics of direct and indirect business 
interactions in international markets (Paliwoda, 2011). Adopting the network approach to 
investigate how companies deal with risk allows this research to move beyond the single 
company or direct relationship as the exclusive units-of-analysis that characterise existent 
research in this field. 
The term ‘business network’ is a metaphor to describe markets as complex webs of 
interdependent direct and indirect relationships between actors. Relationships are the 
building blocks of networks that connect actors, resources and activities (Holmlund & 
Törnroos, 1997). Business networks are not lifeless, static structures or a mere ‘context’ for 
business interactions, but complex systems that refute “many of the core concepts of the 
rational planning approach simply by emphasizing that a firm cannot act on its own since its 
actions are necessarily influenced by the actions of others in the network” (Baraldi et al., 2007, 
p.883). Regarding risk, the network approach suggests that companies are unlikely to engage 
in unilateral processes of “environmental analysis and strategy development followed by 
strategy implementation by one company in isolation from the firms around it” (ibid.), because 
networks are characterised by interdependency and interaction.   
The network approach draws its conceptual power from articulating a view of markets that 
refutes three dominant myths: the myth of independence, the myth of action and the myth of 
completeness (Ford, Gadde, Håkansson & Snehota, 2002).  
The myth of independence questions the assumption that a  
“company is able to act independently. It can carry out its own analysis of the 
environment in which it operates, develop and implement its own strategy 
based on its own resources, taking into account its own competences and 
shortcomings” (Ford et al., 2002, p.5, emphasis in original).  
Instead, the network approach suggests that companies are irredeemably intertwined with 
the performance of other, directly and indirectly connected network actors. Companies may 
possess a restricted understanding of their surrounding network and have “limited freedom 
to act independently, and the outcomes of their actions will be dependent upon the actions of 
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other firms within that network” (Baraldi et al., 2007, p.885).  While business relationships 
form the basis of a company’s operations, these relationships may be simultaneously enabling 
and restricting. While a company may choose and define its relationships, it is also defined by 
those relationships (Ford et al., 2002). Interactions and interdependency with other actors are 
indispensable to access and exchange resources, because ‘no business is an island’ (Håkansson 
& Snehota, 2006). This inherent need for interaction builds on the Hayekian problem of 
resource dispersion (1945, p. 519): the problem “that knowledge of circumstances of which 
we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as dispersed bits 
of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge, which all separate [actors] possess.” 
While the second myth of action “sees business as a process of action by one company in 
relation to another” (Ford et al., 2002, p.1), the network approach emphasizes a company’s 
embeddedness in direct and indirect relationships that enable and constrain its activities. 
Håkansson and Snehota developed this argument in No business is an island (1989), stating 
that a company’s performance: 
“by whatever criteria [it is] assessed, become[s] dependent not only on how 
well the organization itself performs in interaction with its direct 
counterparts, but also on how these counterparts in turn manage their 
relationships with third parties. An organization’s performance is therefore 
largely dependent on whom it interacts with” (Håkansson & Snehota, 1989, 
p.190, emphasis added).  
Moreover, every company faces restricted freedom to ‘act’ because networking involves 
anticipation, action and reaction to others’ actions, who in turn react to other actors’ 
(anticipated or realized) actions. This, however, does not disregard the fact that power 
(asymmetry) and striving for control in business interactions matters.  
The third myth of completeness questions the assumption that each “company is self-sufficient 
and is able to develop a strategy that marshals its own resources into a unique approach based 
on its own internal competencies and shortcomings” (Ford et al., 2002, p.2). In contrast to key 
assumptions advanced in research, assuming the resource-based-view (RBV, see Barney, 
1991, 2001), the network approach argues that no single company possesses all relevant 
resources to be able “to satisfy requirements or solve the problems of any other and so is 
dependent on the skills, resources and actions and intentions of suppliers, distributors, 
customers, or even competitors to satisfy those requirements.” (Ford et al., 2002, p.2).  
Acknowledging the myths of independence, action, and completeness demonstrates that 
business networks are not static, but complex systems of dynamic interactions (Gadde & 
Håkansson, 1992). Complex systems refer to: 
“any system that has within itself the capacity to respond to its environment 
in more than one way. This essentially means that it is not a mechanical system 
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with a single trajectory, but has some internal possibilities of choice or 
response that it can bring to play” (Allen, 2001, p.150, emphasis added).  
As complex systems, business networks expose five features (cf. McMillan, 2004, p.31), 
including:  
(a)   Dispersed control throughout the network with no central controlling actor; 
(b)   Co-occurring competition and co-operation;  
(c)   Multiple, reciprocally interdependent levels of interaction; 
(d)  Experience-based re-organization and change in actors’ interactions; 
(e)  Continuous interaction in anticipation of the (partly unknown) future. 
As business networks do not follow a “linear reality” (Abbott, 2001), they resemble: 
“…complex systems [consisting of] large numbers of independent yet 
interacting actors. Rather than ever reaching a stable equilibrium, the most 
adaptive of these systems…keep changing continuously by remaining at the 
poetically termed ‘edge of chaos’ that exists between order and disorder” 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997, p.29). 
To cope with the complexity of networking, companies actively engage in creating “an 
acceptable level of order and certainty” (Thietart & Forgues, 1995, p.24). Devising simple, 
order-generating rules, business networks “permit limited chaos whilst providing relative 
order” (Burnes, 2004, p.315). Under certain conditions, such order-generating rules can be 
subject to change, as actors decide to generate new, more effective “order-generating rules, 
when the old ones can no longer cope with the changes in the system’s environment” (ibid.). 
While order-generating rules may operate at the network level, such rules may equally emerge 
in dyads: for instance, in the form of shared artefacts that “can serve the purpose of creating 
islands of …certainty and, as a consequence, a form of stability” (Thietart & Forgues, 1995, p.19, 
emphasis added). Such stability, however, does not imply a fixed-point equilibrium (Meyer, 
Gaba & Colwell, 2005).2 
Recognising networks as complex systems of interdependent interactions illuminates why 
probability-based conceptualisations of risk in this context are futile. In networks, or as Hock 
(1999) suggests, ‘chaordic’ systems3, small variations in one interaction may result in 
                                                                
2 Similarly to the assumption of rational actors, the equilibrium assumption originating from 
research in economics appears to more implicitly permeate research in business and management 
studies, particularly underpinning research on strategy and change. Meyer, Gaba & Colewell (2005, 
p.459) observe:  
“…unlike economists, who articulate their equilibrium assumptions explicitly, many social 
scientists fail to recognize the concept’s pervasive influences on their own theories and 
methods. While social scientists routinely disavow the economists’ fiction of human beings 
as rational maximizers, they rarely challenge the equilibrium assumption. All too often, we 
forget that equilibrium is also a convenient fiction, and treat it instead as literal truth.” 
Equilibrium, as a desirable state of stability, is often portrayed as “the holy grail of managers, for 
stability mean[s] order and certainty in long-term planning success” (McMillan, 2004, p.86). 
3Thietart and Forgues (1995, pp. 25-26), among others, suggest that non-linear dynamics and 
chaotic systems emerge when the number of system variables (i.e., actors) is equal to or greater 
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“monumental consequences…which could not have been predicted beforehand” (Thietart & 
Forgues, 1995, p.21). The table contrasts characteristics of risk as understood in network and 
operational (mostly probability-based) research: 
Table 2.1. Network approach to risk. Developed from McMillan, 2004, pp.67, 72, 169 
Network approach to risk Operational approach to risk 
Risk is… 
[Partly] unpredictable Predictable  
[Partly] uncontrollable Controllable 
Non-linear Linear 
Networked/distributed Centralised 
Multiple (potentially inapprehensible) causes 
and impacts 
(Known or knowable) cause and effect 
relation 
Highly connected Limited connectivity 
Holistic Reductionist 
 
Conceptually acknowledging the characteristics of risk in business networks raises important 
implications for this research: First, there is limited value in researching individual companies’ 
response to risk. Instead, it is essential to reconsider the unit-of-analysis in order to 
investigate how companies deal with risk in interaction with other actors. Second, bearing in 
mind the change in the unit-of-analysis, it is less relevant to examine the application of 
unilateral risk-management tools. Instead, it is more promising to explore how companies deal 
with risk through devising order-generating rules that co-ordinate interactions in the face of 
risk. Third, to implement the aforementioned implications, conceptual tools are needed to 
capture the complexity of network interactions. 
To capture network phenomena theoretically and empirically, this research adopts two of the 
conceptual tools developed by the IMP Group: The first conceptual tool presented below is the 
Actor-Resources-Activities (ARA) model (Håkansson & Johanson, 1992; Ford et al., 2003), which 
captures the interdependency and connectivity of network interactions. The second 
conceptual tool distinguishes between three interdependent levels of network analysis 
(Halinen & Törnroos, 1998), and in this way, allows moving beyond the single company unit-
of-analysis.  
It is worth reiterating at this stage that the network approach is understood as an alternative, 
ontological view of business markets and not as a way for dealing with risk. This research does 
not advocate the idea that “inter-organizational networks offer a flexible and rapid way to 
                                                                
than three. Chaos is likely to emerge when these actors are ‘highly coupled’ (i.e., closely 
interdependent) with each other.  
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cope with uncertainty” (Tikkanen & Halinen, 2003, p.2; Beckman, Haunschild & Philips, 2004), 
because a ‘network’ per se is not a mechanism for dealing with uncertainty. Rather, networks 
are a metaphor for a complex, social reality within which companies must interact and develop 
means for dealing with risk and uncertainty.  
2.5.6.1 Network Actors, Resources and Activities  
The business network conceptualisation developed by the IMP researchers Håkansson and 
Johanson (1992) captures network relationships as interwoven entities of actor bonds, 
resources ties and activity links (ARA):  
 
Figure 2.1. The Actor-Resources-Activities (ARA) model. Håkansson & Johanson, 1992, 
p.29. 
Most alternative network models offer a one-dimensional view of network relationships by 
drawing on social network theory (Granovetter, 1985) - which primarily focuses on actor 
network nodes, with each node representing typically individual actors4 - and neglecting the 
interdependency with resources and activities. 
The terminology of actor bonds, resource ties and activity links is important, because it refers 
to the substance of relationships not as isolated, but as interactive entities. Consequently, the 
concept highlights the intertwined nature of economic and social dimensions of business 
relationships and demands the consideration of actors, resources and activities in combination 
with each other (Finch, Wagner & Hynes, 2012). Furthermore, the ARA-model highlights that 
“many of the activities and resources on which the companies in a relationship depend are 
under the control or ownership of counterparts” (Ford & Mouzas, 2013, p.436). The 
interdependency of actors, resources and activities in business relationships should not 
dismiss the reality of business relationships rarely being symmetrical. Rather, “interaction is 
a self-serving process in which each actor seeks to address its own short- and long-term 
benefits” (Ford & Mouzas, 2013, p. 435). In fact, Hingley (2005, p.856) argues, with reference 
                                                                
4 This observation shall not diminish the immense contribution of Mark Granovetter’s work on 
embeddeness and social network theories, as his research moved the discussion away from a 
neoclassical idea of markets, where actors were primarily seen as homogenous sums of buyers and 
sellers engaging in arm’s length transactions (Biggart & Delbridge, 2004). Granovetter’s social 
perspective of the market suggested instead that the substance of markets is heterogeneous social 
relations. Later work by White (1981), Burt (1982), and Baker (1984) established a structural 
stream of research demonstrating the significance of actor connections for understanding market 
phenomena. 
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to the European food retail industry, that asymmetry in business relationships, “is a more 
typical state than the existence of perpetual co-operation and power symmetry … It is a natural 
desire for all organizations to gain advantage and to disrupt symmetry.” 
The following sections examine the conceptualisation of actors, resources and activities: 
Actor bonds: Actors can refer to companies, non-business organizations or individuals. Actors 
are understood as boundedly rational, self-interested and goal-oriented, continuously aiming 
to increase their control over the network (Håkansson & Johanson, 1992; Ford & Mouzas, 
2013). Acknowledging actors’ purposeful behaviour illuminates that business networks are 
not governed by an ‘invisible hand’. Instead, there are multiple ‘visible hands’ that aim at 
implementing self-interested strategies and that develop relationships through repeated 
exchange practices (Ritter, 2000).  
The notion of actor bonds implies that actors are “bonded together and are not usually entirely 
free to dissolve those bonds at will” (Easton, 1992, p.10). As bonds imply a measure of (inter-
) dependence, actors are continuously confronted with issues of power and control over other 
actors, activities and resources. Direct control refers to ownership of resources, whereas 
indirect control refers to relationships with other actors, which may facilitate access to 
resources yet also generate dependence. The efforts of one actor to increase control over other 
actors is always accomplished at the expense of another actor’s control (Håkansson & 
Johanson, 1992). Actors tend to hold greater control of other actors who may operate in: (a) 
closer proximity; (b) more regular exchanges; and (c) over longer periods of time. Conversely, 
actors operating in distant parts of a network may not be even known to other actors who, 
nevertheless, indirectly depend on the use of their resources and/or activities. In this 
situation, actors may mobilize their power to use direct relationships to acquire greater control 
over indirect relationships. 
In relation to risk in business networks, this conceptualisation of actors yields two important 
insights: First, a company’s necessarily limited knowledge of all potentially relevant network 
actors contributes to the inherent risk involved in business interactions. Hence, it becomes 
important to investigate how companies deal with risk through direct and indirect 
relationships. Second, actor bonds illuminate the need to consider means for dealing with risk 
in interaction with direct and indirect actors.  
Resource ties: A widely adopted approach to conceptualising resources presents the 
resource-based-view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 2001), which assumes that companies are 
endowed with resources. However, such an approach de-emphasizes the interaction involved 
in resource access, development and protection.5 Most companies experience limitations 
                                                                
5  A more elaborate comparison of the lines of convergence and difference between the resource-
based- View (RBV) and the IMP conceptualization of resources is beyond the scope of this section. 
However, please refer to the paper by Baraldi, Gressetvold and Harrison (2012) entitled “Resource 
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regarding resources they can claim direct ownership of, and therefore must mobilize a range 
of direct and indirect relationships with other actors to gain access to further resources. 
Business relationships are therefore a key resource in themselves, because they can be 
leveraged to gain access and facilitate resource (re-) combination (Baraldi, Gressetvold & 
Harrison, 2012b). Resource ‘access’, ‘adaptation’ and ‘recombination’ are rarely conflict-free, 
as the very possession, access and degrees of resource adaptation are contested and 
inextricably linked to power: “Organizations controlling more highly demanded resources, or 
that can reduce the most uncertainty about resource flows, typically enjoy greater power in 
any inter-organizational relationship” (Knoke & Chen, 2008, p.446). Conversely, the scarcer 
the resource, the more important becomes the control over it and “the more efforts will be 
spent on getting control over it” (Håkansson & Johanson, 1992, p.33). This may result in 
asymmetric dependency and expose the liability of embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997). While existent 
network research on resources appears to predominantly examine resources access and re-
combination (Finch, Wagner& Hynes, 2012), in the context of dealing with risk, examining how 
actors protect resources from risk becomes vital. 
Activity links: Activity links form wider activity networks where “activities performed by one 
company build on activities performed by others and enter in those of some other actors” 
(Tikkanen, 1998, p.113). Activity links emerge from repeated transactions in which actors 
develop “routines and … rules which give the activities a certain institutionalised form” 
(Håkansson & Johanson, 1992, p.31). As activity links manifest when “one or several actors 
combine, develop, exchange or create resources by utilizing other resources” (Håkansson & 
Johanson, 1992, p.30), activity links form prime conduits for risk migration: Disruptions in one 
activity link may trigger a domino-like effect influencing other, inter-dependent activities 




Table 2.2 summarizes the implications from the above review of the ARA-model for examining 
how companies deal with risk in business networks: 
Table 2.2. ARA-model implications for dealing with risk in business networks.  
 Risk implications Dealing with risk 
Actors Risk may originate from (inter-) 
actions of directly and indirectly 
connected, possibly distant and 
unknown actors 
Dealing with risk involves interacting 
with direct and indirect actors across 
space and over time 
                                                                
interaction in inter-organizational networks: Foundations, comparison, and a research agenda”, 
which provides an excellent comparative treatment of these two approaches.  
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Resources Risk may have a negative impact 
on resources 
Dealing with risk involves mitigating 
impact on resources 
Activities Interdependency and connectivity 
of activities facilitate risk 
migration 
Risk may emerge beyond the horizon of 
direct activity links. Dealing with risk 
involves interaction reaching beyond 
direct activity links. 
 
While the ARA-model presents a vital contribution to capturing the interconnectivity of actor 
bonds, resource ties and activity links, it is limited in capturing the embeddedness of direct 
and indirect network interactions. In this regard, the ARA-model is one-dimensional, because 
it does not conceptually differentiate between different levels of aggregation in network 
analysis. To address this limitation, the following section examines Halinen and Törnroos’ 
conceptualisation (1998) of a company’s embeddedness at three levels of network analysis: 
the dyadic, focal and network levels. This conceptualisation is revisited in more recent 
research (Halinen et al., 1999; Fletcher & Barrett, 2011; Öberg, Henneberg & Mouzas, 2012) 
and offers a valuable conceptual tool to inform our understanding of how companies deal with 
risk at three interdependent levels of analysis.  
2.5.6.2 Network, focal and dyadic interactions 
Understanding different levels of network analysis addresses the common failure in 
marketing research to “take a broad view of the network [that] make[s] the company 
vulnerable to dynamics that have their origin ‘over-the-horizon’ from its normal operations” 
(Ford et al., 2002, p.20). Considering three levels of network interactions acknowledges that 
“what happens at one level is difficult to understand without reference to what is happening 
simultaneously at lower and higher levels of aggregation” (Lomi, Negor & Fonti, 2008, p.328). 
In other words, 
“industries cannot be adequately characterized by aggregating attributes of 
individual firms, and that firms’ actions cannot be inferred or understood 
solely through analyses of industry-level data…Although the firm, network 
and industry [are] distinct units of analysis, …changes occurring at different 
levels can be highly interrelated” (Meyer, Brooks & Goes, 1990, p.107). 
Existing research acknowledges how processes at one level of analysis – for instance, in dyads 
-influence focal or network interactions and vice versa (see, for example, Hertz, 1998; Halinen, 
Salmi & Havila, 1999; Harrison & Easton, 2002; Johnston, Peters & Gassenheimer, 2006; Veal 
& Mouzas, 2011). As the different levels of network interaction appear co-constitutive of each 
other (Easton, Lenney & Gilchrist, 2012), it is not sufficient to focus on one level of analysis 
when investigating how companies deal with risk in business networks. Since the “whole is 
implicated in the parts [i.e., dyads] in two senses – it emerges from them and it acts back upon 
them – though the full implicative force can only be grasped over time” (Archer, 2010a, p.246, 
emphasis original), it is essential to understand how companies deal with risk in dyadic, focal 
and network interactions. 
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Dyadic interaction: Dyadic interactions denote direct relationships between two actors, as 
conceptually illustrated below: 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Dyadic interaction.  Adapted from Halinen & Törnroos, 1998, p.192. 
Understanding dyadic interactions “forms the prerequisite of the management of all the other 
…layers” (Möller & Halinen, 1999, p.417). To date, dyads form the preferred unit-of-analysis 
in business network research, due to its nuclear importance and relative ease of delimitation 
(Holmlund, 2004). The nodes surrounding the key actors in Figure 2.2 highlight that the dyadic 
relationship “cannot be managed in isolation from the other relationships a firm has, and 
represents a conduit to other relationships through which resources may be accessed” 
(Easton, 1992, pp.25-26). 
Focal interaction: Focal interaction considers several actors who share a direct connection to 
a focal actor. The focal level is useful in bridging the extremes of dyadic and network 
interactions by capturing all direct and indirect relationships that “the focal firm is able to 
identify in a broader network of actors and relationships between them” (Tikkanen, 1998, 
p.114). Focal nets can be simple or very complex, and display different levels of power 
asymmetry between actors. 
 
Figure 2.3. Focal interaction. Adapted from Halinen & Törnroos, 1998, p.192. 
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To illustrate, consider the case of Wal-Mart: With over 100 000 suppliers, Wal-Mart purchases 
over 80 per cent of its stock in China and serves 245 million customers per week in 27 
countries (Wal-Mart Annual Report, 2013). With investment in a complex governance system, 
Wal-Mart functions as a ‘focal actor’ who orchestrates a globally distributed and highly 
embedded network of actors that behaves “almost like a single firm” (Arkansas Business, 
2012). In cases with a clearly identifiable dominant actor, mapping focal interactions is useful 
to bridge the dyadic and network perspectives. 
Network interactions: Network interaction captures the interdependency between a number 
of focal interactions that may be directly or indirectly connected with each other. 
 
Figure 2.4. Network interaction. Adapted from Halinen & Törnroos, 1998, p.192. 
Analysing network interaction highlights that actors’ activities may be “affected not only by 
the actor’s isolated relations with other individual actors (e.g., a series of buyer-seller 
relations) but also by the structure of the overall network of relations within which each actor 
resides” (Choi & Kim, 2008, p.8). Empirical research at this level of network analysis remains 
limited, possibly due to the methodological complexity involved in data collection and the 
delimitation of network ‘boundaries’ (Hertz & Mattsson, 2004).  
The discussion of three levels of network interactions provides the conceptual groundwork 
for addressing the empirical challenge that in networks, risks “are linked to each other in 
complex patterns with one risk leading to another, of influencing the outcome of other risks” 
(Manuj & Mentzer, 2008, p.198). Capturing the connectivity and embeddedness of actors, 
resources and activities at different levels of interaction is critical to inform research on how 
companies deal with risk. However, while it is recognized in existent network research that: 
“significant events may take place in distant parts of the network, or in ‘another’ network, not 
fully associated with the main or obvious one. [And] also, threats to the future of a business 
often come from unexpected locations” (Ford & Redwood, 2005, p.649), there is limited 
systematic research into how companies deal with risk in business networks. In fact, dealing 
with risk remains a ‘black box’ in reviewed network research.  
Dealing with Risk in Business Networks 
[45] 
 
To address this limitation, this thesis argues for the synthesis of the network and institutional 
approaches: While the network approach offers the conceptual groundwork for capturing the 
complex reality of business interactions in which risk occurs, institutional research adds 
explanatory power by illuminating how companies use institutional devices such as standards 
and contracts for dealing with risk. Therefore, the following section introduces relevant 
concepts from institutional research that inform the development of the subsequent 
theoretical framework discussed in Section 2.6. 
2.5.2 Institution-based approach to risk 
The institution-based approach is an umbrella term, subsuming research that investigates 
how and why companies use institutional devices such as contracts (see, for example, 
Bazerman & Gillespie, 1999; Carson, Madhok & Wu, 2006; Dekker, Sakaguchi & Kawai, 2013), 
standards and certification systems (Gopal & Gao, 2009), insurances (Miller, 1992), routines 
(Becker & Knudsen, 2005), financial reports and supplier audits (Zsidisin, Melnyk & Ragatz, 
2005) and norms or customs (Macaulay, 1963, 1986; Macneil, 1978, 1980). Humans have 
relied on institutions as “organizing principles in a complex reality” (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, 
p.75) since ancient times as a means “to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange” 
(North, 1991, p.97). However, despite this fundamental role of institutions in business 
interactions, a review of business and management research on institutional devices reveals 
that it proceeds predominantly on a separate trajectory from institutional research. This 
section addresses the disparity by offering a systematic review of relevant institutional 
concepts that significantly help in informing our understanding of how companies use 
institutional devices for dealing with risk. 
It is worth clarifying, at this stage, the use of the terms ‘institutional theory’, ‘institutional 
economics’, ‘neo-institutional theory’ and ‘institution-based approach’ to delimit the thesis’ 
theoretical scope, positioning and contribution. ‘Institutional theory’ is not a uniform 
theoretical framework, but an umbrella term subsuming at least two broad schools of thought: 
old and neo-institutionalism (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). ‘Old institutionalism’ predominantly 
rests on ideas from ‘institutional economics’ and ‘neo- institutionalism’ draws on sociology, 
focusing on the symbolic, cultural and interpretative elements of institutions. While a 
distinction between ‘institutional economics’ and ‘neo-institutionalism’ is common, it tends to 
obscure the strong parallels between both streams: for example, a major focus often used to 
demarcate the difference between the two streams of institutional research is the concern 
with efficiency in institutional economics (for example, Williams, 2003) and concern with 
legitimacy in neo-institutionalism (for example, Suchman, 1995). However, detailed reading 
of institutional theory research from both streams reveals significant overlaps, with 
institutional economists such as North (1990) and Hayek (1945) questioning purely 
efficiency-driven institutional arguments and neo-institutionalists arguing for efficiency 
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considerations to precede legitimacy concerns in business settings (see, for example, Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Deephouse, 1996). 
In line with critics of this periodization of institutional research (Abbott, 1992; Sleznic, 1998; 
Peng, 2002), this research deliberately adopts an integrative approach (Peng & Heath, 1996; 
Oliver, 1997; Peng, 2002), referred to as ‘institution-based’. Institution-based research 
considers relevant insights from both streams of ‘institutional theory’ and is aligned with more 
recent treatments of institutional research in business and management studies (Peng & 
Khoury, 2008; Peng, Sun, Pinkham & Chen 2009). 
Considering the potential contribution of institutional research in understanding fundamental 
concepts such as institutions, rules, institutional creation, change and diffusion across space 
and time, it is surprising that business and management literature investigating institutional 
devices such as contracts or standards does not explicitly and more systematically draw on 
this body of knowledge. This aversion may be explained by the “endless disputes over the 
definition of key terms such as institution and … led some writers to give up matters of 
definition and to propose getting down somehow to practical matters instead” (Hodgson, 
2006, p.1). Consequently, there is limited effort expended in defining key terms such as 
‘institutions’, ‘rules’ and ‘institutionalisation’ in business and management literature. Yet, it is 
critical to review existent literature on these key concepts, because it provides vital insights 
into the very properties of institutional devices such as standards and contracts, and 
significantly enhances our understanding of how companies use institutional devices for 
dealing with risk. Therefore, the following paragraphs review relevant literature discussing 
the concepts of institutions, rules and institutionalisation. This conceptual discussion informs 
the empirically substantiated institution-based explanation of how companies deal with risk, 
developed in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
Despite the centrality of institutions to social science, where it holds a similar status to the 
concept of competition in economics, the term remains vague (Jepperson, 1991). Dominant 
(mis-)conceptions include using the term with reference to a particularly important or large 
organisation, or the identification of ‘organisational context’. Such conceptions limit the 
understanding of institutions to ‘faceless’, ‘external actors’ such as the ‘legal system’, who may 
influence, impose, constrain or regulate the behaviour of other actors who have limited room 
for manoeuvre in the face of ‘institutional commands’. 
In contrast to these (mis-)conceptions, this thesis adopts a more nuanced definition developed 
by Jepperson (1991, p.145), who refers to institutions as a: 
“social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or property; 
institutionalization denotes the process of such attainment. By order or 
pattern, I refer, as is conventional, to standardized interaction sequences. An 
institution is then a social pattern that reveals a particular reproduction 
process. When departures from the pattern are counteracted in a regulated 
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fashion, by repetitively activated, socially constructed controls - that is, by 
some set of rewards and sanctions – we refer to a pattern as institutionalized. 
Put another way: institutions are those social patterns that, when chronically 
reproduced, owe their survival to relatively self-activating social processes” 
(emphases added). 
This definition of ‘institutions’ and ‘institutionalization’ is invaluable in drawing attention to 
institutions: (a) as a sequence of interaction constituting a social order or pattern; (b) 
institutionalization as a process; (c) the vital role of inbuilt controls, rewards and sanctions; (d) 
for ensuring a self-activating process that perpetuates the use of institutions. Consequently, 
institutions are not merely constraining forces, limiting (unwanted) variability of behaviours. 
Instead, institutions are “powerful sources of both stability and change” (Jepperson, 1991, 
p.161), which “simultaneously empower and control” (ibid. p.146). ‘Institutionalization’, as a 
‘self-activating’ process is different from ‘action’. Whereas ‘action’ involves active, repeated 
and resource-intensive “(re-)mobilization and (re-)intervention in historical processes to 
secure persistence” (ibid., p.148), institutionalization is efficient and fast because it relies on 
self-organizing principles that facilitate co-ordination across time and space. What remains 
unclear at this point, however, is what exactly distinguishes ‘institutions’ from ‘rules’? 
The distinction between ‘institutions’ and ‘rules’ is crucial, because it sheds light on rules as 
the building blocks of institutions that give rise to the properties of institutions identified by 
Jepperson (1991). Yet, the difference between the two concepts is not straightforward, 
particularly as some authors collapse rules and institutions into one another, offering few 
words of clarification. For example, Hodgson (2006, p.2) suggests that institutions are 
“systems or established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions”, and, 
North claims, “institutions are the rules of the game in society” (1990, p.3, emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, rules and institutions are distinct, yet inter-related entities. Specifically, this 
thesis uses the term ‘rules’ to denote “socially transmitted and customary normative 
injunction[s] or immanently normative disposition[s], that in circumstances X do Y” (Hodgson, 
2006, p.3, emphasis added). Ostrom suggests a similar, more concise definition of rules by 
stating that a “rule can be thought of as the set of instructions for creating an action situation 
in a particular environment…Rules combine to build the structure of an action situation” 
(2005, p.17, emphases added).  These definitions deserve further clarification:  
First, the ‘social transmission’ of rules draws attention to the fact that rules are not ‘given’, but 
rely on active codification, sharing and replication among groups of actors. The “criterion of 
codifiability is important because it means that breaches of the rule can be identified explicitly. 
It also helps to define the community that shares and understands the rules involved” 
(Hodgson, 2006, p. 3). Codifiability of rules also distinguishes rules from the often 
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interchangeably used concept of ‘norms’6: Rules and norms are distinguished by their means 
of transmission and enforcement (Toumela, 1995; Hodgson, 2006). While norm-guided 
behaviour is influenced by shared beliefs and (non)-conformity results in approval or 
disapproval, rule-guided behaviour relies on “actual agreement between individuals” 
(Hodgson, 2006, p.5, emphasis added) and non-conformity implies sanctions. In fact, 
codification, in-built mechanisms of enforcement and sanctioning are identified as key 
elements constituting ‘rules’.  
Second, the concept of rules defining ‘that in circumstances X do Y’ highlights how rules are an 
instrument to “achieve order and predictability among humans by creating classes of 
persons…who are then required, permitted, or forbidden to take classes of actions in relation 
to required, permitted, or forbidden outcomes, or face the likelihood of being monitored and 
sanctioned in a predictable fashion” (Ostrom, 2005, p.18). Highlighting the aims actors have in 
using rules, such as permitting, forbidding, monitoring or sanctioning, demonstrates how 
rules are capable of limiting variability in interactions by operating “as protection against the 
opportunistic behaviour of other actors” (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.76). However, such an 
understanding shall not mislead us into equating rules with ‘commands’. In contrast to 
commands, rules derive their power not merely from constraining (inter-) actions, but from 
facilitating collective adaptation to change: That is because, “the more complex the order 
aimed at, the greater will be that part of the separate action which will have to be determined 
by circumstances not known to those who direct the whole, and the more dependent control 
will be on rules than on specific commands” (Hayek, 1973, p.50). 
Such complexity precludes designing rules that address all potential future situations X and 
responsive behaviours Y (Vermeule, 2015). Rather, rules emerge as “problem-solving 
individuals interact, trying to figure out how to do a better job in the future than they have 
done in the past” (Ostrom, 2005, p.19).  Hence, the guiding principle for considering changes 
to rules is not precaution but precedent: The “idea of precedent means that if a particular 
problem of practice X is settled in case C, then the rationale in case C would be applied by later 
                                                                
6 The distinction between ‘norms’ and ‘rules’ is more complicated than the scope of this discussion 
permits examining. For one thing, regionally varying normative understandings may significantly 
influence the kind of rules created and the way these rules are enforced and sanctioned. Secondly, 
normative underpinnings may significantly influence the compliance with rules, and, hence, the 
effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms. However, the purpose of the simplified distinction 
above highlights why properties of rules, such as the codifiability and subsequent sharing of rules, 
enforceability by third parties and looming sanctions are important in business networks, where 
actors may not know each other or have no opportunity to interact with each other in a way that 
would deem reliance on norms alone insufficient. In this way, this line of enquiry is close to Douglas 
North’s proposition that  
“neither self-enforcement by parties nor trust can be completely successful. It is not that 
ideology or norms do not matter; they do and immense resources are devoted to 
[them]…Equally, however, the returns on opportunism, cheating and shirking rise in 
complex societies. A coercive third party is essential…Indeed, effective third-party 
enforcement is best realized by creating a set of rules that then make a variety of informal 
constraints effective” (North, 1990, p.35). 
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actors to practice X. In other words, case C sets a precedent in relation to practice X” (Mouzas 
& Ford, 2009, p.496). Rule creation and adaptation based on precedent illustrates how on the 
one hand, “rules structure the behaviour of actors, but in interaction, are also formed by these 
same actors” (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.76). Hayek addresses this observation by stating 
that: 
“the knowledge which has given [the rules] their shape is not knowledge of 
particular future effects but knowledge of the recurrence of certain problems 
…and most of this knowledge exists not as an awareness of an enumerable list 
of situations for which one has to be prepared, or of the importance of the kind 
of the problems to be solved, or of the probability that they will arise, but as a 
propensity to act in certain types of situations in a certain manner” (1973, 
p.21). 
This perspective is significant in that it recognizes that rules are not “self-formulating, self-
determining, or self-enforcing” (Ostrom, 2005, p.20) and that rules are powerful exactly 
because actors have limited capacity to accurately identify and act upon probability-based 
future scenarios.  Beckert (1996, p.810) articulates this even more clearly in suggesting that 
rules: 
“do not increase [actors’] calculative capabilities for determining probabilities 
in order to master uncertainty. Rather, they rely on social ‘devices’ and restrict 
their flexibility and create a rigidity in the responses to changes in an 
uncertain environment. The term ‘social devices’ encompasses all forms of 
rules, social norms, conventions, institutional, social structures, and power-
relations that limit the choice set of actors and make actions at the same time 
predictable” (Beckert, 1996, p.819, emphases in original). 
To influence action, actors must design institutional devices that induce compliance (Tolbert 
& Zucker, 1996). Ostrom (2005, p. 259) provides the most comprehensive synthesis of 
principles generating compliance in long-enduring institutions. Among other principles, she 
mentions that institutions must: 
(a) Clearly define boundaries delimiting who are the actors who are included by the 
systems of rules and who have rights to access and use resources;  
(b) Provide for ‘collective-choice arrangements’, by which Ostrom means that actors 
involved in accessing and using resources must “be included in the group who can 
modify the rules”; 
(c) Include monitoring processes to ascertain compliance. Monitoring may be outsourced 
to third parties who must be at least partially accountable to the actors who are 
involved in accessing and using resources; 
(d) Involve sanctioning, so that “users who violate rules-in-use are likely to receive 
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offence) from 
other users, from officials accountable to those users, or from both”; 
(e) Include conflict-resolution mechanisms characterized by easy access for all parties 
concerned and at relatively low cost;  
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(f) Be created under at least a minimum of freedom to self-organize, where institutions 
created by actors are not challenged by governmental authorities and where these 
actors retain long-term rights over their institutional set-up; 
(g) Comprise the provision of rules, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and 
governance activities organized on multiple layers. 
While Ostrom offers the most comprehensive account, other authors have focused on the 
principles of ‘enforcement’ and ‘sanctioning’ (Ehrlich, 1913/2002; North, 1990; Hodgson, 
2006). North traces the development of enforcement principles back to medieval merchants, 
stating that: 
“although … courts handled commercial disputes, it is the development and 
evolution of mechanisms for enforcing agreements by merchants themselves 
that is of particular interest. Enforceability appears to have had its beginning 
in the development of internal codes of conduct in fraternal orders of guild 
merchants; those who did not live up to them were threatened with ostracism” 
(1990, p.127).  
While enforcement is easier in direct interactions with few actors, it becomes more difficult in 
a context with multiple, geographically dispersed actors. Hodgson (2006, p.15) suggests that 
industry associations may therefore take upon themselves “state-like qualities to enforce 
agreements and protect property.” Lacking investment in institutional enforcement may 
significantly weaken the power of institutional devices in reducing uncertainty, because of the 
increased potential for “considerable difference between predicted and actual behaviour” 
(Ostrom, 2009, p.21). The two dominant ways of enforcement are of the “self-enforcing 
variety, through codes of behaviour, or by third party policing and monitoring” (North, 1986, 
p.231). 
Apart from enforcement, existent research focuses on the looming threat to exercise non-legal 
sanctions to achieve compliance (Ehrlich, 1913/2002; Charny, 1990). Charny (1990) provides 
a typology of non-legal sanctions, which may result in reputational damages, loss of 
relationship-specific assets and of future business opportunities. He maintains that 
agreements between business actors which “formally provide for legal sanctions depend upon 
non-legal sanctions for their effectiveness whenever the legal sanctions are ineffective in 
inducing the promisor to perform” (Charny, 1990, p. 394). While empirical research on exact 
sanctions is scarce, most authors agree that sometimes, the  
“mere fact that business partners know, often only very vaguely, that there 
might be some form of sanction… is the key to understanding the sanctioning 
power of formal and informal institutions. They provide orientation and 
stability rather than explicit threats and deterrence” (Bachman & Inkpen, 
2011, p.291).  
Enforcement and sanctions are not peaceful institutional set-ups but contested arenas in 
which power (asymmetry) and resources matter. Enforcement and sanctioning are regarded 
as interventionist practices, where interference refers to an “act of coercion, undertaken for 
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the purpose of achieving a particular result. Every act of interference thus creates a privilege 
… that it will secure benefits to some at the expense of others” (Hayek, 1973, p.129). This 
insight builds on the early work of Commons, who maintains that institutions emerge “from 
resolutions to strategic problems in social relationships between wilful and conflicting 
individuals” (in Van de Ven, 1993, p.139). 
The assumption of agency in institutional creation strongly influences the stream of research 
on institutional entrepreneurship (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio, 1988; Lawrence, Hardy 
& Phillips, 2002; Dacin, Goodstein & Scott, 2002; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Veal & Mouzas, 
2011), which is important to enhance our understanding of who designs institutional devices, 
how and why. Institutional entrepreneurship refers to the “activities of actors who have an 
interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new 
institutions or to transform existing ones” (Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004, p.657). This 
description builds on the early research on this concept by DiMaggio (1988, p.14), who 
suggests that “new institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient resources 
(institutional entrepreneurs) see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value 
highly”.  
Empirical research on institutional entrepreneurship covers national, international and global 
levels of analysis and draws attention to the importance of understanding the contextual 
conditions, such as changing legal, political, social and market developments. Specifically, 
existing research examines triggers for institutional entrepreneurship activities, which 
include high uncertainty, crises (Fligstein & Mara-Drita, 1996), disruptive events (Hoffman, 
1999), shocks (Fligstein, 1991), jolts (Meyer, 1982), regulatory changes, technological 
disruptions or publication of media reports (Hardy & Maguire, 2008). An example of 
companies creating institutions as a way of dealing with uncertainty arising from ‘legal 
ambiguity’ is given by Mezias (1990), who examines how major U.S. companies have 
influenced the development of financial reporting requirements. 
While it is agreed that institutional change tends to be initiated by dominant actors in a 
network, who control sufficient resources to intervene and impose new institutions, consent 
and co-operation from other actors remains indispensable. Institutional entrepreneurs may 
exploit their access to critical resources “as a lever against other actors to negotiate support 
for their… project in question” (Hardy & Maguire, 2008, p.207). Granting this support may 
depend on the “positive inducements offered to prospective allies in exchange for their 
support. Others are premised on negative inducements in the form of threats” (Hardy & 
Maguire, 2008, p.207), which institutional entrepreneurs may enforce themselves or through 
third parties. Multiple studies report that such ‘new’ institutions are not isolated, but 
embedded and dependent on existing institutions such as the legal system, industry 
associations, or auditing and certification agencies (Holm, 1995; Hardy & Maguire, 2008). For 
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example, Garud et al. (2002) examine how companies behind the Sun Microsystems and Java 
standards have capitalized on the legal system for establishing and enforcing new institutions. 
Institutional entrepreneurship is inextricably linked with the existing institutional context and 
the exercise of power, which may manifest in the use of “offering financial incentives, imposing 
penalties, or invoking formal authority” (Hardy & Maguire, 2008, p.209) in the name of 
institutionalizing new practices to ‘grow the bandwagon’ and the practice’s legitimacy (Garud 
et al., 2002). 
Yet, how do institutions bridge time and space to influence interaction beyond organizational 
boundaries and direct interactions? Academic research addressing this question offers two 
directions, which appear to proceed on parallel trajectories. One direction, which appears to 
attract most research, is advanced by neo-institutionalist scholars who examine coercive, 
normative and mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983/1991) to explain 
‘institutionalisation’. Later, Tolbert and Zucker (1996/1999) suggested that habitualization, 
objectification and sedimentation are mechanisms of ‘institutionalisation’. The second 
direction, which appears to have been undeservedly neglected, is the examination of 
institutional “carriers…such as symbols, relations, artefacts” (Dacin, Goodstein & Scott, 2002, 
p.49). This direction is of particular interest to the present research because it focuses on the 
analysis of business artefacts as material ‘carriers’ of rules (Ehrlich 1931/2992; Suchman, 
2003; D’Adderio, 2011), and illuminates how such artefacts function as ‘O-rings’ in business 
interactions. 
Business artefacts, such as contracts, or General Terms and Conditions, standards or insurance 
policies, are one form of empirical manifestations of institutions in business interactions. 
Artefacts are “discrete material object[s], consciously produced or transformed by human 
activity, under the influence of the physical and/or cultural environment” (Suchman, 2003, 
p.98). Artefacts, “unlike speech or gestures…exist independently of their creators; unlike 
ideas, they are perceivable by the senses” (ibid.) and can therefore transcend individual actors 
and dyadic interactions. Such artefacts are tangible manifestations of adaptable institutional 
devices that provide ‘islands of certainty’ in complex business interactions across time and 
space.  
Specifically, business artefacts are relevant in establishing a common referent and for 
scaffolding activities carried out by inter-dependent, but distinct actors (Okhuysen & Bechky, 
2009). In network interactions, companies draw on the symbolic and technical properties of 
artefacts: signing a contract, for instance, is seen as “symbolic reassurance that the parties are 
entering into a predictable, controllable, and mutual relationship within a social order” 
(Suchman, 2003, p.111). Like scripts for a play, business artefacts may “provide a storyline to 
keep the performance on course, even in the face of substantial improvisation” (Suchman, 
2003, p.114) by providing the actors “with a tractable reference document that can link the 
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individual parts into a coherent… whole” (ibid.). Simultaneously, artefacts possess technical 
functions such as defining the actors involved, intention of interaction, the time horizon, 
litigiousness; they may also: “signify commitment, seriousness and finality” (Suchman, 2003, 
p.113). Codifying rules in business artefacts can facilitate dealing with risk by specifying 
outcomes that actors want to avoid at all costs:  
“By formulating ‘don’ts’, parties are able to protect themselves against the risk 
of investing their resources in an interaction process that ultimately achieves 
an undesirable … [outcome]. An important ‘don’t’ for companies that 
participate in interaction is the leaking of sensitive information or innovative 
ideas to competitors” (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.194-195). 
This illustration highlights that business artefacts are not neutral, but carry the inscribed 
interests of those actors who created them and in whose interest it is that these artefacts indeed 
‘guide the play’ (D’Adderio, 2011; Öberg, Henneberg & Mouzas, 2012). The concept of 
‘inscription’ sheds light on how artefacts function as “mediators that perform and influence 
the practices in which they are involved” (D’Adderio, 2011, p.212. emphasis in original). The 
value of business artefacts as ‘carriers of rules’ in business interactions is their capacity to 
transcend organizational boundaries, time and space.  
While the above review has highlighted the relevance and conceptual potential of the network 
and institution-based approaches in understanding how companies deal with risk in direct 
and indirect interactions, these approaches remain surprisingly underdeveloped in business 
marketing and the broader fields of business and management studies. Therefore, the 
following section presents a deliberate effort to develop a systematic, theoretical synthesis 
that provides the groundwork for the institution-based explanation of how companies deal 




2.6 Towards a theoretical framework 
The following three sections present a synthesis of business network and institution-based 
research by examining the current state of literature on companies’ use of institutional devices 
for dealing with risk at three levels of network interaction: the dyadic, focal and network 
levels. 
Despite the promising insights to be gained from the synthesis of network and institution-
based research, there is limited development in this field to date (Brito, 2001; Garud, Jain & 
Kumaraswamy, 2002; Järvenisu et. al., 2008; Yang & Su, 2014). After decades of proceeding on 
“largely separate trajectories” (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008, p.594) there are few attempts at 
exploring “points of intellectual cross-fertilization” (ibid.). These attempts have in common 
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that scholars from both fields agree that “networks and institutions are co-constitutive. 
…[N]etworks shape institutions but institutions sculpt networks” (Owen-Smith & Powell, 
2008, p.603), and therefore any attempt at understanding network phenomena must consider 
institutions and vice versa. The relatively nascent attempts at combining network and 
institution-based research recognise the “generative potential of networks as transmission 
channels” (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008, p.595), and call for research that focuses on “the 
conditions under which particular practices…diffuse or fail by making rules and practices 
themselves the unit of analysis” (ibid., p.617). This call is addressed in this research by 
investigating the content and use of institutional devices – contracts, GTC and industry 
standards – for dealing with risk in networks.  
Yet, while there is evident interest in combining network and institution-based research, the 
synthesis needs more systematic development: To date, institution-based research appears to 
lack a useful conceptualisation of ‘networks’, while network research appears to under-utilize 
the explanatory potential of institutional research for understanding network phenomena 
such as dealing with risk. In fact, risk appears to have escaped research attention in both fields. 
In addressing these observations, this research capitalizes on the IMP Group’s 
conceptualisation of networks and substantiates the explanation of how companies use 
institutional devices for dealing with risk by drawing on institution-based research. 
A critical prerequisite for the synthesis of network and institution-based research – which is 
an exercise in “building theory by combining lenses” (Okhuysen & Bonardi, 2011, p.6) – is to 
ensure that both approaches share underlying assumptions and analytical foci. Since existent 
research has not addressed this issue, the following section outlines three fundamental 
assumptions that underpin network and institutional research and therefore strengthen the 
theoretical rigour of this synthesis. 
First, network and institutional research does not consider individual actors as their main or 
exclusive units-of-analysis, but allow operating at higher levels of aggregation (Holmlund & 
Törnroos, 1997; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008; Yang & Su, 2014). Actors in both fields are 
conceptualised as purposeful, boundedly rational, inter-dependent and embedded (Owen-
Smith & Powell, 2008). Recalling the conceptualization of ‘business networks’ described 
earlier, it is worth illuminating the parallels with the institutional concept of ‘organizational 
fields’. The institutional concept of ‘organisational fields’, also referred to as ‘inter-
organizational fields’ or ‘institutional fields’ (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008), shows significant 
parallels with the network concept advanced by the IMP Group. ‘Organizational fields’ refer to 
“network ties between constituents that directly and indirectly interact with each 
other…organizational fields focus on the degree to which a field of actors is characterized by a 
single, predominant, or by multiple, potentially competing institutional orders” (Meyer, 
2008a, p.525, emphasis added). Organizational fields encompass actors such as business 
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organisations, interest groups, industry associations or governmental bodies. Similar to 
observations in business network literature, delimiting organisational fields can be 
challenging, because fields are:  
“not necessarily bound by geography or goals, but instead make up a 
recognized area of institutional life. These could include organizations that 
produce similar services or products, suppliers, resource and product 
consumers, regulatory agencies and others” (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008, 
p.131). 
Second, network and institutional research share the emphasis on field/network dynamics and 
change processes, focusing significantly on “the ways in which organizations enact their 
environment and are simultaneously enacted upon by the same environment” (Wooten & 
Hoffman, 2008, p.136). As actors need to reconcile multiple, potentially contradictory 
institutional arrangements, organizational fields, similar to networks, are in constant flux. This 
is because fields and networks are characterized by constant “entry or exit of particular 
organizations…and through an alteration of the interaction patterns and power balances 
among them” (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008, p.135). This view emphasizes that institutions are 
seen as “products of human design [and] the outcomes of purposive action by instrumentally 
oriented [actors]” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p.8). To capture processes and dynamics in 
networks, both approaches emphasize the need for research at multiple levels of analysis, 
including network, focal and dyadic interactions (Yang & Su, 2014). Yet, existent research in 
both fields recognizes that to date: 
 “we know relatively little about the specific dynamics of change within and 
between these different institutional layers. More analytical concepts that 
integrate structural features of the different layers with relational and 
processes approaches need to be developed in order to discern the 
interactions between the different layers” (Djelic & Quack, 2008, p. 317, 
emphasis added). 
Third, network and institutional research draw on critical realism to inform empirical work 
and theory development (Leca & Naccache, 2006; Easton, 2010). Critical realist logic 
contributes to theory development in network and institutional research by providing the 
conceptual tools to illuminate structure-agency duality (Archer, 2010); and by facilitating 
causal explanation of patterns of interactions (Meyer, 2008b). 
Building on the conceptual groundwork informing the synthesis of network and institution-
based research, the following sections examine the current state of literature on companies’ 
use of institutional devices for dealing with risk at three levels of network interaction: dyadic, 
focal and network interaction. 
2.6.1 Dealing with risk in dyadic interactions 
Research into how companies use institutional devices for dealing with risk in direct dyadic 
interactions has attracted most attention, and consistently advances within and outside 
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business network research (Lusch & Brown, 1996; Eggleston, Posner & Zeckhauser, 2000; 
Seshadri & Mishra, 2004; Mouzas & Ford, 2006; Weber & Mayer, 2011). Common 
classifications of research investigating the use of contracts in business-to-business 
relationships distinguish between:(a) relational contracting, focusing on the role of trust, 
commitment and norms (Macaulay, 1963; Macneil 1985; Eisenberg, 2000; Mouzas & Blois, 
2013); and (b) formal contracting (Mouzas & Furmston, 2008; Mouzas & Ford, 2012). 
In both streams of research, contracts provide the ‘architecture’ of business relationships by 
orchestrating actors, resources and activities in repeated, direct interaction over time (Mouzas 
& Furmston, 2008), and facilitate the continuity of business interactions in the face of future 
contingencies.  
The purpose of contracts is to find: 
“relatively simple specifications that come close to achieving what a complete, 
contingent contract could do under situations of environmental risk (i.e., the 
whims of Mother Nature) and behavioural risk (i.e., the potentially 
opportunistic behaviour of trading partners” (Lyons, 1996, p.29). 
Despite continuous research investigating the use of contracts in business relationships, and 
particularly the use of umbrella agreements (also referred to as ‘framework contracts’) in 
retailer-manufacturer relationships (Mouzas, 2006; Mouzas & Blois, 2008; Mouzas & 
Furmston, 2008), the majority of contract research remains conceptual, offering limited 
empirical evidence. While this may be explained by challenges in accessing confidential 
contracts-in-use, Argyres, Bercovitz and Meyer (2007, p.3) highlight other contributing 
factors, such as the significant research emphasis on trust and norms following Macaulay’s 
work on non-contractual relations in 1963, and respective scepticism towards the importance 
of formal contracts in business relationships. 
However, research into major litigation cases, such as between British retailer Marks & 
Spencer and the supplier Baird, highlights that reliance on non-contractual relations can cause 
serious enforceability problems for any actor (Blois, 2003). Consequently, depriving a 
business relationship of formal contracts appears unwise, because the actors miss the benefit 
of legal enforcement in court if all negotiation efforts fail. While it appears that it is not 
necessarily the actual legal enforcement, but rather the looming possibility of legal 
enforcement that motivates contractual performance (Ring, 2008), the formality of 
contracting remains central. Recourse to formal contracts draws attention to the fundamental 
principle that what is exchanged between business actors “are not [only] physical entities but 
the rights to perform certain actions – and those rights are established by the legal system” 
(Ring, 2008, p.510).  
Considering the issues associated with relational approaches to contracting, and the 
limitations of relying on norms and customs in globally dispersed interactions across multiple 
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actors, this research is concerned with understanding how companies use formal contracts for 
dealing with risk in direct relationships. In taking this approach, the researcher follows 
Suchman’s (2003, p.96) call to study ‘contracts-as-artefacts’ rather than ‘contracts-as-
doctrine’ or ‘contracts-as-relation’. What distinguishes the contract-as-artefact from 
alternative approaches is that it is primarily concerned with understanding the substance of 
contract in its own, yet contextual, use. In his seminal piece, Contracts as Social Artefact (2003, 
pp.96-97), Suchman suggests that: 
“despite the ubiquity of contract documents in modern life, this question has 
received surprisingly short shrift from the existing literature. Doctrinalists 
tend to trivialize contract documents as mere occasions for applying Contract 
Law, while relationalists tend to marginalize contract documents as mere 
legalistic formalities. From an artefactualist perspective, however, such 
dismissals ignore a fundamental empirical puzzle: Evidence suggests that in 
most transactions, legal doctrine is obscure, and the threat of legal 
enforcement is remote; yet actors often invest substantial resources into 
producing written contracts…This paperwork, moreover, generally exhibits a 
systematic internal structure and generally changes in systematic ways over 
time. For better or worse, contract documents behave not like extraneous 
phenomena, but rather like systematically produced social artefacts, and we 
might learn something of value if we occasionally were to study them in 
precisely those terms.” 
Moreover, while Suchman highlights the significance of researching the contract-in-use, 
because “the use of handwritten amendments to printed contracts … indicates direct attention 
to a particular clause” (2003, p.109) his suggestions were followed with limited empirically 
founded research.  
Existent research highlights the benefits of contracting for addressing idiosyncratic risks in 
direct relationships. Contracts create: 
“tailored obligations, responsibilities, benefits and arbitration arrangements 
ex-ante to [the exchanges]… In the presence of market ambiguity, a 
customized contract functions as an ex-ante safeguard against a partner’s 
opportunism because it legitimizes monitoring and adds more term specificity 
and contingency adaptability to the contract. For example, a customized 
contract enables firms to accurately measure and reward productivity…avoid 
productivity and avoid performance risk by modifying goals, activities and 
arbitration arrangements in advance” (Yang, Su & Fam, 2012, pp.43-44). 
Such measures facilitate safeguarding resources from risk, including the relationship itself, 
which is considered a primary asset in marketing literature and practice. Contracts derive 
their power from their ongoing adaptability to the requirements of multiple, idiosyncratic 
relationships, as the terms are tailored to meet the present demands and concerns of both 
actors, while projecting courses of joint action into the future.  Moreover, contracts – as forms 
of rule-based devices – help actors assume “certain behaviour by others, without having to 
confirm it in concrete situations” (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.80).  
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In the context of retailer-manufacturer relationships, research on ‘umbrella agreements’ is of 
particular relevance to this thesis. Umbrella agreements provide a ‘frame’ for future 
transactions and facilitate re-negotiation in “regular, stable and established business 
relationships” (Mouzas & Furmston, 2008, p.40). Instead of specifying transaction parameters, 
such as volume or delivery times, umbrella agreements provide a ‘constitution-like’ set of rules 
within which future exchanges are concluded (Mouzas & Ford, 2006). Key clauses in umbrella 
agreements deal with exclusivity, confidentiality, property rights, force majeure, termination 
conditions and renegotiation (Mouzas, 2006). The benefits of drafting umbrella agreements 
include reduced “time and effort to select, manage and oversee single transactions 
[…provision of] certainty regarding the conditions under which exchanges may take place 
[…and the provision of] a platform for an on-ongoing negotiation” (Mouzas & Furmston, 2008, 
p.38). Umbrella agreements constitute a device for dealing with idiosyncratic issues relevant 
in single dyads, by offering a codification of rules for future interactions.  
While existent research confirms the value of contracting in direct, dyadic relationships, there 
are limitations to contracting if applied across a high number of direct and indirect 
interactions: Since contracting presumes mutual negotiation, it becomes prohibitive in terms 
of time and cost to replicate this practice across multiple direct and indirect interactions. For 
example, recalling the case of Wal-Mart with over 100,000 suppliers, negotiation of individual 
contracts becomes absolutely impossible. This raises the question: How do companies deal 
with risk emerging from multiple, potentially indirect relationships? To answer this question, 
it is useful to review research conducted at the next higher level of network interactions: the 
focal network. 
2.6.2 Dealing with risk in focal interactions 
Knowledge of how companies deal with risk at the focal level of network interaction is 
particularly limited. Analysing focal interactions requires examination of all relevant direct 
and indirect business relationships from the perspective of a single company. This view 
requires moving our attention beyond direct relationships to considering how companies deal 
with risk in direct and indirect relationships.  
A promising, yet often neglected stream of research focuses on the use of General Terms and 
Conditions (GTC). GTC are a form of contract, which “one of the contracting parties has defined 
in advance with the intention to incorporate them into future transactions” (Mouzas & 
Furmston, 2008, p.42). Typically, GTC are the result of a continuous “rationalisation and 
adaptation process to the evolving needs of commercial practice” (ibid.). GTC provide a 
powerful tool for: 
(a) Unilaterally defining the terms and conditions governing multiple interactions;  
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(2) Fast and constant adaption of terms and conditions in response to the “evolving 
needs of commercial practice” (Mouzas & Furmston, 2008, p.42); and  
(3) Enhancing efficiency, predictability and reliability in multiple interactions across 
geographic boundaries and legislatures by standardizing the GTC. 
Although GTC have facilitated repeated business transactions since ancient times, research in 
the context of business-to-business relationships remains scarce (Blois, 1972; Blois, 2003; 
Mouzas & Furmston, 2008). Yet, without GTC, business transactions would either require 
individually negotiated contracts, or, alternatively, result in complete reliance on informal 
agreements. The limitations of both alternatives highlight GTC’s significance. 
GTC’s efficiency has contributed to their ubiquitous use in business transactions since ancient 
Roman times. Roman jurist Marcus Labeo, for example, reported a storehouse landlord who 
nailed liability exemption terms at his entrance (Hellwege, 2010). A similar practice is 
reported from medieval Scotland by Bankton (1751, in Hellwege, 2010, p.3), where a stable 
owner fixed a “placard …on the door of a stable, … declaring the stabler not liable for hazards, 
[as] the persons interested are presumed to consent to the terms of it”. With the inception of 
industrialization, to date, GTC has proliferated in almost every industry, including banking, 
insurance, transportation and retailing.  
Consider the recent case of General Mills, who amended their GTC to the effect that consumers 
“give up their right to sue the company if they download coupons, ‘join’ in online communities 
like Facebook, enter a company-sponsored sweepstake … or interact with it in a variety of 
other ways” (New York Times, 2014). General Mills’ GTC state that the company has “new legal 
terms which require all disputes related to the purchase or use of any General Mills product 
or service to be resolved through binding arbitration” (General Mills GTC, April 14, 2014). The 
U.S. chain ‘Whataburger’ practises a similar move by hanging a placard at its entrances 
“warning customers that simply by entering the premises, they have agreed to settle disputes 
through arbitration” (New York Times, 2014). The parsimony of unilaterally created and – at 
least in principle - globally applicable agreements, and the power of GTC to address legal 
loopholes or ambiguities, secures GTC a key role in business interactions (Hellwege, 2010; 
Hörnicke, 2012). 
Yet, in contrast to other contract forms, GTC are subject to surprisingly limited regulatory 
intervention. 
In most jurisdictions, including the U.S., the United Kingdom or Germany, GTC became subject 
to regulation only in the 1960s and ’70s, and in Australia as late as 2003. Moreover, these 
regulations focused predominantly on the use of GTC business-consumer, not business-to-
business interactions. In German law, for example, it is sufficient for business actors to 
demonstrate a ‘silent concurrence of wills’ (‘stillschweigende Willensübereinstimmung’) (IHK 
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Stuttgart, 2010) for GTC to become a binding basis for business interactions.7 Another 
implication of the GTC’s legal state is that business actors reserve significant freedom in the 
content, scope and reach of the terms, while warranting the document’s full legal 
enforceability.  
While research on umbrella agreements facilitates our understanding of how companies deal 
with idiosyncratic risks in direct dyadic relationships, research on GTC may shed light on how 
companies deal with risk at a higher level of network aggregation: focal networks. Blois (1972, 
2003, 2006) offers some pioneering work examining the use of GTC in the focal network of the 
British retailer Marks and Spencer. While his work focuses on the phenomenon of vertical 
‘quasi-integration’, he provides one of the few analyses of the retailer’s use of GTC in 
addressing risk emerging from quality deficiencies, cost fluctuation or competitor ‘copy-
catting’.  
However, apart from this glimpse into Marks and Spencer’s use of GTC, there is limited 
research supported by empirical evidence on the: (a) contemporary content and use of GTC 
for dealing with risk; (b) the distribution of GTC across a focal network; and (c) the relation 
between the content and use of GTC and other contracts. 
The notion that “it is obvious that General Terms and Conditions are used to pass on risks and 
liabilities to other contractual parties” (Mouzas & Furmston, 2008, p.42) deserves further 
research that would investigate GTC-in-use. This endeavour echoes Ehrlich’s (1913/2002) 
advice, which retains its relevance despite the fact that it is over a century old:  
“The living law is the law which dominates life itself … The source of our 
knowledge of this law is, first, the modern legal document; secondly, direct 
observation of life, of commerce, of customs and usages […] only the concrete 
usages, the relations of domination, the dispositions, the contracts…yield the 
rules according to which men regulate their conduct. The living law must be 
sought in…contracts of purchase…business partnerships […] In all these 
contracts, there is, in addition to individual content, which applies only to the 
particular transaction, a typical, ever recurring content. This typical content is 
basically the most important thing in the document…” (pp.493-501). 
2.6.3 Dealing with risk in business networks  
Research examining how companies deal with risk at the network level can be categorised 
into: (a) more abstract, conceptual research on ‘network constitutions’ (Mouzas & Ford, 
2009); and (b) empirically-founded research on the uses of industry standards and 
certification schemes. Surprisingly, research in both streams does not consider references to 
institutional research.  
                                                                
7 GTC are treated in both common and civil law systems as a type of ‘standard form contract’, and hence are 
enforceable like any other contract. 
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Research on ‘network constitutions’ is relatively recent and refers to ‘constitutions’ 
metaphorically - to capture “a higher-order of multiple conventions that are customary, 
expected and often self-enforcing within particular business networks” (Mouzas & Ford, 2009, 
p.495). Such ‘higher-order of conventions’ comprises “shared systems of values, norms and 
rules that transcend any single organization or dyadic relationship” (ibid.).  
While research on network constitutions does not specifically state how such constitutions 
emerge, who the actors are who are creating such custom systems, and how network 
constitutions are transmitted beyond dyadic interactions, it offers valuable groundwork in 
understanding the use of institutional devices in network interactions. Network constitutions 
ensure “behavioural regularities which sustain themselves as they serve the interests of the 
actors involved…. a constitution supplies actors with the rules of the game or the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (Mouzas & Ford, 2009, p.496). Network 
constitutions are shown to “emanate to a large extent from a process of codification of 
distributed knowledge and experiences generated by the whole industrial system and are 
subject to [change] over time” (Araujo & Mota, 2005, p.11). Changes to network constitutions 
are subject to actors’ continuous engagement with reproducing or reshaping the rules 
considering precedent cases. Hence, network constitutions are specific to “each network’s 
history… These rules regulate the behaviour of actors in the network in the sense that they 
prescribe what actions are permitted, which actors can participate in which games” 
(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.77). In business networks, constitutions “specify the nature of 
rights [over resources] that … actors may possess, acquire or transfer” (Mouzas & Ford, 2009, 
p.497). To enhance actors’ capacity of enforcing rights, network constitutions frequently 
encapsulate “externally imposed but accepted laws or legal regulations” (ibid.).  
While most research on network constitutions remains conceptual, it is evident that 
companies invest in “factual, physical and social artefacts of exchange practices [which] create 
externalities in the form of ‘network assets’” (Mouzas & Ford, 2009, p. 500). However, it 
remains unknown to what extent “network constitutions are explicit, formalized, legal, non-
legal or illegal” (Mouzas & Ford, 2009, p.501) and how constitutions materialise, disseminate 
and change empirically. Conceptually, existent research suggests that older and stable 
networks will generate more explicit constitutions, which may even materialise in the form of 
cartels or trade restraints (Mouzas & Ford, 2009, p.501). 
Alongside conceptual research, there are relevant historical accounts of network constitutions 
(Buchelo, 2004; Epstein, 2004; Kadens, 2012) as well as research on standards and 
certification schemes that examine empirical evidence of companies’ use of institutional 
devices in network interactions. One of the most prominent examples in the field of business 
and legal history is the phenomenon of “Law Merchant”. Law Merchant refers to “the 
commercial rules – contractual, customary, and statutory – that govern transactions among 
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merchants. It includes the rules governing sale, credit, insurance, transportation, and 
…partnership” (Epstein, 2004, p.1) developed by merchants in the medieval age. While the 
specific content and application of ‘Law Merchant’ remains subject to ongoing academic 
debate (Sagy, 2011; Kadens, 2012), there is agreement that ‘Law Merchant’ originates from 
the Roman law of sale and was concerned with enhancing the reliability of business exchanges 
between merchants trading internationally: “Much of it, such as the creation of bills of 
exchange and similar credit instruments, was created by merchants in response to the 
difficulties of trading at a distance” (Epstein, 2004, p.1).  
A more recent empirical examination of ‘network constitutions’ originates from Buchelo’s 
(2004) research of United Fruit’s involvement in the banana trade between South and North 
America in the beginning of the 20th century. United Fruit dominated the banana trade by 
orchestrating an impressive structure of GTC and other contract forms that insulated the 
company from risks emerging from interactions with multiple plantations owners, natural 
hazards and long-distance trade. Until the 1960s, United Fruit controlled almost 90% of 
banana production and trade in Central America, and its practices were replicated by other 
exporters operating in the United States and Latin America. Examining the documents-in-use 
allows a detailed understanding of the institutional devices that United Fruit developed over 
time to deal with various risks (Buchelo, 2004). The original historical insight into United 
Fruit’s use of institutional devices for dealing with risk is worth quoting in full:  
[a] “Local providers were obliged to sell all their produce to United Fruit, but 
United Fruit was not obliged to buy crops from them;  
[b] The contracts guaranteed United Fruit protection from any unpredicted 
event…for the first four decades of the twentieth century, these contracts 
established that the fruit belonged to the company as soon as it was cut from 
the tree. If, however, the fruit happened to have any defect identified by the 
company’s quality-control officials, ownership of the bananas reverted to the 
planter.  
[c] Moreover, even if the company’s officials approved and shipped the fruit 
but it was later rejected by U.S. health authorities for any reason, the fruit 
reverted to the Magdalena planter, who received no payment.  
[d] The contracts also specified that the local planters could not sell any of 
their fruit, including produce rejected by United Fruit, to another company.  
[e] If a local planter sold his or her property to someone else, the seller was 
obliged to include a clause in the land-sale contract that committed the buyer 
to adhere to the terms of the company’s purchase contract.  
[f] In the event that the Colombian or the U.S. government enacted taxes on 
the banana trade, the locals had to bear the extra costs. 
[g] Although the contracts gave a detailed description of the characteristics of 
the fruit the company considered acceptable for export, the company’s 
officials reserved the right to reject any fruit, regardless of its quality. 
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[h] Finally, the company reserved the right to cancel any purchase contract 
with any local planter without indemnification in the event of political 
conflicts or for any other reason the company decided upon” (Buchelo, 2004, 
p.189-190). 
To ensure compliance with United Fruit’s terms, the company relied on three enforcement 
mechanisms, including the (1) staggered release of contracts to farmers so that at no point in 
time were there several planters that were ‘free’ of contract to start their own export business 
or revolt against the terms; (2) third-party enforcement through the United States’ customs 
office and British courts, who confiscated shipments if planters tried by-passing selling their 
harvest to United Fruit; and (3) use of rewards and sanctions in the form of United Fruit loans.  
While historical research may appear dated, it provides two key insights: First, this research 
demonstrates the value of examining artefacts-in-use, such as standards, insurance 
agreements or trade contracts, to understand the uses and content of institutional devices that 
companies employ for dealing with risk in network interactions. Second, this research 
highlights the importance of studying formalised rules instead of norms and customs. Kadens 
(2012) powerfully demonstrates that ‘Law Merchant’ maintained its relevance due to the 
formalised codification of rules in business artefacts rather than reliance on ‘customs’ and 
‘norms’, because of the “pliability of custom, the difficulty of proving it with any assurance, and 
the complexity of transmitting it from place to place… [which results in] custom [being] a 
slippery type of law to borrow or share” (p. 1194). 
Modern use of industry standards and artefacts shows significant parallels with historical 
accounts, although empirical research in this area remains limited, with a few notable 
exceptions (Garud et al., 2002; Araujo & Moto, 2005). What is known is that companies can 
derive significant advantages from developing and enforcing industry standards, which is 
rooted in the ways standards are set up and distributed: 
First, standards are not limited to specifying technical issues, but can be designed to address 
any issue, including risk. Second, standard-setting is not exclusive to certain standard-setting 
bodies. Instead, any private or public actor can set and address standards to anyone, including 
companies, but also states or NGOs (Brütsch & Lehmkuhl, 2007). Third, decision making 
within standard-setting organizations is typically organized “as a rather exclusive club” (Arts 
& Kerwer, 2007, p.153), which leaves actors with significant freedom to negotiate their own 
preferences. Fourth, capitalizing on the freedom of contracting, actors use the: 
“authorization for designing private transactions as an important avenue for 
‘including’ extra-legal standards, because parties are authorized by the 
principle to refer to ‘outside’ norms as a part of the ‘legitimate’, binding private 
arrangement. […In this case] standards serve three ‘facilitating’ functions: 
They are ‘definers’, ‘monitors’ and ‘ex-post references’ of a given transaction. 
…References to standards may control the transaction throughout its duration 
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from pre-contractual to the post-contractual stage” (Schanze, 2007, pp.171-
175). 
This allows companies to establish ‘institutional shortcuts’ in regulating interactions with 
multiple actors by taking references to standards ‘off the rack’ and “plugg[ing them] into the 
draft with the assurance that they ‘function’ whenever the contingency arises” (Schanze, 2007, 
179). Depending on the power relationship between actors designing and actors adopting the 
standard, standards may ‘cascade’ across a network. Cascading is an intervention practice that 
refers to actors developing  
“artefacts that indicate their requirements of suppliers, in terms of protocols, 
preferences and policies, and provide them to suppliers with instructions … to 
comply. Furthermore…the [actors are] expected to pass on the customer’s 
requirements to its suppliers and so on” (Lamming, 1996, p.74).  
In addition to business actors’ contractual obligations to comply with standards, standard-
setting actors typically rely on third-party certification systems in the form of (unannounced) 
inspections and audits (Meidinger, 2007).  
Finally, standards emerge as efficient mechanisms to address ‘legal loopholes’ that challenge 
actors who are constantly engaging in business interactions across multiple national, legal and 
cultural boundaries. Van der Meulen summarizes this observation, stating that at times when: 
“the authority of national governments largely ends at their borders…[t]he 
only set of rules that trading partners at opposite ends of the world have in 
common are the rules they created for themselves by contract, including the 
private systems they include in their relation” (2011, p. 49). 
Existing research on the exact content and companies’ use and enforcement of standards for 
dealing with risk in network interactions remains hitherto limited.  
2.7 Conclusion 
The literature review highlights that risk in the context of business marketing research has 
received limited attention and that our knowledge of the conceptualisation of risk and how 
companies deal with risk requires theoretical development and empirical foundation. In terms 
of theoretical development, this chapter has shed light on the origins and implications of the 
probability- and uncertainty-based conceptualisation of risk and how these 
conceptualisations shape (d) our views of how companies are theorised to deal with risk. Upon 
a systematic review of the economic, behavioural and operational research of how companies 
deal with risk, it becomes evident that existent research in this field places disproportionate 
emphasis upon the unit-of-analysis of single actors and assumes that these actors can 
unilaterally implement relevant ‘risk management systems’. 
In addressing the limitations of existent research approaches, the chapter has introduced a 
new perspective to enhance our understanding of how companies deal with risk in business 
networks by developing a systematic synthesis of network and institution-based research: 
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While the network approach captures the complexity of interdependent and embedded 
business interactions, the institution-based approach contributes an important explanatory 
dimension to understand companies’ use of institutional devices - such as contracts and 
standards - for dealing with risk in direct and indirect business interactions. The value of this 
synthesis rests in capturing more accurately how companies deal with risk in real life by 
transcending the conceptual lens of single actors’ actions.   
The theoretical insights raised in the literature review are significant in co-determining the 
paradigmatic and methodological decisions underpinning the empirical research discussed in 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the epistemological, ontological and methodological choices of this 
research. Building on the critical realist epistemology and network ontology, this research 
employs case study research to collect empirical data through in-depth semi-structured 
interviews, business artefacts and participant observation. The chapter describes the data 
analysis and data reporting, and concludes with identifying considerations for research 
quality, rigour and ethics as well as methodological limitations. 
3.2 Critical Realist epistemology 
The research adopts a critical realist epistemology, as developed in the works of Bhaskar 
(1978), Archer and Bhaskar (1998); Sayer (1992), Easton (2000, 2010), Danermark et al. 
(2002), Archer (2010) and Tsoukas and Chia (2011)8. The reason for considering a critical 
realist stance is threefold: First, a critical realist epistemology provides superior congruence 
between the thesis’ research objective of explanatory theory development from a qualitative 
data set and the adopted network ontology. Moreover, this combination of epistemological, 
ontological and methodological approaches has been continuously advanced in the field of 
business network research, which allowed the researcher to learn from existing work by 
reading published research (for instance, Harrison & Easton, 2002) and from personal 
conversations with Geoff Easton in 2011 and 2012, who offered invaluable advice on critical 
realism informed qualitative case study research. Second, critical realism offers a set of 
conceptual tools to make sense of empirical observations and guide explanatory theory 
development. These conceptualisations include the critical realist understanding of dynamics 
in polyvalent open social systems, the morphogenetic cycle in structure-agency settings 
(Archer, 2010) and the development of causal mechanism explanations (Hedstrom, 2005; 
Mason, Easton & Lenney, 2013; Pawson & Tilley, 2013). Third, critical realist assumptions 
about knowledge generation support the methodological choice of case study research 
method (Easton, 2000; 2010).  
The following briefly examines key assumptions of critical realism, including the concepts of 
a stratified reality and the operation of causal mechanisms as an approach to explanatory 
theory development. An abbreviated version of core assumptions underpinning the critical 
realist epistemology include (Sayer, 1992; Archer, 2010): 
a) The existence of a mind-independent reality. 
                                                                
8 This research does not consider the meaning of ‘critical’ in the Marxist context of identifying and 
changing suboptimal social structures. Instead, the term ‘critical’ is used to refer to the researcher’s 
awareness for the need for critical reflection throughout the research process, which is partly an 
implication of a stratified understanding of reality and the understanding of inevitable limitations 
of any research process in capturing ‘reality’. 
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b) The understanding that perception and knowledge of this reality is fallible and theory 
laden. Evaluating the accuracy and truth value of research findings rests in its practical 
adequacy. 
c) Analytical dualism, which captures the interdependence of structure-agency duality in 
a ‘morphogenetic cycle’ (Archer, 2010, p.276).  
d) A differentiated and stratified reality, where natural and social objects possess 
“powers and liabilities capable of generating events” (Sayer, 1992, p.5). These 
structures exist regardless of whether they generate regular patterns of (perceivable) 
events or not9. 
Critical realism assumes a stratified reality, comprising the ‘empirical’, ‘actual’ and ‘real’ 
domains: 
Table 3.1. Stratified reality.  
 Adapted from Bhaskar, 1978, p.13. 
 Empirical Domain Actual Domain Real Domain 
Experiences ✓  ✓  ✓  
Events  ✓  ✓  
Mechanisms   ✓  
 
The ‘empirical domain’ comprises the layer of reality imperfectly perceivable by the researcher 
through experience and senses. The empirical domain includes all that is possibly perceivable, 
including “the external and visible behaviours of people, systems and things as they occur… 
[or] are reported” (Easton, 2010, p.120). The ‘actual domain’ comprises events and actions that 
a researcher may be partially aware or unaware of, due to limited cognitive capacity that 
prevents accurate capturing of all empirical events and activities. The ‘real domain’ comprises 
“structures, mechanisms, powers and relations” (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000, p.13, emphases 
added) that are generally not directly apprehensible by the researcher, but can be 
approximated through scientific inference – specifically the process of retroduction - and 
analysis. Across the three layers of reality, there are ‘objects’ and ‘entities’ connected through 
necessary and/or contingent relations, which together form the “basic theoretical building 
blocks for critical realist explanation” (Easton, 2010, p.120). The aim of critical realist inquiry 
is to penetrate the surface level of the empirical and actual domains in order to uncover 
generative causal mechanisms.  
                                                                
9 For a comprehensive discussion of critical realist assumptions, please consult Sayer, 1992, 
particularly from p. 5 onwards. 
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Identifying ‘causal mechanisms’ is key to meeting the explanatory aim of critical realist 
research, which seeks to answer the question of what caused the events observed in the 
empirical domain to happen (Easton, 2010)? In other words, “to ask for the cause of something 
is to ask what ‘makes it happen’, what ‘produces’, ‘generates’, ‘creates’ or ‘determines’ it or, … 
what ‘enables’ or ‘leads to’ it” (Sayer, 1992, p.104). Easton defines ‘mechanisms’ as “ways in 
which structured entities by means of their powers and liabilities act and cause particular 
events” (2010, p.122). Consequently, a causal explanation “is one that identifies entities and 
the mechanisms that connect them and combine to cause events to occur” (ibid., emphasis 
added). Figure 3.1 illustrates conceptually the operation of causal mechanisms:  
 
Figure 3.1. Causal mechanism. Adapted from Sayer, 1992, p. 109.  
‘Mechanisms’ in critical realist literature are also referred to as ‘deep structures or processes’ 
(considering their emergence in the ‘deep/real’ domain) or ‘generative mechanisms’ 
(considering their power to ‘generate’ events in the actual and empirical domain). Figure 3.1 
illustrates that the relation between objects (or social entities) and causal powers is necessary. 
However, the relation between causal powers and their conditions (also referred to as 
‘context’, which has the potential to activate the mechanisms) is contingent (Sayer, 1992). 
Because the activation of mechanisms is context-contingent, critical realist research considers 
context - the structural embeddedness of (social) entities and the relationships between 
entities - seriously. The present research translates this consideration into practical research 
terms by: 
a) Adopting a network ontology (Section 3.3); 
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b) Using a layered unit of network analysis (Section 3.5) to examine the relationships 
between entities; 
c) Presenting it in a defined industry context (see Chapter Four). 
Since causal powers do not inhere “simply in single objects or individuals but the social 
relations and structures which they form” (Sayer, 1992, p. 104, emphasis added) it is important 
that the research ontology and unit-of analysis informing this research enable the examination 
of relationships between entities. Identifying potential causal mechanisms relies on applying 
retroductive logic to scientific inference, proceeding backwards from the empirically 
observable events of the ‘empirical domain’ to the patterns of activities in the ‘actual domain’ 
to the abstract mechanisms in the ‘real domain’ (Danermark et al., 2002). Retroductive logic 
assumes that “events are causally explained by retroducing and confirming the existence of 
mechanisms …in turn the existence of mechanisms is explained by reference to the structure 
… of the objects” (Sayer, 192, p.235). While deductive and inductive logic allow movements 
within the ‘empirical layer’ from the general to the particular and vice versa (Easton, 2010), 
retroduction implies movement across the three layers of reality from one, empirically 
observable phenomenon to an abstract mechanism. 
3.3 Network ontology 
Ontology refers to “assumptions about how the world is” (Easton, 2002, p.108) and seeks to 
answer the question “What sort of object are we trying to describe and explain?” (Outhwaite, 
1983, p.328). Defining the ontological stance is important, clarifying the researcher’s “’system 
of picturing’ of the world that guides the questions we raise and the explanatory forms we 
deem plausible” (Tsoukas & Chia, 2011, p.3), and is closely inter-related with epistemological 
and methodological decisions.  
Critical realist epistemology highlights the importance of investigating not only the properties 
of social entities in context, but also the need to focus on the interactions between social 
entities. This epistemological requirement is addressed in adopting the business network 
ontology. The term ‘network’ captures metaphorically the complex webs of direct and indirect 
business interactions. Interactions between actors (or ‘entities’) are the building blocks 
constituting networks. Adopting the network ontology marks a significant departure from the 
dominant approach in business marketing and management research, particularly evident in 
the field of risk research, which tends to adopt the single firm as the preferred unit-of-analysis 
and treat the ‘market environment’ as a ‘response function’ (Mouzas, 2005, p.1272) to the 
firm’s actions. Such a perspective is rooted in the positivist approach assuming ontological and 
epistemological atomism (Sayer, 1992) and dichotomy between “marketing action and its 
context” (Mouzas, 2005, p.1272).  
In contrast, the network ontology advanced by the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP)-
group conceptualizes markets as webs of embedded, interdependent relationships between 
actors, resources and activities (Lundgren, 1992; Waluszewski, Hadjikhani & Baraldi, 2009). 
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Adopting the network ontology allows leveraging the implications of a critical realist 
epistemology in two ways: 
(1) The network ontology enables a contextualised understanding of business 
interactions, which corresponds with the critical realist focus on contextually 
contingent, causal explanations of social phenomena.  
(2) The network ontology illuminates the ‘multidimensionality’ of reality (Sayer, 1992) 
by moving the unit-of-analysis beyond the single firm to capturing inter-action at 
higher levels of aggregation.  
 
3.4 Research methodology: Case study research 
The case study research method is used to collect empirical data through: in-depth interviews, 
business artefact analysis and participant observation.  Case study research is understood as 
a methodological approach, referring to the “process where the design of the research and 
choice of particular methods, and their justification in relation to the research project is made 
evident” (King & Horrocks, 2010, p.6). This research defines a ‘case’ according to Dubois and 
Araujo (2007, p.171, emphases added), who suggest that a case is: 
“a complex configuration of events and structures situated in spatial and 
temporal contexts, which preserves the integral character of social phenomena 
and which the analyst believes exhibits the operation of some identified 
theoretical [or causal] mechanism.” 
This definition illuminates three key characteristics of critical realist informed case study 
research: a context-contingent interplay of social entities and structures that can be explained 
with reference to causal mechanisms.  
Capitalising on the possibilities of case study research is critical to generate an in-depth, 
structured analysis of a complex, context-contingent and under-researched phenomenon: 
dealing with risk in business networks. Specifically, case study research is adopted, because 
this research requires a methodological approach that: 
a) Allows the investigation of the complex, context-contingent phenomenon of risk in 
business networks;  
b) Allows the mobilizing of the methodological and analytical possibilities entailed in a 
critical realist epistemology and network ontology (Ryan et al., 2012); 
c) Facilitates theoretical and methodological triangulation; 
d) Supports the thesis’ objective of explanatory theory development (Sayer, 1992; 
Easton, 2010); 
e) Offers a flexible framework for abductive and retroductive data collection and analysis 
(Gadde & Dubois, 2002; Danermark et al., 2002). 
To inform the empirical application of case study research, this research draws on case study 
research practices and recommendations from existent work in business network research 
(for example, Easton, 2000; 2010; Harrison & Easton, 2002; Halinen & Törnroos, 2005; Dubois 
& Arujo, 2007; Ryan et al., 2012). Specifically, this research addresses ‘best practice’ 
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considerations raised by Piekkari et al (2010, p.113) regarding theory development, sampling 
and research method triangulation: 
Explanatory theory development: The objective of this case study research moves beyond 
generating a descriptive account of “a phenomenon in its real-life context” (Piekkari et al., 
2010, p.112) bound to the ‘empirical domain’ of observed evidence. Instead, this research 
applies the critical realist logic of ‘causal mechanisms’ and abductive case analysis to 
analytically span the boundaries of the empirical, actual and real domains. This allows for 
explanatory, analytical generalisation (in contrast to predictive, statistical generalisation) 
based on the intensive analysis of a few cases. Analytical generalisation rests on the 
identification of the “operation of some identified theoretical principle that distinguishes case 
study research from an account of a series of events” (Dubois & Araujo, 2004, p.210). 
Case selection and sampling: Case study selection follows the principle of purposeful (also 
referred to as ‘theoretical’) sampling. This sampling principle describes the ongoing selection 
of cases, chosen to “test or refine new ideas as these emerge from the data. Sites and sources 
are selected flexibly for their theoretical relevance in generating comparisons and extending 
and refining ideas, rather than for representational value in allowing generalizations to 
particular populations” (Dey, 2004, p.80). The advantage of purposeful sampling is that it is 
congruent with abductive data analysis, because the flexibility of purposeful sampling allows 
us “to arrive at an appropriate matching between reality and theoretical constructs. Sampling, 
thus, becomes more of a continuous process than a separate stage in the study” (Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002, p.559). Case selection is based upon a pilot study of four interviews (conducted 
in 2011) and preliminary contract analysis, which informed more finely calibrated sampling 
decisions in recruiting interview participants and collecting business artefacts. 
Triangulation of empirical data: In addition to in-depth interviews and participant 
observation, this research deliberately invested effort into obtaining access to confidential 
business artefacts-in-use, such as General Terms and Conditions and framework contracts. 
Triangulating material evidence with verbal accounts has been insightful, since “material 
traces of behaviour give an important and different insight from that provided by any number 
of [accounts]” (Hodder, 1998, p.114). Moreover, the analysed business artefacts offer an 
original perspective of ‘material traces’ not of just one actor, but several actors’ interactions. 
This research also applies the triangulation logic within interview- and artefact-based data 
collection: The selection of interview participants ensured a triangulation of insights from 
different perspectives, such as retailers and manufacturers, NGOs, industry associations, 
farmers, and standard auditors. The selection of business artefacts ensured triangulation of 
different artefact categories such as industry standard documents, GTC and framework 
contracts, as well as a collection of these artefacts from different actors. 
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3.5 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis includes sets of dyadic business relationships.  In line with existent 
business network research, dyadic relationships are understood as building blocks of business 
networks (Ford & Håkansson, 2006; Gadde, Hjelmgren & Skarp, 2012) and are defined as “an 
interdependent process of continuous interaction and exchange between at least two actors 
in a business network context” (Holmlund & Törnroos, 1997, p.305). 
This thesis examines dyads as sets of inter-dependent, direct and indirect relationships, which 
are studied at three levels of aggregation: the network, focal and dyadic levels. This choice is 
not accidental. While direct dyadic relationships form the preferred unit of analysis within 
network research for valid practical and theoretical considerations, focusing exclusively on 
direct dyads is of limited value in understanding business network phenomena, and 
particularly how companies deal with risk through direct and indirect relationships. This is 
because activities observed in direct dyads are not simply additive enough to reflect a network 
view (Easton, 2010). Therefore, this research answers the call to consider three units (or 
levels) of network analysis (Hulthen, 2012) because “by shifting the focal points…another 
understanding of the network can be reached and other conclusions drawn” (p.196). 
Consideration for the network, focal and dyadic levels is reflected in the thesis’ methodological 
approach and data reporting: By adopting the ‘embedded case study’ approach (Yin, 1994, 
p.39), this research understands methodological ‘embeddedness’ as the integration of three 
interdependent units-of-analysis. The reported empirical data in Chapters Six to Eight reflects 
the three units-of-analysis by presenting how companies use institutional devices for dealing 
with risk at the network, focal and dyadic levels.  
3.6 Data collection 
This research draws on three methods of primary data collection, including semi-structured 
in-depth interviews, business artefacts and participant observation:  
 
Figure 3.2. Data collection. 
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Triangulating three data collection methods allowed addressing of the limitations of 
individual methods and enhancing the robustness of the empirical findings. Data collection 
was preceded by a pilot study conducted in the summer of 2011, involving four in-depth 
interviews with food industry experts and a preliminary analysis of a small set of business 
artefacts, including two contracts and two GTC. The pilot study helped in evaluating the 
feasibility of the research project and significantly facilitated recruitment of future 
participants.   
3.6.1 In-depth semi-structured interviews 
This section justifies the decision to conduct in-depth semi-structured interviews and 
describes the applied technique and encountered challenges. This research involved 
conducting 42 in-depth semi-structured interviews in Germany between 2011 and 2014. A full 
anonymised overview of interview participants is enclosed in the Appendix. The following 
reasons informed the decision to conduct semi-structured in-depth interviews: 
First, this type of face-to-face interview suits the sensitive nature of the topic and allowed: (a) 
responding to the participants’ concern of confidentiality; (b) exploring multiple actors’ 
perspectives; and (c) securing further access through snowball and purposive sampling of 
participants. Second, in-depth semi-structured interviews support exploratory research 
through flexible research design that is in ‘constant evolution’ (Dana & Dana, 2005, p. 82) and 
allow for “sufficient flexibility to approach different respondents differently while still 
covering the same areas of data collection” (Noor, 2008, p. 1604). 
The adopted interview technique resembles ‘responsive interviewing’ (Rubin & Rubin, 2005), 
which facilitates ongoing data collection and analysis in light of new evidence and allows a 
maximum adaptation to a diverse range of interview participants, respective (confidentiality) 
concerns and possibilities for new insights. Responsive interviewing treats interviews as a: 
“dynamic, iterative process, not a set of tools to be applied mechanically. […] 
Responsive interviewers begin the project with a topic in mind but recognize 
that they will modify their questions to match the knowledge and interests of 
the interviewees” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p.30).  
Responsive interviewing contrasts with the ‘stimulus-response’ model prevalent in positivist 
research, which aims at “standardizing the stimulus or, perhaps a better term, to neutralize it, 
so that responses may be interpreted clearly and unequivocally” (Mishler, 1986, p. 15). In 
responsive interviewing, the researcher capitalizes on insights gained from previous 
interviews and evolving published research to continuously adapt the unfolding interview 
sessions (Gorden, 1956). Interview outlines were treated as a ‘Leitmotif’ for each session, with 
several open questions forming “the skeleton of the interview” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p.134). 
This allows the freedom to capture the participants’ accounts without pre-defining or 
scaffolding accounts into established question-sets. Key to ‘responsive interviewing’ is that the 
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researcher actively listens to “each answer to determine the next question based on what was 
said” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p.12) instead of following an ex-ante question set disregarding 
the participant’s previous response. This approach allows for rich probing and proved 
invaluable in generating themes that lay outside the common frame of risk management 
literature.  
While ‘responsive interviewing’ clearly contributed to developing a rich data-set, the 
challenges in using this approach are oftentimes undeservedly overlooked and therefore 
deserve to be revisited. 
First, responsive interviewing assumes that the participant and the researcher are 
comfortable with an unstructured approach and that the researcher possesses necessary skills 
in listening, observing, understanding and tailoring subsequent questions based on the 
ongoing conversation of potentially novel content. These assumptions sometimes clashed 
with participants’ expectations of receiving a structured interview outline and the 
researcher’s need to improve her ‘responsive interviewing’ skills throughout the process. To 
address the issue of participants’ expectations, the researcher decided to replace the word 
‘interview’ with ‘conversation’ in her correspondence with potential participants, which was 
more accurately reflecting the process of ‘responsive interviewing’. This modification helped 
addressing the baggage of meaning that many participants associated with ‘interviews’, 
including the association of interviews with pre-structured outlines and media interviews. 
The learning lesson from this modification is that it is not sufficient to eliminate theoretical 
jargon from the ‘interview’ questions but equal care must be applied to eliminating 
methodological jargon from communication with participants. It is worth noting that the 
purpose and all respective participation rights associated with ‘research interviews’ were 
rigorously aligned with the Marketing Research Society’s ethical guidelines discussed in 
‘Section 3.10 Research Ethics’.  
Second, responsive interviewing requires the skill of framing the next question based on 
immediate prior accounts. The challenge lies in respectful unpacking of the account without 
questioning the participant’s expertise and infringing the ‘employer confidentiality’ barrier. 
Moreover, the challenge was aggravated by the fact that the interview participants ranged 
from lawyers, members of the food and agricultural ministry, compliance and distribution 
managers to activists, farmers or on-site auditors. The diversity of participants’ backgrounds 
required continuous adaptation to multiple expert jargons, including legal, management, 
agricultural and biochemical jargons. Understanding and being able to converse in this jargon 
significantly contributed to building rapport, which facilitated rich accounts as well as further 
snowball sampling of participants. However, this equally required significant preparation 
from the researcher, who read legislative and governmental reports, recent activist 
campaigns, audit check-lists, standard catalogues and contracts.  
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Third, framing questions based on the preceding conversation required the researcher to 
balance exploration of emerging themes with understanding the main research focus on 
manifestations of ‘risk’ and ‘how companies deal with risk’. Given the diversity of participants’ 
backgrounds, extensive probing sometimes resulted in detailed but tangentially relevant 
accounts. 
Similar to the observation stated in large-scale research on food retail commissioned by the 
European Union (Bunte et al., 2011), the researcher faced significant challenges in recruiting 
participants. To address this issue, the researcher adopted the following techniques: 
(1) Instead of using corporate contact details provided on company websites, the researcher 
used professional networks - ‘LinkedIn’ and the German equivalent ‘Xing’ - to identify and 
contact relevant participants (based on their CV and current occupation). This helped 
avoiding that the contact letter would be forwarded to the company’s “Media and Public 
Relations” division, which typically results in a rejection letter. Moreover, the researcher 
could evaluate participants’ professional experience (and prepare the interview session 
accordingly), as well as identify ex-employees of retailers and manufacturing businesses 
who were now self-employed or working in consultancies or industry associations and 
were more willing to participate. 
(2) Attending industry conferences and congresses, including the ‘Food Safety Conference’ 
held in Germany annually or the ‘GFSI annual conference’ held globally, was another route 
to recruiting participants. However, the limitations of this approach were high attendance 
fees of up to 2000 EUR per event and the limited time that participants could dedicate to 
in-depth conversations. Hence, the researcher studied the profiles of congress speakers 
and contacted all relevant speakers individually. This proved invaluable in securing access 
to industry experts for tailored conversations of up to three hours, which would have been 
impossible during a congress. In addition to this approach, the researcher secured access 
to one industry conference organized by the ‘Bonn International Centre for Food Chain 
and Network Research’, entitled “Cross-company quality and risk management along the 
food supply chain”, held in June 2013 in Berlin. This event offered the opportunity for 
informal conversations with participants over a two-day period and generated a further 
pool of relevant interview contacts.  
(3) A further technique involved identifying participants who were working for hub 
organizations such as industry associations, and consultancies working with clients from 
the food industry. Such organizations typically employ industry experts who have had 
previous careers with major retailers or manufacturing businesses. These individuals 
demonstrated necessary ‘detachedness’ from a specific company, which facilitated more 
open and honest accounts, as well as detailed ‘insider knowledge’ of current issues and 
Dealing with Risk in Business Networks 
[77] 
 
practices. Moreover, these participants proved to have an extensive network of contacts 
who facilitated further ‘snowball sampling’.  
(4) Travelling to attend face-to-face interviews was essential to secure contact with 
participants, establish rapport, and enhance the quality of the collected data. Adapting to 
participants’ preferences regarding time and location helped in addressing participants’ 
confidentiality concerns and often facilitated access to further materials, such as copies of 
contracts, letters, insurance policies, audit checklists or standard catalogues, which some 
participants retrieved during the interview.  
Despite these efforts, this research experienced limitations in interviewing participants who 
were directly and currently employed by food retailers and manufacturers. Although more 
than forty-five further participants were contacted to address this, the most frequent reasons 
for rejection included fear of infringing employee confidentiality agreements; time 
constraints; no response. It is therefore even more critical to consider the value of the other 
two methods of primary data collection: business artefacts and participant observation.  
3.6.2 Business artefacts 
Consulting business artefacts-in-use as primary data in addition to interview accounts allows 
the capturing of inter-organisational, material objectifications of business interactions. For 
this thesis, the researcher secured access to: 
a) The International Featured Standard (IFS) Food versions five and six; IFS Food Store, IFS 
Logistics and IFS Broker catalogues and respective IFS communication, including member 
updates on changes to IFS schemes, training events and IFS Integrity Committee decisions; 
b) Eleven GTC sets, including the GTC of all six German food retailers and manufacturers; 
c) Six framework contracts agreed between German food retailers and manufacturers and 
some manufacturers and suppliers, alongside respective ordering agreements, insurance 
policy confirmations and requests for information (also known as supplier-screening 
agreements). 
These are still valid, original artefacts-in-use, which often contain annotations and 
attachments reflecting negotiated changes. The artefacts were obtained from an individual 
working for a German food manufacturer who maintains accounts with various German 
retailers; an individual working for the German food industry federation; and an individual 
working for a non-food product supplier to German food retailers. The latter was relevant, 
because retailers use the same GTC and even framework contracts for food and non-food 
suppliers. Early access to these artefacts was critical, because it informed subsequent 
interviews. The researcher acknowledged in the interviews that she read those artefacts in 
advance, which significantly enhanced the depth of the interviews. 
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Artefacts refer to “concrete things, possessing their own autonomous physicality…which exist 
independently of their creators” (Suchman, 2003, p.98). GTC and framework contracts are a 
specific category of legal business artefacts that can be defined as “formally documented 
arrangements for governing a voluntary exchange relationship” (Suchman, 2003, p.94). Legal 
artefacts are of relevance to business marketing research, because they specify the interaction 
between resources, activities and actors. Key marketing activities and resources, such as 
product specifications, distribution conditions and pricing specifications are stated in 
contracts. As utilitarian devices, legal artefacts provide “intricate frameworks of procedures, 
commitments, rights and incentives – … to accomplish practical objectives in the governance 
of human transactions” (Suchman, 2003, p.99). Existing research highlights the use of legal 
artefacts as ‘scripts’ for co-ordinating business interactions, while recognising that a ‘script’ 
may differ from actual performance (D’Adderio, 2008; Suchman, 2003). 
Despite recognising its relevance in conceptual terms, empirical research involving business 
artefacts as primary data appears limited in business marketing research, where artefacts are 
often subsumed into ‘secondary’ or ‘archival data’. This research considers business artefacts 
such as standards, GTC and framework contracts as primary data, which refers to written 
artefacts that are not publicly accessible, but are customized for a specific purpose and 
constitute an inherent or essential element of the phenomenon under investigation. In addition, 
a wide range of secondary data was consulted, including industry and governmental reports, 
news and trade press to establish the industry context (see Chapter Four) and sensitise the 
researcher for contextual developments underpinning data collection and analysis.  
Business marketing research considering artefacts as primary data appears to favour research 
of technological artefacts and effects of technology on changing organizational practices (for 
example, Orlikowski, 2007; Mouzas & Araujo, 2000), with some exceptions exploring the role 
of contracts (Suchman, 2003; Mouzas, 2006; D’Adderio, 2008; Mouzas & Blois, 2012). 
Moreover, research considering business artefacts tends to concentrate on one category of 
artefacts (such as contracts or standards) in isolation from other artefacts (Garud, Jain & 
Kumaraswamy, 2002); it focuses on the use of artefacts in an intra-organizational setting 
(D’Adderio, 2011) and consults publicly available template artefacts instead of artefacts-in-use 
(Argyres, Bercovitz & Mayer, 2007). 
The paucity of research considering business artefacts-in-use as primary data appears to be 
rooted in several reasons: 
(1) Analysis of business artefacts-in-use in marketing and business studies seems to lack 
broadly recognized cases of successfully using this method for generating original 
findings (with a selection of exceptions mentioned above). 
(2) Compared to other data collection methods, such as interviews or survey research, 
there are limited publications addressing procedures and conceptual frameworks that 
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would aid in selecting, analysing, interpreting and reporting findings from business 
artefacts-in-use. 
(3) Building on the above observations, it may be unclear to researchers how research of 
primary artefacts can contribute to answering research questions and how such 
evidence can be triangulated with other primary data. 
(4) For practitioners, artefacts often constitute mundane aspects of routinely performed 
activities that are not considered ‘novel’ or of ‘special interest’ to researchers and are 
therefore rarely mentioned in other data collection encounters. It requires proactive 
effort on the part of the researcher to understand what artefacts are used, by whom, 
when, how and why. 
(5) Access to certain artefacts such as GTC or contracts may prove difficult due to 
confidentiality concerns and, considering the above observations, ‘not worthy’ of the 
researchers’ effort. 
(6) Existing literature on business artefacts only recently started to address the 
misconception that artefacts are ‘insignificant’ to marketing practice because of their 
allegedly ‘solid’ nature (D’Adderio, 2008, 2011).  
Considering these observations, this research adds in three ways to our understanding of 
using business artefacts in business marketing research: First, this research draws on original 
artefacts-in-use (in contrast to templates), which allows for a comparative analysis of artefacts 
from different sets of business interactions and the analysis of changes to artefacts. Second, 
this research examines the use of artefacts in inter-organisational business interactions, 
compared to the predominant focus in existing research on intra-organisational uses of 
artefacts. Third, this research considers for the first time in the literature the interdependent 
analysis of three categories of business artefacts-in-use (industry standards, GTC and 
framework contracts), whereas previous research focused on analysing one category (such as 
contracts) in isolation. 
3.6.3 Participant observation 
Participant observation was conducted in June and July 2013 at the leading German risk and 
crisis consulting firm specialising in German and European food retail and agricultural 
business. Core consulting services offered by the firm include ex-ante and ex-post risk 
management, risk assessment and communication with media, consumers, activist groups and 
governmental authorities, and product recall and/or withdrawal support. Key clients include 
all major German retailers, including the REWE and EDEKA groups, Lidl and the Metro Group, 
most of the top brand and private label manufacturers across all product categories, and food 
industry associations. The consulting firm maintains joint risk management projects with the 
Federal Ministry for Food and Agriculture and the Federation of German Food and Drink 
Industries (BE). The researcher gained access through an in-depth interview with the 
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managing director in June 2012. Considering the consulting firm’s leading position in the 
German food industry, with an unmatched number and range of clients relevant to this 
research, it offered an ideal ‘hub’ for participant observation, despite the limitations posed by 
the non-disclosure agreement.  
It is worth noting that this ‘participant observation’ was not focused on observing the 
behaviour of individuals within the consulting firm, but used as an opportunity to facilitate 
further data collection regarding the consulting firm’s client activities. The project work 
allowed the researcher to observe and contextualise the interactions of various clients, such 
as retailers, manufacturers, representatives of local and national authorities, logistics 
providers, media and activist groups. The researcher adopted an overt stance and ‘active 
membership role’ (Adler & Adler, 1994, p.380), which involved daily work with the firm’s 
consulting team on current projects. Sharing the ‘hub office’ with the team leader ensured 
continuous involvement in all ongoing projects, client calls and strategy meetings. Specifically, 
the researcher worked with five members of the consulting team on risk management projects 
for two internationally operating dairy producers and manufacturers; one compliance project 
for a German retailer; and was involved to a minor extent in managing two product recalls of 
a frozen food retailer-brand manufacturer and a manufacturer-brand soft-drink producer.   
Participant observation adds to this research in the following ways: 
(1) While the non-disclosure agreement prevents the use of any material evidence from 
the researcher’s project work, it was agreed to record and transcribe several 
conversations with the consulting team. These conversations often included 
reflections on ongoing projects that the researcher was jointly involved in with the 
respondent and allowed for greater depth compared to other interviews. Moreover, 
the consulting firm’s reputation helped the researcher in securing further access to 
interview participants outside the firm. 
(2)  Exposure to client projects and observation of current cases allowed the researcher 
to adopt a ‘bird’s eye’ perspective to observing network interactions between various 
organizational actors in the context of a specific client project, which moved beyond 
the perspective of single companies. Moreover, considering the unwillingness of most 
participants to disclose details of how companies deal with risk, actual observations 
of recall/withdrawal activities or compliance with guarantee and insurance terms 
provided a valuable way for the researcher to contextualise and interpret interview 
accounts from conversations outside the participant observation phase.  
(3) A less tangible, but critical, benefit of the participant observation phase was the 
researcher’s genuine interest in improving her portfolio of data collection and analysis 
skills through practicing different research methods as well as advancing her 
understanding of this empirical context for future research. 
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3.7 Data analysis 
Data analysis is understood as an iterative, recursive and holographic process, rather than a 
self-contained ‘phase’ of research. This section aims to present a structured account of the 
executed data analysis while preserving the authenticity of this complex process. First, the 
section describes the applied abductive analytical approach by drawing on the concept of 
‘systematic combining’ introduced by Dubois and Gadde (2002). Second, the section describes 
how this research translates the logic of ‘systematic combining’ in the application of specific 
data analysis techniques. 
Figure 3.3 positions the role and approach to data analysis informing this research: 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Data analysis.  Developed from conversations with Ryan, 2010. 
Figure 3.3 captures data analysis as a recursive, iterative, progressive and holographic 
process, which concretizes the idea of ‘abductive logic’. Recursive means that “one part can call 
you back to a previous part” (Ryan, 2010) to evaluate evidence from a new vantage point or 
to generate further data. Iterative and progressive refers to the experience that data analysis is 
a “cycle that keeps repeating”. For instance, emerging codes and themes may inform a 
preliminary theoretical framework, which simultaneously informs the ongoing coding. 
Holographic means that each ‘step’ in the data analysis process (such as reading original 
transcript; labelling data pieces with codes; re-organizing descriptive codes into ‘pattern 
codes’) contains the entire process. This is because the researcher’s mind is imprinted with 
(ongoing familiarization with relevant) theory, and the processes of constantly confronting 
data excerpts with theoretical knowledge are simultaneous processes that are both informed 
by the whole research process and informing the research process. Figure 3.3 captures this 
latter observation in the ‘outer’ circle. 
In adopting the abductive approach, the researcher: 
“starts from the particular… identifies a particular phenomenon - a surprising 
or anomalous finding, perhaps. …by inspecting [her] own experience, …stock 
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of knowledge of similar, comparable phenomena, and the equivalent stock of 
ideas that can be included from within other disciplines” (Coffey & Atkinson, 
1996, p.156).  
 
To illustrate, in one of the first in-depth interviews, one participant mentioned a particularly 
surprising phenomenon referred to as ‘private food law’ in the context of confectionery 
manufacturers’ efforts in dealing with risk. This phenomenon fell outside the conventional 
scope of ‘risk management’ literature the researcher was familiar with. This instance 
illustrates how the researcher inspected her own ‘stock of experience and knowledge’ and 
identified the need to look beyond the immediate theoretical, and to some extent, disciplinary 
boundaries of marketing and business network research to make sense of this concept. In this 
process, the researcher initially consulted literature on ‘private ordering’ (Eisenberg, 1976; 
Macaulay, 1986; Birnhack, 2004), a concept from legal sociology that showed close 
terminological proximity, empirical and theoretical relevance. Following this theoretical 
exploration, the researcher examined the broader field of institutional research, which proved 
invaluable in making sense of this and further concepts emerging from ongoing data analysis, 
such as ‘codification’, ‘monitoring’ or ‘sanctioning’. Consulting institutional research proved 
invaluable beyond making sense of emerging concepts, as it demonstrates congruence with 
key assumptions of business network research, which is critical for theory development.  
This brief illustration captures the essence of data analysis as an iterative process of 
confronting empirical data with theory. The researcher aimed to bring ‘raw data’ to “the full 
range of intellectual resources, derived from theoretical perspectives, substantive traditions, 
research literatures and other sources” (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, p.153). Such an approach 
highlights that “methods of data collection…and analysis do not make sense when treated in 
an intellectual vacuum and divorced from more general and fundamental disciplinary 
frameworks” (ibid.). This illuminates the role of theory in qualitative data analysis that helps 
the researcher to “organize your data, and organize your brain, so that you set the stage for 
having insight” (Morse, 1994, p.23). 
To further systematize and articulate the abductive data analysis process, the researcher 
adopted ‘systematic combining’ (Dubois & Gadde, 2002), which significantly contributed to 
meeting the objective of theory development. ‘Systematic combining’ describes the 
simultaneous and inter-dependent evolution of data analysis, the theoretical framework and 
data collection with the objective of theory development (in contrast to theory generation or 
verification): 
 “Systematic combining builds more on the refinement of existing theories 
than on inventing new ones. One major difference, as compared with both 
deductive and inductive studies, is the role of the theoretical framework. In 
studies relying on abduction, the original framework is successively modified, 
partly as a result of unanticipated empirical findings, but also of theoretical 
insights gained during the process. This approach creates fruitful cross-
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fertilization where new combinations are developed through a mixture of 
established theoretical models and new concepts derived from the 
confrontation with reality” (Dubois & Gadde, 2002, p.559).  
 
The outcome of applying ‘systematic combining’ in this research is the successive modification 
of the theoretical framework, resulting in the synthesis of the network and institutional 
research, which informs the institution-based explanation of how companies deal with risk in 
business networks. Having established the general principles of the applied data analysis logic, 
the remainder of this section zooms in on concrete analytical techniques employed in this 
research. Describing the employed data analysis techniques serves the objective of providing 
the reader with information that allows tracking the procedures, assessing the adequacy of 
the links between data analysis and findings and, ultimately, evaluating the credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability of the findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Miles 
& Huberman, 1994).  
The first step of data analysis involved converting all empirical evidence into ‘text’, which 
resulted in a data set comprising: (a) 42 verbatim interview transcriptions in German, and 
subsequent translation; (b) business artefacts, including eleven GTC in-use; six sets of 
framework contracts and ordering agreements and respective insurance policy specifications 
and standard catalogues. The researcher notes written during the participant observation 
phase were used to aid interpretation and contextualisation of emerging themes from the 
interview and artefactual data-sets. 
Transcription and translation are regarded as stages of analysis (Kvale, 1996; Arksey & Knight, 
1999), because what “passes from tape to paper is the result of decisions about what ought to 
go on paper” (Arksey & Knight, 1999, p.141, emphasis added). In this research, transcription 
and translation involved verbatim translations (preserving instances where participants 
clearly emphasized words) but excluded word repetitions, pauses and expressions like 
laughter (Kvale, 1996). Once the textual data-set was established, the researcher proceeded 
separately with analysing the interview data and artefactual evidence by performing code-
based content analysis and using matrix displays proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994). 
Content analysis served as a ‘diagnostic tool’ (Mostyn, 1985, p.117) to make sense of rich 
textual data, whereas matrices were compact and flexible displays of data. An example of a 
refined outcome of a matrix approach is offered in Figure 7.1, which compares GTC content 
across four food retailers. 
Interview data was subjected to multiple rounds of content analysis using a combination of 
open, axial and selective coding (Neuman, 1994). Coding facilitated three kinds of operations, 
including “detecting relevant phenomena, collecting examples of those phenomena and 
analysing those phenomena in order to find commonalities, differences in patterns and 
structures” (Seidel & Kelle, 1995, pp.55-56). Coded interview transcripts and artefacts set the 
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stage for mapping relations between high-order concepts. In open and axial coding, initial 
codes were written against ‘interesting’ data excerpts (individual terms, phrases or passages) 
and supplementary comments and questions added in the margin. At this stage of three rounds 
of ‘first level coding’, the analysis generated a predominantly descriptive list of 250 codes, 
some of which displayed low code density. ‘Interesting’ data excerpts were those that 
appeared as evidence of patterns, regularities, themes, contrasts, paradoxes, irregularities 
(Coffey & Atkinson, 1996) or particular expressions used by respondents, such as metaphors 
(for instance, ‘avalanche’ (ID 20) in relation to risk). Sometimes, the respondent’s terms were 
preserved to create an in-vivo code such as ‘modus operandi’ (ID 33) or ‘liability regime’ (ID 
15). The researcher also used codes drawn from the literature, such as ‘legal sanctions’ and 
‘non-legal sanctions’ (Charny, 1990) to label passages depicting such practices. To reduce the 
number of first-level codes, the researcher proceeded to identify ‘pattern codes’, which refer 
to “explanatory or inferential codes …that identify an emergent theme, configuration, or 
explanation. They pull together a lot of material into more meaningful and parsimonious units 
of analysis” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p.69). Examples of pattern codes are ‘codification’, 
‘monitoring’, ‘enforcement’ and ‘adaptation’ which are conceptually integrated in Chapter 
Nine, Figure 9.7. 
Similar to interview transcripts, standard catalogues, GTC and framework contracts were 
translated and subjected to the same coding processes as outlined above. The difference was, 
however, that these artefacts were already organized by ‘labelled’ clauses and paragraphs. 
Hence, the descriptive coding phase primarily adopted ‘ready-made’ codes, but ‘pattern 
coding’ was applied to map and compare the content of the standard, GTC and contract terms. 
Tabulating clauses by ‘code/clause’ revealed high degrees of similarity across and between 
GTC and contract terms of actors. 
To organize the codes from the interview and artefact analyses, the researcher compiled 
several versions of ‘thematic conceptual matrices’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p.131). Matrices 
facilitated progressing from first to second and third-order concepts by “subsuming the 
particulars into the general” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p.129) while preserving the integrity 
and meaning of the original context by including quotation excerpts and respective indexes to 
direct the researcher to the original location. Coding and matrix creation were performed 
predominantly in Microsoft Office Word, although initial rounds of interview transcript coding 
were performed with Atlas.ti. While Atlas.ti facilitated systematic coding displays, it was 
limited in facilitating links between interview and artefact analysis, and therefore the 
researcher completed the analysis in Word and by using paper/board displays. 
3.8 Data reporting 
Data reporting refers to how the empirical findings are organised and presented. To balance 
‘rich description’ with a minimum of redundancy, the empirical evidence is structured 
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thematically (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt 2007). Thematic reporting 
allows distinguishing a case study from a descriptive account, because it is organised to exhibit 
“the operation of some identified theoretical principle” (Dubois & Araujo, 2004, p.210). In the 
context of this thesis, the theoretical principle refers to the use of institutional devices for 
dealing with risk at three levels of network interaction. Therefore, the evidence in Chapters 
Five to Eight is presented according to the three levels of network unit-of-analysis: the 
network, focal, and dyadic level and respective evidence of the institutional devices used at 
each level of network interaction. Thematic reporting is also known as ‘phenomenon driven’ 
reporting (Eisenhardt & Grabner, 2007, p.26), because it “synthesizes the lessons from all 
[data types] and is organized around [relevant themes]” (Yin, 1994, p.137).  
Thematic reporting allows focusing on who are the actors and when, how and why they use 
institutional devices for dealing with risk. This description is important given the limited 
research on both the locus and impact of risk in business networks and the content and use of 
institutional devices for dealing with risk. Reporting the cases thematically was driven by the 
question what is my data a case of (Ragin & Becker, 1992)? Answering this question 
illuminates that the empirical evidence presents a case of companies using institutional 
devices for dealing with risk in direct and indirect interactions. Consequently, Chapters Six to 
Eight report the content and use of the IFS, GTC and framework contracts for dealing with risk 
at the network, focal and dyadic levels of interaction. 
In this way, thematic analysis reflects Yin’s observation of case study research where each 
“individual case reveals a discovery [in this case, the content and use of an institutional device] 
but in which the replication across cases also adds up to a significant theoretical 
[development]” (1994, p.148). By keeping the analytical dimension at the forefront, thematic 
reporting facilitates theoretical development (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007) in Chapter Nine. The integrated model of dealing with risk in business networks 
(Chapter Nine, Figure 9.7) captures the pattern of codifying, monitoring, enforcing and 
adapting institutional devices across the use of institutional devices at three levels of network 
analysis. This abstraction is further substantiated by the proposition of the causal mechanism 
of ‘rules’, which may explain in critical realist terms why and how companies use institutional 
devices for dealing with risk in business networks. In this way, the combination of the process-
model and proposition of the causal mechanism aims to address the tension “between the 
particular [case evidence] and the universal [explanation]” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p.173). 
3.9 Research quality and rigour 
This section establishes how this research addresses credibility, transferability, dependability 
and confirmability requirements (Lincoln & Guba, 1985)10 to ensure research quality and 
                                                                
10There exist several attempts at applying modified understandings of traditionally quantitative 
parameters (i.e., internal/external validity; generalizability) to qualitative research. Most 
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rigour throughout the research process. Considering the qualitative nature of this research 
and the underlying epistemological, ontological and methodological decisions, it is more 
accurate to consider qualitative ‘measures’ for assessing research quality and rigour (Astley, 
1985; Weber, 2004). The following sections therefore briefly define and outline how each 
requirement was addressed. 
Credibility: Credibility refers to the ‘truth value’ of the findings (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 
p.278) and is assessed by how congruent the findings are with ‘reality’ (Merriam, 1998). 
Credibility is a critical parameter for trustworthiness and is addressed in this research 
through six practices: 
(1) Adopting established research methods: The research draws consistently on established 
means for scientific enquiry in its field. The combination of a critical realist epistemology, 
network ontology and case study research has proved useful in previous conceptual and 
empirical studies in the field of marketing and business network research (Perry, Riege & 
Brown, 1999; Easton, 2000, 2010, Ryan et al., 2010) and is well-suited to address this 
thesis’ research objectives. 
(2) Developing early familiarity with the empirical field was accomplished in two ways: First, 
the researcher prepared for data collection by studying EU and German legislation on food, 
trade and corporate law, company reports, trade press and available information on 
participants, including CVs and interviews. Second, the researcher developed familiarity 
with the German FMCG and retailing business through her internship at the risk and crisis 
communications division at a German Marketing Communications Agency in Frankfurt in 
2010. 
(3) Triangulation: This thesis combines triangulation of empirical evidence, research methods 
and theoretical lenses. 
(4) Ensuring honest interview accounts is vital for data quality and was achieved in three ways: 
Adhering to strict confidentiality agreements (see, for detail, 3.8 Research ethics); 
establishing rapport with participants through accommodating various time and location 
preferences for personal meetings; performing member checks on collected data; and 
triangulating obtained accounts with accounts from other primary and secondary data 
sources. Member checks were particularly useful, as some participants supplied the 
researcher with additional documentation or comments upon reading the transcribed 
data. 
(5) Continuous internal and external peer scrutiny comprises continuous academic 
supervision, formal and informal peer review at conferences or personal conversations 
and publication attempts: Academic supervision was vital in guiding the research 
                                                                
prominent examples include Yin (1994), Eisenhardt (1989) and Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007). 
The researcher adopts Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) framework for clarity and coherence.  
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objectives, methods and data analysis in light of an evolving theoretical framework. 
Formal and informal peer review occurred through regular research presentations at the 
‘Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Conferences’ (IMP, 2012, 2013, 2014); at Lancaster 
University Management School (2010, 2013; 2016) and personal conversations with 
scholars in the field of risk and business marketing. Moreover, peer review feedback 
generated in the publication process enhanced the researcher’s understanding of 
alternative ways of framing her research. 
(6) Extensive and intensive engagement with theory: Taking the abductive approach to 
research seriously, the theoretical framework informing this thesis co-evolved with the 
data collection and analysis processes. This required continuous engagement with 
theoretical lenses beyond the immediate field of business marketing and resulted in a 
theoretical framework that synthesises business network and institutional research to 
generate an institution-based explanation of how companies deal with risk. 
Transferability: Transferability refers to the extent to which findings from one case can be 
applied to other cases (Shenton, 2002). Transferability can refer to empirical case data or 
analytical transferability (referred to above as ‘analytical generalizability’). To address this 
requirement, this research provides detailed contextual information in Chapter Four to situate 
the findings in relevant temporal, geographic, legal, social and industry-specific conditions.  
Dependability: Dependability enables future researchers to “repeat the work, if not 
necessarily to gain the same results” (Shenton, 2002, p.71). Hence, this requires detailed 
explanation of employed research, analysis and reporting methods. Such accounts also 
enhance the reader’s ability to assess if, in fact, adequate research practice was implemented. 
This requirement is addressed throughout this chapter, particularly in the sections detailing 
the data collection and analysis processes.  
Confirmability: Confirmability ensures that findings are accurate and truthful 
representations of the respondents’ experiences, ideas and accounts. This requirement has 
been addressed by the measures discussed above, including triangulation of research 
evidence, methods and theory; reflective research practice; the detailed methodological 
account presented in this chapter; and identification of relevant research limitations (see 
Section 3.9). 
3.10 Research ethics 
This research complies with relevant ethics guidelines published by the Marketing Research 
Society (MRS), including the “MRS Guidelines for Business-to-Business Research” (MRS B2B, 
2011) and the “MRS Guidelines for Qualitative Research” (MRS QR, 2011), as well as relevant 
academic publications addressing ethics considerations in qualitative research (Kvale, 1996; 
Ryen, 2004; King & Horrocks, 2010).  
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Table 3.2 summarises how the present research addresses pertinent ethical considerations 
detailed in the MRS guidelines. The selection of nineteen guidelines considers three main areas 
of concern to the present research: obtaining informed consent, ensuring confidentiality and 
anonymity of collected data, and managing incentives. 
Table 3.2. Research ethics. 
Based on MRS B2B and QR Guidelines (2011). 
 
Guideline Implemented measures 
Informed Consent 
(1) Research participation is 
based on informed consent 
All interview participants received a signed electronic 
version of the letter of intent upon first contact 
(2) Researcher maintains 
professional and honest 
approach. 
(3) Transparency of subject and 
purpose of data collection. 
(4) Participants are clearly 
communicated: 
▪ Interviewer name … 
▪ Compliance with MRS Code 
of Conduct; 
▪ The subject, purpose and 
likely duration of the 
interview; 
(5) Participants must not be 
misled. 
(6) Participants have the right 
to withdraw at any stage. 
 
Guidelines 2-6 are addressed in the “letter of intent” 
provided to each participant. The electronic messages 
asking for participation included three sections clarifying: 
▪ The purpose for contacting the participant, the subject 
and scope of this research; 
▪ The name and contact details of the researcher, the 
institution and academic supervisor; 
▪ The estimated duration of the interview; 
▪ That participants are free to withdraw at any stage of 
the research; 
▪ How data is collected, anonymised, transcribed, stored 
and reported; 
▪ The participant’s right to review the data at any stage 
prior to its publication; 
▪ A sample of key questions; 
▪ A range of suggested meeting times and locations (to 
minimize the participants’ financial and time 
investment); 
▪ Options for contacting the researcher for further 
details. 
 
▪ All participants were clearly informed of their right to 
not have the interview audio-recorded. 
(7) Follow-up contact with 
participants must be agreed 
in the previous contact. 
The researcher obtained consent to re-contact all 
participants via phone, e-mail or personal meetings for 
further clarification or follow-up interviews.  
(8) Researchers must respect 
the rights and well-being of 
participants. 
The participants’ well-being was respected by obtaining 
informed consent and ensuring that participants’ 
preferences regarding meeting time, location and duration 
were observed as much as possible. The researcher 
travelled across Germany to meet participants in various 
locations, including offices, homes, cafes or cars. 
(9) Participants are reassured 
that data are used only for 
stated research purposes. 
This concern was addressed in the letter of intent and 
through verbal confirmation during the introduction 
and/or de-briefing phase of the interview. 
Data Confidentiality and Anonymity  
(10) Researchers must 
respect the confidentiality of 
collected information. 
Data confidentiality was observed by signing the letter of 
intent and implementing agreed data storage and reporting 
practices. 
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Guideline Implemented measures 
Data confidentiality involves:  
▪ Secure data storage  
▪ Anonymising data for transcription, translation and 
analysis processes 
▪ Non-disclosure of any personal or interview 
information identifying individual participants to other 
participants or readers 
▪ Using obtained data strictly for the stated purpose 
 
The confidentiality agreement regulating the participant 
observation phase required: 
▪ No disclosure of project details to third parties  
▪ No statement of the company name on the researcher’s 
CV 
▪ No hard or soft copies of any material from the company 
PC, databases or e-mail exchanges. 
▪ No audio recording, unless individually agreed with the 
employees  
(11) Anonymity of 
participants must be 
preserved, unless informed 
consent is obtained to reveal 
identification details. 
(12) Qualitative data labelled 
as anonymised must not 
contain identifiable data 
(13) All hard copy and 
electronic data must be 
stored, transferred and 
processed securely in 
accordance with relevant 
data protection policies. 
▪ Participant information was anonymised by allocating 
each participant an identification number (ID) that has 
been used throughout the transcription, translation and 
reporting phases. 
▪ Access to the table matching participant ID with further 
information is exclusive to the researcher and academic 
supervisors.  
▪ All business artefacts are anonymised. 
(14) Only relevant personal 
data must be collected. 
The researcher collected only essential participant 
information, including the full name, organization, 
professional role, preferred contact e-mail address and/or 
phone number. 
(15) Researchers must 
ensure that participants are 
not adversely affected by 
their professional activities 
In response to this requirement, the researcher 
▪ Strictly adhered to confidentiality requirements;  
▪ Anonymised all collected data; 
▪ Met several participants outside their work 
environments, such as cafes, homes and cars.  
(16) Researchers must not 
reveal to any other 
participants any details 
regarding their identity or 
response details 
This concern was addressed by the researcher’s alertness 
during interviews (and participant observation), as multiple 
participants voiced interest to know who else participated 
in the research. 
(17) Researchers must fully 
inform participants about 
what will be revealed, to 
whom and for what purpose 
This concern was addressed in the letter of intent and 
through verbal confirmation during the introduction and/or 
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Guideline Implemented measures 
Incentives 
(18) Incentives: offering a 
brief report summary may 
be used as an 
encouragement for 
participation. 
(19) Researcher must inform 
participants of potential 
research limitations. 
The researcher offered participants the opportunity to 
obtain an abridged version of key findings from this 
research. This report contains a section stating relevant 
research limitations.  
 
3.11 Limitations 
This section identifies the limitations arising from the epistemological, ontological and 
methodological choices. Adopting a certain epistemological and ontological stance necessarily 
predefines what the researcher deems ‘valuable’ and what ought to be documented for 
analysis. While a critical realist epistemology and network ontology provide a valid fit with 
the thesis’ research objectives and methodological approach, it offers only ‘one window’ upon 
a complex reality, and alternative paradigmatic choices may yield different insights. For 
example, analysing the empirical evidence from a constructivist point of view would allow 
exploring how meaning is constructed in material artefacts and verbal accounts, and 
particularly lend itself to analysing power themes in the empirical context of food retailer-
manufacturer networks (Hingley, 2005). While this research acknowledges the limitations of 
critical realism (Contu & Willmott, 2005; Al-Amoudi & Willmott, 2011) regarding the 
construction of knowledge claims, it embraces critical realism as a frame for discussing its own 
and alternative assumptions (Reed, 2005) by fully accepting the “inevitability of the 
hermeneutical circle [which] underlies all of human knowledge” (Zinkhan & Hirschheim, 
1992, p.86). This stance acknowledges the potential and limitations of various paradigmatic 
choices, in agreement with Easton’s comment that a paradigmatic choice is not there to offer 
“definite answers, [rather] it can ask relevant questions and provide some guidance and 
justification for certain courses of action” (2002, p.108). 
Another set of limitations emerges from the employed methodological approach and research 
methods. To allow for comparative research across markets, it would be useful to examine 
how companies deal with risk beyond the present context of German food retailer-
manufacturer networks. Moreover, there are limitations pertaining to each research method: 
a) In-depth interviews: This research would benefit from a greater number of in-depth 
interviews with participants who currently work for retailing or manufacturing companies 
and from participants directly interacting in dyadic retailer-manufacturer or 
manufacturer-supplier relationships. Due to access limitations, the present research relies 
to some degree on accounts of industry experts who had previously worked for retailers 
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or manufacturers. This ‘detachment’ may encourage rationalisation and conflation of 
activities considering later events.  
b) Business artefacts: While this research offers one of the few ventures into researching 
original artefacts-in-use, including GTC and framework contracts, better insight could be 
generated if the researcher could compare GTC and contracts over a longer period to track 
the evolution of changes to the artefacts over time. Although this was achieved to some 
extent, it would be useful to analyse artefacts used in the years 2000-2004. Considering 
the profound changes to European and German legislation, it would be useful to examine 
how those artefacts evolved and compare them to those currently used. 
While the current research focused primarily on the utilitarian value of business artefacts 
in dealing with risk, it neglects the analysis of symbolic meaning of artefacts in business 
relationships and the inscription of agency and power (Suchman, 2003). Moreover, the 
given set of business artefacts-in-use would lend itself to analysis from a different 
epistemological and theoretical vantage point, considering performativity and materiality 
literature (D’Adderio, 2011). Adopting this perspective would enhance our understanding 
of ostensive and performative dimensions of business artefacts in the inter-organisational 
context and would be of particular relevance in the context of risk in business networks. 
c) Participant observation: While this method was invaluable in contextualising data, the 
confidentiality constraints significantly limited its potential. Future research would 
benefit from participant observation that allows for greater use of artefacts dealt with 
during participant observation and disclosure of project information related to how 
companies deal with risk. 
3.12 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the thesis’ positioning in the critical realist epistemology and network 
ontology and explained the decision to conduct qualitative case study research underpinned 
by in-depth interviews, business artefact analysis and participant observation. 
The chapter highlighted the value and original contribution of this research in: (a) considering 
three inter-dependent levels of network units-of analysis; and (b) collecting and analysing sets 
of business artefacts-in-use as primary data sources.  
The empirical evidence generated from this methodological approach is reported in the 
following four chapters: Chapter Five describes the locus and impact of risk in food retailer-
manufacturer relationships. Chapters Six, Seven and Eight systematically report how German 
food retailers and manufacturers use three institutional devices – the International Featured 
Standard, GTC and framework contracts - for dealing with risk at the network, focal and dyadic 
levels of interaction. This thematic approach to reporting empirical evidence reflects the 
network unit-of-analyses and consideration of business artefacts as primary data sources. 
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CHAPTER 4. INDUSTRY CONTEXT 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter defines the context and the industry in which the empirical research has been 
conducted. The empirical research has investigated how companies deal with risk in food 
retailer-manufacturer networks. The food industry operates in a complex economic, socio-
cultural and regulatory context that shapes and is shaped by various organisational actors 
operating increasingly beyond the German market. This chapter examines: a) the economic, 
socio-cultural and regulatory environment; and then zooms into describing b) relevant 
business actors and industry-specific developments. This contextual account sets the 
foundation for reporting and analysing the empirical evidence in the subsequent chapters. 
4.2 Economic, socio-cultural and regulatory environment 
Economic situation: 
Germany is the fifth largest economy in the world and the strongest Eurozone economy (CIA 
World Factbook, 2013). Key drivers for economic growth have traditionally been the trade 
surplus generated from exports of manufactured goods, a developed infrastructure, high 
capital stock, and a skilled labour force. The consequences of the global financial and European 
Union debt crisis in 2008/2009 have slowed economic growth among Germany and its trade 
partners. As the second largest exporter in the world, the subsequent recession hit Germany’s 
trading partners and resulted in a record low GDP growth of -5.1% in 2009 (IMF World 
Economic Outlook, 2012). The weak GDP growth of 0.4% in 2013 was the worst since 2009, 
although experts predicted recovery of a 2% increase for 2015. Despite disappointment over 
low GDP growth, Germany still performed above the EU average, owing growth to increased 
domestic demand (FT, January 2014). The relatively high domestic demand generated rising 
imports and is caused by real wage gains, low interest rates boosting investment expenditure 
and low unemployment that is projected to fall by a further 0.5% in 2015 (OECD Economic 
Outlook, 2013), which makes Germany an attractive market for fast-moving consumer goods, 
including food.  
Socio-cultural environment: 
Socio-cultural factors generate important implications for Germany’s food industry: 
Demographic decline and changing household composition, price sensitivity and German 
consumers’ pronounced distrust towards the food industry influence consumer preferences, 
spending and shopping patterns.  
Germany is the EU’s largest country with a population of 81.24 million (Eurostat, 2012), and 
faces the worst demographic decline compared to other member states. The negative 
population growth rate of -0.1% (World Bank, 2011) implies an increasingly reversed age-
pyramid, with the elderly outweighing the younger population, as well as increasing reliance 
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on immigration. In contrast to most German households, immigrants live in family households 
and have higher birth rates (Hamburgisches Weltwirtschaftsinstitut, 2013). Immigrants form 
an increasingly significant consumer segment who require internationalised and specialised 
product ranges, such as Halal meat, at very competitive prices. This results in retailers and 
manufacturers exploring opportunities for efficient international food supplies, including 
‘exotic’ ingredients and changes to packaging and labelling.  
Another trend in German household composition presents a significant rise in single 
households driving demand for convenience in product range and store location. Until 2025, 
40% of German households in urban centres such as Berlin, Hamburg and Frankfurt are 
expected to become ‘single households’ (Hamburgisches Weltwirtschaftsinstitut, 2013). This 
segment has higher disposable income and generates higher values of sales per person, which 
in turn drives retailers’ and manufacturers’ interest in catering to its demand for convenience. 
Moreover, this segment is increasingly concerned with food ‘process attributes’ such as 
sustainable sourcing, animal welfare, organic farming, and ethical trading practices. This 
results in companies’ efforts to ‘prime’ these attributes through the use of various ‘certification 
labels’ and the rise of specialised food retailers such as ‘Alnatura’, ‘tegut’ and ‘Reformhaus’, 
who tap into the food retail market despite maintaining a limited market-share.  
Despite these developments and average salaries climbing 3%, the major long-term trend 
among German consumers remains the pronounced price-sensitivity and reluctant spending 
on food, crowning the German consumer as the most ‘frugal’ of all EU countries (Eales, 2012, 
p.20). The consumers’ profound price-sensitivity, coupled with highly competitive retailer 
offers, results in Germany reporting the lowest fast-moving consumer goods price-index 
across Europe (Nielsen, 2013). Moreover, price-sensitivity translates into the continuous 
success of discounter-format stores such as Aldi and Lidl across all income ranges, and the 
significant rise in retailer-brand products. Discounters pioneering the concept of retailer-
brand products have reached above average growth of 8% compared to moderate overall 
growth in food retail of 1.5% (Handelsblatt, 2013), and retailer-brands account for 40% of all 
sales revenue in food retail (Lebensmittelzeitung Handelsmarken, 2013). In fact, 87% of 
consumers trust that the quality of retailer- and manufacturer-brands is the same 
(Handelsmarkenstudie, 2013), and retailer-brands increasingly seek to satisfy all German 
consumers’ purchasing criteria beyond price, including sustainability and social responsibility 
(Statista, 2012, consumer purchasing criteria).  
German consumers’ price-sensitivity results in two trends among retailers and 
manufacturers: (a) building cost advantages through economies of scale and backward quasi-
vertical integration; and (b) the proliferation of retailer-brands, which strengthens retailers’ 
bargaining power vis-à-vis manufacturers. For manufacturers, this creates the need to 
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compete for less shelf space, to price manufacturer-branded products competitively, and to 
constantly innovate offerings. 
Although the German food industry enjoys renowned status for offering the highest food 
quality and safety globally (Lebensmittelwirtschaft, 2013), German consumers demonstrate 
the lowest confidence rating towards the food industry across the EU. This phenomenon is 
referred to as the German food industry’s ‘confidence crisis’, which has been further amplified 
through a series of real and alleged food safety incidents, followed by extensive media 
coverage and activist campaigns. The expressed ‘confidence crisis’ is relevant to German food 
retailers and manufacturers because it: (a) creates short-term costs through product boycotts 
and public product recalls, despite no adverse health effects and heavy investment in trust and 
image building campaigns; and (b) long-term costs triggered by activist-motivated political 
actions such as stricter regulations for product quality, packaging and labelling.  
German consumers’ distrust towards corporate actors fuels a diverse and powerful network 
of actors, including professionally organised consumer protection groups, media specialising 
in investigative journalism and anti-corporate reporting, and the ‘green party’. For various 
reasons, such as funding, increasing sales and political support, these actors constantly 
monitor and publicly scrutinize food industry actions. As most actors are at least partly funded 
by the government, such as the consumer protection groups “Stiftung Warentest” or 
“Verbraucherzentrale”, or the TV and broadcasting channels “Das Erste” or “3Sat”, these actors 
tend to benefit from increased credibility and consumer trust compared to food businesses. In 
fact, 61% of consumers trust ‘independent’ reports from consumer protection groups, 
whereas only every fifth consumer trusts food businesses (Die Welt, 2013). With 70% of 
consumers feeling misled by packaging and ingredient information (Statista, 2011, consumer 
perception) and 65% of consumers trusting negative news about the food industry (Die Welt, 
2013), food retailers and manufacturers face the need to meet the highest product quality and 
social and environmental standards. 
Regulatory environment: 
Following a series of food safety incidents throughout the 1990s and increasing 
internationalisation in food sourcing, manufacturing and retailing activities, the EU and 
German governments launched the ‘European Food Law’ (2002) and the German 
‘Lebensmittel- und Futtermittelgesetzbuch’ (LFGB, 2005). It is critical to consider the 
provisions, limitations and interdependency of the EU and German food laws to better 
understand companies’ use of industry standards, GTC and contracts for dealing with risk. 
With the launch of new regulations, the food industry became one of the most regulated 
sectors, with provisions covering every stage ‘from farm to fork’. 
The EU food law materialised in enforcing the regulations (EC) No. 178/2002 and (EC) No. 
882/2004, which override national food laws and the creation of new institutions - the 
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European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) 
and the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) – which deal with food safety11. The (EC) Reg. No. 
178/2002 regulates the responsibilities of all food-chain actors, the EFSA and the RASFF. Most 
notably, the regulation emphasises food safety by attributing major responsibilities for risk 
prevention to corporate actors, rather than adopting the traditional way of allocating such 
responsibilities to governmental institutions. To this end, the European food law has been 
innovative in ensuring pan-European food safety through defining:(1) product 
recall/withdrawal responsibilities; (2) risk communication and information sharing 
responsibilities of corporate and governmental actors; (3) traceability; and (4) food 
import/export requirements; and (5) transnational crisis management procedures. 
A key passage from (EC) Reg. No. 178/2002, Art.19, entitled “Responsibilities for food: food 
business operators” illustrates the shift in responsibility for food safety to corporate actors:  
 “If a food business operator considers or has reason to believe that a food 
which it has imported, produced, processed, manufactured or distributed is 
not in compliance with the food safety requirements, it shall immediately initiate 
procedures to withdraw the food in question from the market where the food 
has left the immediate control of that initial food business operator and inform 
the competent authorities thereof. Where the product may have reached the 
consumer, the operator shall effectively and accurately inform the consumers 
of the reasons for its withdrawal and if necessary, recall from consumers 
products already supplied to them when other measures are not sufficient to 
achieve a high level of health protection.” 
Moreover,  
“a food business operator shall immediately inform the competent authorities 
if it considers or has reason to believe that a food which it has placed on the 
market may be injurious to human health” (emphases added). 
                                                                
11The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) located in Parma (Italy) work on risk assessment for food/feed 
safety to provide impartial scientific research to the European Commission on potential risks related to all 
aspects of the food industry and consumption (i.e., tolerable pesticide residue levels; potential health impact 
of GMO).  
The Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) is an electronic system used by all member states as well as 
Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein to enter alerts for food/feed products that may pose a health 
or safety risk. “Alerts are triggered by the member of the network that detects the problem and has initiated 
the relevant measures, such as withdrawal or recall” (RASFF, Annual Report, 2011, p. 9). ‘Information’ or 
‘border rejection’ alerts notify other members of “consignments of food/feed/food contact material that was 
refused entry to the EU for reason of a risk to human health…animal health…or to the environment“ (RASFF, 
Annual Report, 2011, p. 10). Data entered into the RASFF is coordinated by the European Commission, who 
collects, verifies and distributes food/feed safety information to all EU members to enable immediate action. 
The number of alerts continuously increased from 429 in 2002 to 3516 original and 5281 follow-up 
notifications in 2012 (RASFF Annual Report 2012), which reflects increased volume in international food 
trade and increasingly accurate detection methods.  China is leading in ‘dangerous product’ imports, which is 
due to its role as the highest food exporter to Europe by volume. The most frequent causes for alerts are 
detection of pathogenic micro-organisms, heavy metals, allergens and mycotoxins, all posing serious health 
risks to consumption. 
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The paragraph illustrates a novel shift in legislation that places primary responsibility for food 
safety with corporate actors, who are liable for food safety incidents because they are “best 
placed to devise a safe system for supplying food and ensuring that the food it supplies is safe” 
(Preamble (30), (EC) No. 178/2002). In practice, this translates into companies’ duties to 
demonstrate the operation of food safety monitoring systems and the proactive 
communications with respective authorities in case a product is believed to pose any risk to 
consumer health or safety. Emphasising that it is sufficient to ‘believe’ in potential food safety 
risk is evidence of the newly practiced precautionary principle’ (Art. 7, (EC) No. 178/2002) 
aiming at pre-empting risks from occurring in the first place. To prove the implementation of 
food safety monitoring systems is part of the new ‘due diligence’ demands and requires 
tangible evidence to free a company from liabilities. Typically, ‘due diligence’ is proven by 
evidencing employment of specialised product safety/quality management personnel, check-
point and traceability systems, as well as full documentation of packaging, transport and sub-
contracting activities. Finally, all elements of the ‘food safety system’ must evidence regular 
documentation, because  
“food and feed business operators at all stages of production, processing and 
distribution with the business under their control shall ensure that foods or 
feeds satisfy the requirements of food law which are relevant to their activities 
and shall verify that such requirements are met.” (Art. 17 § 1 (EC) No. 
178/2002, emphasis added). 
Specifically, companies must document the product data to prove ‘due diligence’ - not only to 
governmental authorities but also to the public. One of the most unwelcome EU regulations 
for corporate actors appears in Art.10 (EC) Reg. No. 178/2002 covering “Public information 
requirements”: 
“Without prejudice to the applicable provisions …of national law on access to 
documents, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a food or feed 
may present a risk for human or animal health, then, depending on the nature, 
seriousness and extent of that risk, public authorities shall take appropriate 
steps to inform the general public of the nature of the risk to health, identifying 
to the fullest extent possible the food or feed, or type of food or feed, the risk 
that it may present, and the measures which are taken or about to be taken to 
prevent, reduce or eliminate that risk.” 
While this passage grants governmental authorities the right to publicly name the product that 
may on ‘reasonable grounds’ pose a risk to human health, it jeopardises companies’ concern 
for further damage to the industry’s and companies’ reputation due to publication of incidents 
on grounds of ‘suspicion’ rather than ‘proof’. Following the horsemeat incident, German 
authorities further lowered the threshold for claiming ‘reasonable grounds’ to ‘name and 
shame’.  
Although the EU food law was created in the record time of two years, setting a global 
milestone in regulating food safety across 27 nations, it remained necessarily limited to 
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general principles and required a transition time of three years, with some regulations being 
enforced as late as 2005. The ‘regulatory vacuum’ was further amplified by Germany’s 
bureaucratic structure, consisting of 16 independent sub-states, which prevented immediate 
translation of EU regulations at the national level. While German food companies utilised this 
‘regulatory vacuum’ for designing corporate institutional initiatives, such as the International 
Featured Standard (IFS), the German government requested the right to ‘adapt’ the EU food 
law in its own German food regulations codified in the LFGB (2005). The most notable LFGB 
regulations concern the following:  
(1) The transition from “chain” to “tier responsibility”: Prior to the launch of the European 
food law and the LFGB, German food businesses were subjected to the ‘chain 
responsibility’ principle, which made every company handling food liable for the 
product condition regardless of whether the non-conformities had been caused at 
previous tiers of the food supply chain (Simon, 2007). The disregard for the stage at 
which non-conformities occurred mostly burdened manufacturers and retailers who 
were liable for faults that may have been caused outside their immediate sphere of 
action. This liability burden has historically triggered retailers and manufacturers to 
design contracts that aimed at reversing the impact of this regulation by shifting 
quality control responsibilities and guarantees to suppliers. The shift to ‘tier 
responsibility’ allocates liability for food safety only at its respective stage of 
production in addition to obvious deficiencies from previous stages. 
(2) Stricter requirements for product recall/withdrawal and authority-induced product 
recall: While product recalls and withdrawals are daily business for most food 
manufacturers and retailers, all food businesses are interested in proactively self-
administering these procedures instead of being subjected to it publicly by 
governmental authorities. However, in going beyond the EU regulations, the LFGB 
grants governmental authorities the right to initiate a public recall if a product poses 
or is believed to pose a hazard to consumer health and safety, or is classified as ‘unfit 
for consumption’.  
Despite the EU’s efforts to standardise and unify food law regulations, the German market 
poses an exception, characterised by significant fragmentation and complexity: Each of the 
German 16 federal authorities operate with idiosyncratic reporting and auditing 
requirements, which results in dispersed federal monitoring activities across 430 offices and 
30 accredited testing laboratories. The 16 federal authorities are accountable to three national 
ministerial bodies, including the Federal Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Consumer 
Protection (BMELV), the Federal Ministry for Risk Assessment (BfR) and the Federal Office for 
Consumer Protection and Food Safety (BVL): 




Figure 4.1. German food regulation authorities. Developed from the EU Food Almanac, 
2011. 
Each of the 16 federal authorities is independently responsible for implementing EU 
regulations and monitoring all food businesses ‘from farm to fork’. Such fragmentation 
challenges companies operating in more than one federal state and creates significant 
complexity in communication between authorities horizontally (i.e., federal authorities across 
different states) and vertically (i.e., authorities at the federal and national levels). At the 
national level, the BfR co-operates with the EFSA and is responsible for risk assessment and 
defining legally binding norms such as maximum residue levels or packaging requirements. 
BfR’s risk assessment informs BVL’s development and recommendation of consumer 
protection measures to the BMELV. The German food law is therefore not static, but 
continuously evolving in light of new food safety incidents, production technologies and trade 
patterns, as well as more accurate scientific risk assessments. Almost every major food 
incident, including the E.coli-outbreak (2011), findings about migratory plastic substances in 
chocolate packaging (2012) or the horsemeat incident (2013) triggered political discussions 
about stricter regulations.  
Despite significant changes to governmental food laws, the major weakness resides with the 
authorities’ relatively low sanctioning powers. Apart from prison sentences for deliberate 
offence or severe harm to human health, financial sanctions for non-compliance (such as alert 
delays in warning consumers of health risk or missing documentation) range from twenty to 
one hundred thousand Euros. Compared to sanctions in contractual retailer-manufacturer 
agreements, governmental sanctions are relatively ineffective. 
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4.3 Business actors and industry context 
The German food industry is characterised by significant consolidation among retailers, 
manufacturers, wholesalers and commodity traders, who, in response to consumer price 
sensitivity and fierce competition for consumer share, enhance efficiency and cost savings 
through economies of scale and reduction in intermediaries (Commerzbank Report, 2013). 
The German market shows a noticeable absence of foreign retailers (Stiegert & Kim, 2009) due 
to high entry-barriers that even Wal-Mart and Intermarche have failed to overcome. 
Therefore, Germany’s five major retailers – Aldi, Edeka, Rewe/Penny, Metro/Real and the 
Schwarz Group (owning Lidl/Kaufland) – together hold a market-share of 90% (RP, 2013)12. 
Of these retailers, Aldi, Lidl and Kaufland – known for retailing primarily retailer-brands – are 
the top three German retailers measured by market share. Idiosyncratic to the German market 
are retailers including Rewe and Edeka, who operate multi-format supermarket stores and 
discount stores, as evidenced in the table below: 
Table 4.1. German food retailers. 
 EDEKA Group REWE Group Schwarz Group Aldi Group 









▪ EDEKA Bank and 
Insurance 








supply for all 
EDEKA owned 
properties) 
▪ EDEKA buying 
cooperatives 
▪ EDEKA fruit, 
wine and flower 
buying co-
operatives 





▪ Food retail 
▪ Meat processing 
and manufacturing  
▪ Consumer 
electronics and DIY 
retail  
▪ Travel operators 
▪ Food retail 
▪ Kaufland meat 
processing 
▪ Schwarz Group 
E-Commerce 
▪ Schwarz Group 
Property 
Management 
▪ Aldi North 
▪ Aldi South 
                                                                
12The remaining market share is split between smaller regionally active or specialised retail chains 
such as Tengelman, Lekkerland, Alnatura, tegut and a growing number of drug stores such as 
Rossman, dm, Budnikowksi and Mueller, who specialise in household products but increasingly 
retail health foods. 
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▪ Edeka NP-Markt 




▪ EDEKA neukauf 




the ‘EDEKA’ brand 
in Germany but 
belonging to the 
EDEKA group: 
▪ Spar 










▪ Wholesale stores 
Fegro and Segros – 
recently divested 
B2C REWE stores: 
▪ REWE 
 
Stores not operating 
under the ‘REWE’ 
brand but belonging 
to the group: 
▪ Billa (in Austria 
only) 
▪ Penny Market (and 






▪ Penny Markt 
B2B activities 
have been 
divested in 2002 
B2C: 


























Discounters  Netto and Plus Penny Lidl Aldi 
International 
activities 
EDEKA decided to 
divest most of its 
international 
activities in 
Russia, Poland, the 
REWE operates 
stores in 11 
European countries 
(apart from 
Germany) as well as 
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 EDEKA Group REWE Group Schwarz Group Aldi Group 
Czech Republic 
and France. 
It still operates 
stores in Denmark 
and Austria, which 
are primarily  
‘Netto’ discounter 
stores. 
in Russia and the 
Ukraine.  
its turnover in 
France. 
Kaufland is 
present in six 
Eastern European 



















The above table purposefully introduces the profiles of four retailers - Edeka, Rewe, Aldi and 
the Schwarz Group13 - for the following reasons:  
a) These retailers directly compete with one another in their core business of food retail; 
b) They constitute the main actors in terms of market share, turnover and brand value; 
c) The empirical evidence reported in the following chapters draws on these retailers’ 
use of industry standards, GTC and contracts in interaction with direct and indirect 
actors. 
Edeka remains Germany’s top food retailer measured by turnover, reaching €44.5 Billion, 
followed by the Rewe Group with €25.2 Billion, the Schwarz Group with €24 Billion and the 
Aldi Group with €20.1 Billion in 2013. Edeka and Rewe generated most of their turnover from 
Edeka and Rewe super – and hypermarkets, rather than its discounter-store operations. 
However, both retailers remain in the discounter market to deter customers from moving to 
Aldi or Lidl. 
All four retailers managed to increase their turnover in the years 2011/2012 
(Lebensmittelzeitung, 2013, Top 30 Lebensmittelhandel Deutschland) despite very low 
margins in food retail (Netztrends, 2014). This increase was generated primarily by the 
following factors: continuous growth in store numbers in Germany and internationally, 
increasing store floor-space, mergers and acquisitions (particularly with the bankruptcy of 
‘Plus’ and ‘Schlecker’) as well as the retailers’ enhanced growth outside of Germany. Despite 
Germany being a highly saturated market measured in store density, with Europe’s highest 
                                                                
13 The reason for excluding the Metro Group is that: (a) it operates only 312 food stores in Germany 
(Metro Group, 2014) amounting to a market share of only 7% (Brandeins, 2013); and (b) it focuses 
on other markets than end-consumer food retailers. Metro manages a global presence of wholesale 
food stores, consumer electronics stores (Media/Saturn) and the department chain ‘Galeria 
Kaufhof’. Because of this different focus, Metro does not compete to an equal degree with the other 
four German food retailers. 
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number of food retail square-metres per citizen, the retailers still increased store numbers 
within Germany and internationally: In Germany, the REWE group opened 122 and the Edeka 
group 114 new stores, followed by less ambitious growth by the Schwarz group, with 35 new 
stores and the Aldi Group with 68 new stores. However, the discounters Lidl and Aldi own at 
least four times the number of stores of Edeka and Rewe in the international markets. Edeka 
and Rewe have grown their store outlet numbers and market share through merger and 
acquisition activity over the last decade: Edeka acquired the AVA-AG (2002), the Spar-AG and 
Netto Discounters (both in 2005); whereas Rewe bought 245 ‘Extra’ stores from the Metro 
Group in 2008. The Schwarz group purchased several ‘Schleckerland’ stores in 2010, which 
operate as ‘Kaufland’ today. However, the German competition authority caps further mergers 
and acquisitions, requiring all companies to engage in alternative growth strategies. The most 
notable alternatives pursued by retailers are internationalisation and backwards vertical-
integration, which allow leveraging economies of scale. While Edeka and Rewe primarily 
generate revenue from its German operations, the Schwarz and Aldi Groups have 
internationalised more aggressively, with Lidl generating most of its revenue outside 
Germany. To further strengthen their position vis-à-vis manufacturers in the German market, 
Edeka, Rewe and Kaufland increasingly vertically integrate more profitable and safety 
sensitive food categories such as meat (Lebensmittelzeitung, 2013, Top 10 Fleischwerke des 
Handels).  
The consolidation and internationalisation trends among retailers are mirrored in similar 
developments among manufacturers, wholesalers, brokers, farmer co-operatives and 
commodity traders (Bunte et al., 2011). The main driver for these trends is the need for 
suppliers to cope with retailers’ increasing bargaining power.  There is also fierce competition 
in the commodity trade, which is of concern to 70% of German buyers in the food industry 
(Statista, 2014, trends in the German food industry). The manufacturer landscape is 
characterised by businesses leveraging efficiency through international sourcing and 
distribution. The analysis of Germany’s top-twenty manufacturers’ key performance metrics 
indicates two important trends: 1) most manufacturers earn their highest turnover from 
markets outside Germany; 2) the top-twenty companies are either manufacturer-brand 
conglomerates such as Unilever, Nestle and Oetker, or food processing and trading companies 
dealing with large-scale operations in the sugar trade, dairy or meat processing. Concentration 
among the latter has recently triggered several investigations by the German Federal 
Competition Office (FCO) on the grounds of illegal price-fixing and territorial boundary 
agreements (WDR, February 2014).  
One of the top-twenty manufacturers is Unilever. Unilever sells 400 brands in 190 countries 
and benchmarks all new product developments against the requirement to generate at least 
50 million Euro in sales for each product. Unilever develops 600 new products annually, of 
which 90 are rolled out globally within 12 months (Bloomberg News, 2013). Investment in 
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consumer brand recognition helps such manufacturers in negotiating shelf-space for ‘must 
stock’ products, even with discounters. In fact, Aldi and Lidl are increasingly important 
retailers for brand manufacturers, who accept contracts demanding lower prices in exchange 
for high volume turnover and reach. 
Parallel to recognised brand manufacturers, the German market is characterised by 
internationally operating actors manufacturing exclusively retailer-brand products. Retailers’ 
internationalisation increased demand for retailer-brand products, which led to the rise of 
‘silent giants’: companies manufacturing retailer-brands only and offering considerable cost 
savings from economies of scale and lean logistics. Illustrative of ‘silent giants’ is ‘Tavola’, a 
company who supplied German and other European retailers with high volumes of retailer-
brand products containing undeclared (horse-)meat, including Edeka’s label ‘gut & günstig’ or 
Rewe’s ‘Tavola’ and Metro’s ‘Capri’ in 2012 and 2013. Figure 4.2 illustrates Tavola’s high-
volume share in manufacturing six different retailer-brands: 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Tavola retailer-brand manufacturing. Statista, 2013, Tavola horsemeat 
supplies to Germany. 
Tavola and Unilever are illustrative of the top manufacturers in Germany who set extreme 
benchmarks for smaller- and medium-sized manufacturers interacting with retailers. In fact, 
in 2013, the European Commission investigated food retailer-manufacturer trading practices 
to review the effectiveness of available legal mechanisms addressing power asymmetry in this 
sector. The investigation report suggests that absence of alternative buyers and high switching 
costs lead manufacturers to consent to even more unfavourable contract terms:  87% of 
manufacturers do not take any action over unfavourable terms, because 63% of 
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manufacturers fear revenge and 50% believe that no available measures would be effective 
(European Commission Report on Unfair Trading Practices, 2013, p.8). An analysis of 
European legal provisions regulating trading practices confirms that there are currently no 
effective provisions in place to address this situation. 
The resulting power asymmetry in food retailer-manufacturer relationships materializes in 
many forms, ranging from retailers’ demands for extra listing fees, excessive transfer of 
liabilities or arbitrary contract termination, to coercion, intimidation and even illegal 
practices. Each of these demands opens a range of possibilities, as evidenced in the variety of 
‘fees’ retailers demand from manufacturers on a typical basis, including: per-unit fees for new 
products, ‘pay-to-stay-fees’, buy-back of unsold products, upfront lump sum payments for new 
products, free product discounts, promotional allowances, volume discounts and other non-
specified ‘fees’ (OECD Global Forum, 2009). Among the most prevalent unfair practices in the 
industry identified in the European Commission report are: 
(1) Deliberately ambiguous contract terms; 
(2) Absence of written contracts; 
(3) Retroactive contract changes;  
(4) Unfair/excessive transfer of commercial risks; 
(5) Unfair use of information; 
(6) Unfair termination of contracts; 
(7) Copycatting (of product formulation and/or packaging); 
(8) Limited freedom in choosing third-party suppliers; 
(9) Territorial supply constraints and limitations to trade with other retailers. 
Such practices break the ‘Code of Good Commercial Practice’ and are considered illegal. 
However, the Directive 2005/29/EC offers regulatory protection from unfair practices in 
business-to-consumer, not business-to-business interactions.  With European legal provisions 
showing significant gaps in addressing unfair trading, most European member governments 
(excluding Germany) support the development of ‘Codes of Conduct’. However, such codes 
remain voluntary, with governmental authorities holding no powers of enforcement. 
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CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: LOCI AND IMPACT OF RISK 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the locus and impact of risk in German food retailer-manufacturer 
relationships. The locus of risk comprises the complexity of food supply and distribution 
relationships; variability in product quality, quantity, processes and consumer perceptions; 
and legal ambiguity across markets. Evidence of risk impact is reported by distinguishing 
between damages to tangible and intangible resources.  
5.2 Loci of risk 
5.2.1 Complexity of food supply and distribution relationships 
‘Complexity of food supply and distribution relationships’ is a locus that emerges from the 
sophistication of food products and greater internationalisation of food supply, manufacturing 
and distribution processes. For instance, Nestlé, a global FMCG manufacturer, titled its internal 
“Investor Seminar” presentation held in June 2011: “Managing the unexpected”. The 
presentation reports the manufacturer’s view of “Zone CNN” (Figure 5.1), which refers to the 
“risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those … in 
forward looking statements”: 
 
Figure 5.1. “Zone CNN”. Nestlé’ Investor Seminar, June 2011. 
“Zone CNN” illustrates that relevant risks considered by the manufacturer: 
a) Span various issues, including product contamination, natural disasters, political 
events, legal changes, market risks, volatile raw material cost, and health risks; 
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b) Occur not in isolation or sequentially, but simultaneously;  
c) Are not necessarily geographically contained, but may affect several markets; 
d) Concern complex issues that cannot be effectively addressed unilaterally. 
Evidence from Unilever, another global FMCG manufacturer, confirms this observation, with 
the company broadening the term ‘risk’ in its annual report to include “risks and uncertainties 
[which] could cause actual results to vary from those described…or [which] could impact on 
our ability to meet our targets or be detrimental to our profitability and reputation” (2010, p. 
33, emphasis added). A similar shift in understanding risk is evident in the change of visual 
materials used by a German risk consulting agency (RCA14) specialising in the food business. 
RCA used to rely on the ‘risk matrix’ tool for mapping relevant risks for one company (Figure 
5.2) but now uses a multi-actor, dynamic visualization of risk (Figure 5.3): 
 
 
Figure 5.2. RCA ‘Risk Matrix’, 2013. 
                                                                
14For confidentiality reasons, the consulting company is anonymised and referred to as RCA 
throughout. 
Figure 5.2 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 




Figure 5.3. Risk in a multi-actor context. RCA, 2013. 
Figure 5.3 demonstrates two shifts: first, a change from the single company-centred to a multi-
actor perspective. Second, it does not ‘rank’ risk based on probabilities, but acknowledges the 
distribution of risk across the network. A junior RCA consultant referring to Figure 5.3 states 
that: 
“This slide emphasizes the complexity of risk in the food business. Food is a 
sophisticated product and any incident in the early stages of production can 
generate major repercussions later. It also better shows that companies should 
trust less the prioritization of single risks” (ID 26).  
Shifting focus to complexity in food supply relationships is echoed in McKinsey’s working 
paper series on “Risk assessment for uncertain times”, which emphasizes five principles:  
“1. Consider ‘risk cascades’ rather than individual risks. 2. Think through the 
risks to your whole value chain. 3. Understand yours and others’ likely 
responses. 4. Address the implications of risk, not just the risk map. 5. Be aware 
of the limitations of insight” (Pergler & Lamarre, January 2009, p.1). 
The principles crystallize that risk may ‘cascade’, requiring companies to consider risks 
throughout ‘the whole value chain’ and anticipating one’s own and other actors’ responses and 
implications. The final principle reminds us of the limitation of human insight, which is echoed 
by a former marketing manager at an international FMCG supplier: 
“I think that risk is an issue that comes about through the simultaneous co-
occurrence of many different factors, which assail one like an avalanche. …You 
have a changing role of media, interlocking of new international issues…. 
Today, you may order something from a factory you have never ever seen! 
There is a diversification of issues that is not easy to grasp or control. … we are 
more dependent on a chain of different factors, such as environmental or 
transportation factors…The companies become ‘parts’ that must function in a 
larger system and we just assume that it is going to work out somehow, 
although we do not exactly understand how. 
Figure 5.3 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
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When somewhere issues occur, it is difficult to evaluate: Will it affect my 
company? Maybe? […] Many businessmen do not have an accurate 
understanding of the complexity of their own value chains. A lot of outsourcing 
leads to transfer of responsibilities and risk, without really understanding 
what these risks are and how they can backfire” (ID 20). 
The ‘avalanche’ metaphor highlights the perceived difficulty in identifying risk events. The 
embeddedness and interdependency of a company’s activities in a wider ‘system’, and limited 
capacity to capture its complexity, is well illustrated in David Noble’s (CEO of the Chartered 
Institute of Purchasing and Supply) statement to the Financial Times (October 23, 2012): 
“Often it is some way down the supply chain that the problems occur…With Chinese 
suppliers, for example, there can often be subcontracting and subcontracting until the 
company at the top of the chain might not be certain where it ends.” 
Noble’s observation is illustrated in the ‘nuts for spices’ case, which refers to the intentional 
contamination of spices with nutshells that affected food manufacturers and retailers across 
Europe, the United States, Canada and India, and became evident through consumer reports 
of allergic reactions. Tracing the origin of contamination became impossible due to the supply 
chain’s complexity, as reported by Tom Bawden: 
“The worldwide trails that transport the likes of cumin and paprika from the 
field to the fork is so labyrinthine it’s actually extremely difficult to solve…The 
more intermediaries the spices pass through, the more opportunity there is for 
tampering …Once harvested, the raw spices are shipped from farms all over 
the region to the regional market yard, where they are collected and auctioned 
in lots. They are then typically passed on to a processor, who will … mix the 
fresh spices … ready for export. From there they go to a shipper who takes them 
to an importer or distributor abroad, and possibly on to a manufacturer such 
as Santa Maria, where they are mixed … into “meal kits” and sold on to 
supermarkets. It is also not unusual to export the spice to another country to 
be processed – for example sending spices grown in Asia for processing in Spain 
or Turkey – before exporting them again to their final market […]” (The 
Independent, February 18, 2015).  
This case illustrates the complexity of food supply relationships and the potential for ‘risk 
migration’ through multiple product-touch points across markets. In considering ‘risk 
migration’, retailer Gamma commissioned a risk analysis of beet and cane sugar (April 2011) 
that examined the local cultivation, sustainable soil use, destruction of natural ecological 
systems, potential for mixing with GMO harvests, water consumption and local working 
conditions. Although Gamma does not contract directly with sugar cane or beet growers, it 
conducted the risk analysis for three reasons: First, sugar is a key ingredient in many 
compound products, which may amplify risk migration to products containing sugar. Second, 
at the time of the risk analysis, the EU considered waiving the European sugar market 
regulation, which would enable free trade with non-European markets such as Brazil. Gamma 
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was weighing the cost advantages from importing ‘cane sugar’ against the social and 
environmental damages associated with the production (later referred to as ‘process 
variability’). Third, Gamma aimed to define quality, social and environmental product and 
process standards for sugar sold under its “For the Planet” label.  
Gamma’s sugar risk analysis illustrates that the locus of risk may lie beyond the retailer’s 
direct business interactions. This is echoed by a senior compliance manager at retailer Delta: 
“The greatest challenge for us as a retailer is keeping up with the increasing 
complexity in food sourcing, trade and retail. This complexity comes from very 
high variability of suppliers…different ingredients and processes and the scale 
of operations. We have hundreds of people involved in food from farming, to 
logistics, to packaging, to warehousing, even on our shop floors. But it is 
impossible to prevent every risk. For example, in our company, we have started 
creating ‘risk fields’ – each field is complex! For example, we have 13 fields. 
Look at the first one: ‘Sourcing and purchasing risk’. This includes varying raw 
material prices, supplier breakdown, natural disasters in the country or region 
we source from or epidemics like the SARS. Look at the second one: ‘Product 
risk’. This can include unintentional or intentional product contamination, 
blackmailing, damage caused during transportation, etc. Then we have 
‘changes in consumer behaviour’ – this includes the ‘health trend’, changes to 
the demographic development…and pricing. Then we have ‘competitor 
behaviour’: copy-catting, mergers and acquisitions. Then, that’s one of my ‘hot’ 
topics: ‘Effects of political action’ such as naming and shaming, more 
regulations…The next one: ‘Effects of public opinion’. This includes a whole lot 
of difficult issues, such as GMO, animal welfare, caged hens’ eggs, and pesticide 
use. Then we have ‘effects of negative media reports. ’Next one: Human 
resource risk, … bribery and other unethical practices, unprofessional decision-
making in purchasing or quality management. Then: ‘Effect of governmental 
authority inspections’, especially if it leads to product recall mandated by 
inspection authorities. Then we have ‘changes to governmental regulations’, 
like stricter inspections, more information sharing rights etc. And finally, that’s 
my favourite: ‘Others’. That is basically the category where anything can 
happen and where we could not even think of it yet” (ID 4). 
This account illustrates the attempts at - and limitations of - systematizing ‘risk fields’, with 
each field remaining ‘very complex’. Moreover, the field labelled ‘others’ depicts the inherent 
uncertainty involved in addressing risk where ‘anything can happen and where we could not 
even think of it yet’. This section illustrates the need of retailers and manufacturers to 
understand: 
a) The complexity and scale of risk occurring from complex food supply relationships;  
b) The implications of the simultaneous occurrence of risk in several geographic 
locations; 
c) The implications of risk migration beyond the boundaries of single companies and 
markets. 
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5.2.2 Variability in product quality and quantity 
Variability in product quality refers to measurable distortions in the quality and, potentially, 
safety of food products, while variability in product quantity refers to measurable distortions 
between demanded and supplied product volumes. Variability in product quality emerges 
from a variety of incidents, including variable sourcing, harvesting, processing and transport 
conditions or use of variable raw materials as well as unintentional and intentional 
contamination. Unintentional, or accidental contamination may occur through interactions 
between foods and packaging, excess residue levels from pesticide, fertilizer or antibiotics use 
or unidentified substances. Intentional contamination typically involves fraud, mislabelling 
and alteration. Variability in product quality is a major concern because of its implications for 
food safety, scale and reach, since “[t]today’s food supply knows no borders, but the same is true 
of contamination” (Yves Rey, Danone Corporate Quality General Manager, GFSI 2012). 
Peter Embarek, scientist at the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN) in 
Switzerland emphasizes that  
“[w]e live in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, where food 
products move rapidly across borders. Contaminated raw material …can end 
up creating very large outbreaks of food-borne disease across several 
countries, causing expensive recalls on a large scale…” (GFSI, 2012). 
German food retailers and manufacturers are particularly concerned with variable product 
quality in Chinese imports: 
“Product quality issues can originate from anywhere in the value chain. China 
has become the world’s largest exporter of honey, fruits, processed vegetables 
and even ‘organic foods’. China is the largest producer of animal feed vitamins, 
yet 58% of RAPEX-notifications concern Chinese imports. What is even more 
frightening: In 43% of the cases we do not know who the manufacturer is! Such 
limited traceability is caused by limited resources of Chinese public authorities 
and European ports. Also, companies often supply incomplete or inaccurate 
information with the shipments” (ID 28). 
Apart from Chinese imports, German food retailers and manufacturers are concerned with the 
variability of product quality across many product categories, each requiring specific 
laboratory tests. Table 5.1 illustrates this problem: 
Dealing with Risk in Business Networks 
[113] 
 
Table 5.1. Seafood product safety notifications. World Bank Report, 2005, p.44. 
 
The excerpt summarizes notifications registered for the seafood category for twelve countries. 
The scale, variety and mutation of contamination requires constant adaptation of laboratory 
testing methods: 
“what we are most concerned with currently are food contaminants. … We find 
ever new traces of new substances that we did not even expect to find, because 
previously it was impossible to detect them …. we find fractions of new 
substances and it is difficult to say what the impact of such traces may be” (ID 
2). 
A former quality manager at a poultry meat manufacturer confirms this observation, stating 
that  
“We get increasingly those kinds of letters from retailers, where they tell us to 
‘guarantee that this product is free from…’ basically any kind of contaminant. 
That’s something you cannot guarantee as a food business today. There will 
always be traces of something, because the analytics become better every day” 
(ID 14). 
While variability in product quality is considerably promoted through the combination of 
ingredients from multiple markets and increasingly better analytics, the Escherichia-coli 
bacteria (E.-coli) outbreak and dioxin contamination in Germany in 2011 demonstrate the 
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challenges in tracing product quality even within the domestic market. In case of the E.-coli 
outbreak, Bernhard Kühnle, General Director of the German Federal Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture and Consumer Protection, stated that 
“Germany’s 2011 E-coli outbreak was the largest of its kind since the Second 
World War. There were 3 842 [human infection] cases. One of the biggest 
challenges … was navigating the country’s 16 different authorities and the 
bureaucracy in dealing with them” (GFSI Conference, 2012). 
In fact, while German food inspection authorities and, as a result, the German government 
believed that vegetables imported from Spain caused the E-coli outbreak, further inspections 
had shown that it was a company from Lower-Saxony, Germany, who distributed 
contaminated sprouts. Similarly, in the case of dioxin-contaminated eggs and meats in 
Germany in 2011, one ingredient used in animal feed product contamination impacted human 
health: 
 “One of the greatest challenges with foods is that if one ingredient is of bad 
quality, all products at later stages are at risk. Take the dioxin contamination 
of animal feed in 2011 [in Germany]: There was one company called PetroTec 
located in Emden. They produced biodiesel and as part of this, a waste product 
of mixed fatty acids. These mixed fatty acids were bought by another company, 
called Oil-vet located in Rotterdam. Oil-vet bought and sold this waste product 
to another German company located in Uetersen, who produced fats for animal 
feed. This company again sold the fats for animal feed to another German 
company in Bösel. This last company was involved in storing, mixing and 
distributing fats to about 25 mixed-feed producers. From there, it multiplied: 
The 25 mixed-feed producers sold it to approximately 5 000 farmers, who fed 
it to their stock. These animals were then sold for meat production to 
approximately 50 slaughter houses and packaging companies. The final 
production was distributed to approximately 25 000 retailers. One faulty 
ingredient can migrate throughout the supply chain…even in 2011” (ID 5). 
The dioxin case demonstrates how the chemical mutation and re-combination of ingredients 
causes variability in product quality that lies beyond the immediate control of food 
manufacturers and retailers (ID 14). 
5.2.3 Variability in processes 
Process variability refers to differences in the methods and conditions in food production, 
including growing, harvesting, processing, manufacturing and distribution processes. Process 
variability is not necessarily relevant to food retailers and manufacturers because of legal 
requirements but increasingly because of German consumer concerns: 
“…food safety is mostly regulated by law … But there is nothing like that for 
processes for managing plantations, harvesting, conditions for relocating 
indigenous tribes…. That is well beyond the German borders, but something 
that food businesses are concerned with […] that is an issue you have to solve 
through B2B regulations” (ID 23). 
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Concern for process variability is reinforced in the German market by increased viewership of 
TV documentaries on public and private channels15, which focus on: 
a) Specific companies, such as poultry manufacturer Wiesenhof (ARD-documentary 
‘System Wiesenhof’, 2011; ZDF-documentary ‘Hähnchen und Putenschlachthöfe’, 
2014); 
b) Recent food fraud incidents such as the horsemeat incident or the EHEC outbreak (Arte 
documentary ‘Wege des Fleisches’, 2015; NDR-documentary ‘EHEC Skandal im 
Supermarkt’, 2011; ZDF-documentary ‘Ein Jahr nach dem EHEC Skandal’, 2012); 
c) or more general issues such as food waste, industrial meat production and animal 
welfare, working standards and sustainability (Arte-documentary ‘Nie wieder 
Fleisch?’ 2012; collective documentary by ARD/SWR/3sat on ‘Massentierhaltung – 
Schweinefleisch für den Müllcontainer?’, 2015; WDR-documentary ‚ Essen im Eimer - 
Die große Lebensmittelverschwendung‘, 2013; Arte-documentary 
‘Lebensmittelverschwendung‘, 2015). 
Following the documentary “System Wiesenhof”, retailer Delta terminated all supply contracts 
with meat manufacturer Wiesenhof. A senior risk and crisis consultant observed that: 
“The combination of public media and NGOs is a difficult stakeholder to deal 
with as a food business. They have what we call ‘a leasehold on credibility’ […] 
food businesses must think about: For which actors or parts of the food value 
chain do I take responsibility? So, if I [as a food business] say ‘I don’t support 
child labour’, then I have to take full liability that no one in the value chain that 
I am part of supports child labour in any way” (ID 23). 
Yet, the challenge of addressing process variability is that it often emerges beyond the German 
market: 
“We have no food business that can afford limiting its efforts in dealing with 
risk to its ‘four walls’. We always need to look at the whole value network, to 
include everyone who may be involved in previous stages of production, who 
provide ingredients, ingredients of ingredients, packaging of ingredients of 
ingredients etc. Particularly with sustainability risks you cannot possibly 
address them as a one-man action. Apart from food safety, sustainability and 
social risks are the main areas of concern. … An employee working on my 
confectionary, may easily work on the Ivory Coast. That is the understanding 
consumers have and which businesses must transform in their business 
interactions. … the other hot-spot process risks are consumer protection, 
animal welfare, environmental impact….” (ID 23). 
                                                                
15 The number of documentaries produced on food businesses, and specifically on the subject of 
animal welfare, worker welfare conditions and sustainability concerns, precludes an exhaustive 
report. Therefore, the list includes a small sample of recent documentaries produced by German 
‘public TV channels’, which are available to viewers without cable subscription and which receive 
the highest viewer share. 
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5.2.4 Variability in consumer perception 
The German food retail market is characterised by critical consumers who apply the highest 
scrutiny to quality and price, while spending the least income share on food compared to other 
European markets (ID 27). 
Despite maintaining highest quality foods at the most competitive prices in Europe, German 
food retailers and manufacturers consistently receive low credibility and confidence ratings 
from consumers (GFSI 2011, 2012): Whereas other European consumers show 66% 
confidence in food retailers and manufacturers, it is only 33% in Germany (McGarth, GFSI, 
2011). In contrast, 61% of German consumers trust ‘Stiftung Warentest’ and ‘Ökotest’ (Meyer-
Radtke, December 2013). Consumer perceptions are a vital locus of risk for food businesses, 
because consumers are: 
“going to impose greater control each time trust is violated. Loss of social 
license is not limited to the one bad actor, but affects the entire industry” 
(Arnot, CEO Center for food integrity, USA, GFSI, 2012).   
German consumers subject food products to considerable scrutiny, a phenomenon that a 
senior representative of the German Association for Food Law and Science (BLL) described as 
the “German Angst” (ID 12). To address consumers’ scrutiny regarding pesticide use, a German 
retailer tried to impose: 
“stricter-than-strict requirements for pesticide use in … fruit and vegetables. 
However, the retailer had to refrain, because using less than four different 
chemical agents is not effective in combating food pathogens…. If the retailer 
would continue requiring his suppliers to use less, he would effectively force 
suppliers to supply unsafe food” (ID 2). 
This illustrates that the locus of risk emerging from variable consumer perceptions is tightly 
coupled with other loci of risk, including product quality and legal requirements, which are 
examined next. 
5.2.5 Legal ambiguity 
Legal ambiguity emerges when retailers and manufacturers interact across several 
jurisdictions with partly known and unknown regulations that may overlap, contradict each 
other or leave areas of concern to food businesses unaddressed, such as provisions regulating 
intellectual property, product safety, conflict resolution and compensation for damages. An 
importer to retailer Alpha refers to this as a ‘jungle of regulations’: 
“in our business, everyone stands with one foot in prison who loses perspective 
in the jungle of regulations, of ever new laws, EU- norms, retailer product 
specifications and certification bodies” (ID 21). 
Most German food retailers and manufacturers purchase ingredients from Asian markets, 
primarily from China. However, 
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“we cannot speak of a unified ‘Asian legal system’. In most cases, the colonial 
past of each country has significant implications on each country’s legal 
system. For example, British trade and commercial law significantly influences 
today’s trade and commercial law in India, Malaysia and Singapore. On the 
other hand, Dutch law informs the Indonesian law. […] 
The main crux underpinning this complexity is not only the patchwork like 
pattern of different legal regulations, but the difference between what the law 
says in ‘theory’ … and what laws have actual priority in practice. Hence, you 
cannot really say in advance what the provisions will be and you cannot rely 
on them, …This creates ambiguity over which regulations take precedent….  
There are of course differences regarding the structure of the legal system in 
each country: In China, you have a four-layered court system. […] In 1990, only 
10% of judges and prosecutors had a law or any academic degree. On top, …the 
independence of the legal powers as we know it from Germany is not 
guaranteed. Also, in Germany we have the civil law, which is very detailed and 
‘stable’. But the Chinese foreign trade law is based on the general principles of 
the U.N. trade law, of which the Chinese only mention the ‘guiding principles’! 
[…] 
Given these complexities, most businesses rely heavily on arbitration. In China, 
for example, the qualification of arbitrators is much higher than of 
governmental judges. […] There are other complexities in India, …India has 
very detailed codification. The problems are extremely long proceedings. It can 
easily take several years and again, arbitration is the preferred choice. […]” 
(Thümmel & Kilgus). 
Apart from litigation concerns, legal ambiguity emerges from variable requirements for 
contract validity: 
“The objective of contracts is to create a scaffolding for future issues … In 
Germany, we rely on the internationally recognized principle of free choice of 
jurisdiction. …This means that the buyer … is free to agree with the 
international supplier on applying German law or the U.N. law on trade and 
sales of goods. In practice, this free choice is more limited […] and you must 
consider the procedures making a contract ‘valid’. For example, in India, a 
contract is valid only if the stamp duty was paid. It is a cheap thing, but you 
must do it or the contract is void ...” (Kilgus). 
In addition to legal ambiguity in existent regulations, German retailers and manufacturers are 
concerned with the interference of consumer groups and NGOs in the regulative process: 
“What is probably more significant for the industry long-term is not just 
regulation […] but the involvement of non-specialists, non-experts, in all stages 
of the process” (ID 36). 
The German market witnesses increased professionalisation of NGOs such as ‘Foodwatch’ and 
public-private consumer-protection groups ‘Stiftung Warentest’ and ‘Ökotest’, who influence 
Dealing with Risk in Business Networks 
[118] 
 
policy formation through media campaigns and litigation. A food NGO campaign manager 
stated that: 
“[o]ur objective is to create media-effective campaigns that will bring about 
regulatory change. For this, the bigger names in the industry are better, 
because they have a greater market share, they want to protect their brands 
and reputation and therefore, they react much quicker. Also, we find better co-
operation from retailers. So, if we find any issues with products, labelling or 
packaging or animal welfare, feed production etc. then the retailers are more 
responsive in supporting changes. The big companies know the game…They 
are afraid of harming their brands and reputation and agree quicker to make 
changes. But they also have huge product volumes, production capacities and 
often global campaigns. … the next big issue for us is the debate over obesity 
and health impact of certain foods. …they will need changes to their recipes 
and advertising” (ID 24). 
Lawsuits between Foodwatch and Unilever, Danone or the German confectionery 
manufacturer “Ritter Sport” are representative examples. In the case of “Ritter Sport”, 
Foodwatch claimed the use of synthetic instead of natural aromas stated on the product. While 
the use of synthetic aromas does not pose a health hazard or infringe legislation, “Stiftung 
Warentest” classified the product as “deceiving” and awarded it a low product score16. Ritter 
Sport appealed the score, produced a guarantee certificate from its aroma supplier “Symrise” 
stating that the ingredient was in fact non-synthetic, and won their case. This evidence 
illustrates that legal ambiguity captures not merely the variability among multiple, applicable 
legal regulations, but also the discrepancy between food companies’ ‘de-jure’ and ‘de-facto’ 
responsibilities. The compliance manager at retailer Delta draws attention to this discrepancy 
by referring to the ‘perceived chain responsibility’: 
 “De-jure, the food industry is not subject to chain responsibility anymore. But 
the public’s perception is very different. So, de-facto, as a retailer, we still 
operate as if we are chain-responsible for everything that happens before we 
get the product on our shelf, from feed quality to animal welfare, to social 
standards… and soil erosion in Brazil” (ID 4).  
This statement illustrates that retailers and manufacturers must consider ‘de-facto’ 
obligations in addition to relevant de-jure obligations arising from differences in jurisdictions 
across markets. 
5.3 Risk impact 
This section describes risk impact on German food retailers’ and manufacturers’ tangible and 
intangible resources. Distinguishing between damages to tangible and intangible resources 
serves analytical purposes, as in real life these are interlinked and may reinforce each other.  
                                                                
16 A low product score awarded by “Stiftung Warentest” or “Ökotest” is classified as a reason in 
retailer-manufacturer contracts for removing a product from the shelves at the manufacturer’s 
expense and respective compensatory payments for loss of sales. 
Dealing with Risk in Business Networks 
[119] 
 
Considering the low margins in the German food market, the primary concern for retailers and 
manufacturers are costs, which typically comprise: 
a) The value of the recalled products (which may include unaffected products of the same 
product category or brand); 
b) Costs for marketing communication, such as public recall notifications in (inter-) 
national media, consumer-care services; 
c) Logistics and waste disposal costs for the recalled product, including reverse logistics, 
warehousing, recycling; 
d) Retailer administration fees, costs for laboratory testing, cost for production halt and 
over-capacity following the incident; 
e) Potential product redesign and packaging, including advertising costs, potential legal 
fines;  
f) Potential (temporary) halt of purchasing orders from retailer(s).  
These costs typically arise in combination following a public product recall and may increase 
if safe products from the same brand or product category are affected and removed from 
retailer shelves, too: 
“[Retailer Delta] requires some of the highest compensations from 
manufacturers for product recalls. The sums they claim are unbelievable! It is 
not unusual for manufacturers to be asked to remove everything they delivered 
to Delta even if only one product is affected” (ID 21). 
Consequently, if one product batch provided by one manufacturer is affected, it may generate 
a wider impact: All batches of that product and unrelated products from the same 
manufacturer are likely to be removed. Additionally, products from the same product category 
but different manufacturers may be removed or experience decrease in sales following the 
incident: 
“If you are a retailer-brand manufacturer, you are usually one among let’s say 
seven other manufacturers who produce for the same retailer…so you only 
produce a share of that product. If one manufacturer recalls its production, the 
other six have not necessarily anything to do with it, but their products will be 
taken from the shelves too, at each manufacturer’s expense!” (ID 12). 
Apart from immediate product recall costs, retailers and manufacturers may incur short- and 
long-term costs to comply with additional regulations for product test requirements: 
“Following the BSE incidents in the late 1990s, not only sales for beef fell 
dramatically, but German meat manufacturers had to invest 400 Million Euros 
in 2001-2005 to conduct 13 million laboratory tests. The positive results 
constitute 0.0015% of all tests” (ID 27). 
Similarly, the horsemeat incident generated significant short- and long-term costs: While 
retailer Beta requires additional laboratory DNA-inspections, retailer Gamma requires 
suppliers to reconfigure meat supply chains to provide 100% German sourced beef.  
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Published reports on food product recalls typically consider direct costs involved in public 
food recalls, but the actual cost is higher, if ‘silent product withdrawals’ are considered: 
“A major German retailer silently removes 5-10 products per day. This can be 
triggered by multiple factors: Maybe the allergen-declaration on the product 
was insufficient, maybe the product had a deficient barcode …” (ID 27). 
In addition to direct costs incurred in product recalls, indirect costs emerge from the need to 
reconfigure product recipes, packaging, labelling and respective promotional activities. While 
damages to financial performance are the primary risk impact, retailers and manufacturers 
are equally concerned with consequent impacts: 
“While out-of-pocket losses are considerable, food safety breaches and recalls 
cost everyone in the food chain dearly. There are other irreparable damages – 
the decline or loss of brand image and the loss of consumer trust” (IFS White 
Paper, IFS Safety Certification, 2012, p.2). 
Although sales in product categories affected by an incident tend to recover within 8-10 weeks 
(ID 23), decline in consumer confidence creates longer-term damage:  
“Each time there is a food safety incident, besides the human tragedy, there is 
a loss of confidence in our food supply” (Frank Yiannas, VP Food Safety Wal 
Mart, GFSI 2012). 
While recall insurances and compensatory payments mitigate damages to tangible resources, 
damages to intangible resources such as brand image (ID 35) and reputation (ID 36) are more 
difficult to address: 
“…brands and their reputation are viewed as the most valued assets, which 
face new and more complex risks, in the market place, but also in the wider 
social sphere, in the political environment and media ….We must be alert to the 
political, ethical, societal and even ecological exposure of brands. […] The food 
industry invests vast sums to keep their brands in the limelight. The downside 
of high public awareness is the ever-present, and increasing, risk of 
disproportional reaction to any negative incident. And these incidents happen 
increasingly beyond a company’s control” (ID 36). 
Similarly, Rick Cudworth, lead partner for resilience services at Deloitte, stated in the Financial 
Times (Felsted, 2012): 
“’You can insure for many of the costs …but you can’t insure for the 
reputational damage …which may have been caused by a failure 
elsewhere…and that part is very difficult to deal with.’ He urges companies to 
take a more holistic view of their chains. This goes beyond just insurance, to 
understanding the network, and not just a company’s direct suppliers, but 
where they source from”. 
A former employee at a major German confectionery manufacturer echoes this view by 
highlighting that 
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“…damages to reputation and brands are particularly difficult. This is the 
greatest ‘sword of threat’ for us, because it affects our future value – it can 
decrease sales, it can destroy our business relationships with retailers and 
suppliers, it can damage the trust of our end-consumers. Damages to our 
reputation are worse than compensatory payments. …and no amount of 
insurance can get you out of that and ‘buy’ you credibility back. We are also 
listed on the stock-market! Once the stock value falls, it may be very uncertain 
when it will recover, and above all, if it will recover!” (ID 29). 
Damages to companies’ intangible resources may migrate beyond the boundaries of the 
company responsible for the incident, because of increased outsourcing in the food market. 
The potential for risk impact migration is amplified by consumers’ limited understanding of 
the complexity of food markets and the retailers’ and manufacturers’ tendency to ‘contract 
out’ liabilities:  
“Particularly retailers are held directly responsible by consumers for the safety 
of food. However, retailers pass this responsibility on to their importers and 
processors …. When major food safety issues arise, both retailers and importers 
will be affected” (World Bank Report, 2005, p.7). 
Additionally, retailers and manufacturers fear damages to operational freedom emerging from 
more restrictive regulations following food safety incidents:  
“The problem with many food incidents is that they trigger political actionism. 
Through the German Association for Food Law and Science, we communicated 
to Ilse Aigner that her policy conflicts with data protection laws. … our legal 
freedom and maintenance of current regulations is a key resource in our 
business” (ID 12). 
Consequently, companies aim at protecting resources from risk impact and efforts to dealing 
with risk have 
“…only one objective: Protection of consumer health and safety, protection of 
company reputation, protection of the brand” (ID 14). 
The empirical evidence illustrates the interdependency and migratory potential of risk impact 
on both, tangible and intangible resources. Damages to company or brand reputation may 
translate into damages to the company’s financial performance, including sales, continuity and 
terms of business relationships and stock-market performance.  
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the locus and impact of risk in German food retailer-manufacturer 
networks. Empirical evidence demonstrates that relevant risk loci may emerge beyond the 
immediate environment of German food retailers and manufacturers and migrate through 
direct and indirect business relationships. To reflect these dynamics, the loci of risk are not 
labelled in static terms (such as ‘product quality’ or ‘legal regulations’) but identified with 
variability and ambiguity. Risk impact is evidenced in damages to tangible and intangible 
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resources. Similar to the locus of risk, impact can migrate. These observations highlight that 
risk is rarely contained to a contained event occurring in isolation. Instead, risk may migrate 
across geographical boundaries through direct and indirect interactions and pose complexity 
that precludes any one company from dealing with it unilaterally. Building on this evidence, 
the following chapters, Six to Eight, chart the use of three institutional initiatives that food 
retailers and manufacturers use for dealing with risk: the international featured standard, 
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CHAPTER 6. DEALING WITH RISK:         
THE USE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEATURED STANDARD 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports how retailers and manufacturers use the ‘International Featured 
Standard’ (IFS) for dealing with risk in direct and indirect relationships. Formerly known as 
the ‘International Food Standard’, the IFS is the first comprehensive food safety standard 
launched by a group of German food retailers in 2002. IFS is referred to as a collective response 
to address the risks emerging from “ever-rising demands of consumers, the increasing 
liabilities of retailers, wholesalers and food services, the increasing legal requirements and the 
globalisation of product supply” (IFS Food 6, 2014, p.11). Drawing on progressive versions of 
original IFS documents, in-depth interviews with IFS auditors, members of the sanctioning 
committee and companies using the IFS, this chapter charts the origins, structure, content and 
changes to the IFS.  
6.2 Origin of the IFS 
The IFS is the outcome of collective effort by German food retailers, who aimed to address 
recurring food safety hazards that affected the industry in the 1990s. Additionally, changes to 
the EU and German food laws in the early 2000s resulted in German food businesses facing 
ongoing legal ambiguity and the threat of increased regulatory restrictions. To address these 
issues, German food retailers initiated the development of the IFS. By 2002, three factors 
particularly contributed to launching the IFS: 
a) Articles 13, 17 and 18 of the EU Reg.178/2002 introduced ‘due diligence’, ‘extended 
traceability requirements’ and encouraged the development of industry standards as 
a way for businesses to verify compliance with food safety requirements.  Moreover, 
the re-activation of the RASFF and exposure to potential company ‘naming and 
shaming’ motivated retailers and manufacturers to invest in preventive measures.  
b) EU and German governmental food inspection authorities were significantly 
understaffed and geographically bound, preventing effective food safety monitoring 
and de-facto transferring this responsibility to food businesses. 
c) German food retailers’ and manufacturers’ own food safety provisions required 
significant revisions to meet the demands from increasingly complex and dispersed 
food supply and distribution activities. Previous reliance on in-house second-party 
auditing of business partners became disproportionately time-intensive for the 
company’s quality management departments. Additionally, the international 
distribution of manufacturers and suppliers, alongside specialist knowledge required 
for auditing various food businesses, rendered exclusive reliance on second-party 
audits impossible.  
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IFS became the first pan-European17 collective private food safety standard: 
a) Enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of food safety provisions in international 
supply and distribution; 
b) Limiting retailers’ and manufacturers’ legal liability; 
c) Pre-empting future regulatory restrictions caused by recurring food safety incidents; 
and  
d) Enhancing the credibility and legitimacy of auditing provisions across the food 
industry. 
6.3 Business actors 
“IFS Food” was launched in 2002 by German food retailers Metro, REWE, EDEKA, 
Lidl/Kaufland, Aldi and Tengelman, who currently hold a combined market share of over 75%. 
However, the composition of business actors involved in ‘IFS Food’ has changed over the past 
thirteen years: Table 6.1 summarizes this development and highlights changes to ‘IFS Food’. 
Table 6.1 also considers the development of complementary IFS for logistics, packaging and 
brokering.  
Table 6.1. IFS business actors 
Date Business Actors 
2002 
→ IFS Food Initiation 
- Informal meeting of German retailers, who are 
members of the “Trade association for a free 
market” (Handelsvereinigung für Marktwirtschaft, 
HfM) including representatives of REWE, EDEKA, 
METRO, Tengelman, LIDL/Kaufland, Tegut and 
Globus. 
2003 
→ Official registration of IFS 
Food with the HDE 
→ IFS Food 3 launch 
 
- Official registration of the IFS with the German 
Retail Federation (Handelsverband Deutschland, 
HDE) and transfer of IFS management to the “HDE 
Trade Service GmbH”.  
- Business actors comprise German retailers, a few 
manufacturers and certification and accreditation 
bodies  
2004 
→ IFS Food 4 launch 
- The French Retail Federation (Fédération des 
Entreprises du Commerce et de la Distribution, 
FCD) joins the German IFS Group to co-develop IFS 
Food 4. 
2005/2006 
→ IFS Food 5 launch 
→ IFS Logistics launch 
 
- The German and French retail federations are joined 
by a group of Italian, Swiss and Austrian retailers 
(who are also members of the Italian retail 
federation ‘Federdistribuzione’) to develop IFS Food 
5. 
                                                                
17The IFS competes with multiple vertical and horizontal standards in the food industry. Compared 
to other standards, IFS is the only one demanded by all German, and increasingly, all European 
retailers, and is therefore considered as of particular importance in this thesis. 
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Date Business Actors 
- IFS Logistics is launched, counting major logistics 
providers and associations as members in addition 
to the core group of food retailers 
2009 
→ IFS Household and Personal 
Care Products (IFS HPC) 
launch 
→ IFS Broker launch 
- The launch of the IFS for the production of 
household and personal care products has brought 
new members, including Belgian, French and 
German household and personal care products 
associations (i.e., the European Cosmetics 
Association; the German Cosmetic, Toiletry, 
Perfumery and Detergent Association). 
- IFS Broker launch brought in major purchasing 
organizations such as the ‘European Marketing 
Distribution’ and ‘US Foods’. 
2010  
→ IFS Cash & Carry Wholesale 
launch 
 
IFS Cash and Carry launch is managed by the same IFS 
members as IFS Food 6. 
2011 
→ IFS Food6 launch 
→ Version 6 updated in April 
2014 following horsemeat 
contamination 
 
The IFS Food 6 was developed by the IFS North America 
working group and retailers from Spain, Asia and South 
America, in addition to previous IFS Food members. 
2012  
→ IFS PACsecure launch 
The German IFS GmbH purchased the Canadian 
Packaging Standard ‘PACsecure’ and developed it into 
the IFS-PACsecure. This move brought in new members, 
including the Canadian Packaging Association and 84 
major manufacturers and relevant industry 
associations. Among them are Coca Cola, Kraft Foods, 
Pamalat, Nestle, Maple Leaf Consumer Goods, General 
Mills and Tetra Pak. 
 
2013 
→ IFS Food Store launch 
The German IFS GmbH purchased the ‘French Food 
Store Standard’ and developed it into the IFS-Food 
Store. Members of the IFS Food Store have identical 
status to IFS Food. 
2014 
→ IFS Food Global launch 
IFS Food Global is managed by the same members as IFS 
Broker.  
 
While official IFS publications started with the transfer of the standard to the HDE Trade 
Service GmbH in 200318, archival and interview evidence suggests that the IFS was previously 
negotiated in a series of private meetings between representatives of all German food 
                                                                
18 It is worth noting that the HDE Trade Service GmbH is registered at the same address in Berlin 
as the German Federation for Retail Trade (HDE), the IFS GmbH and the German Federation of 
Retail Trade (BVLH). Immediate geographical proximity further supports the evidence that the IFS 
was primarily the outcome of German retailers who are members of all mentioned institutions. 
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retailers, known as the ‘Kronberg circle’, who manage the ‘trade association for a free market’ 
(Handelsvereinigung fur Markwirtschaft, HfM). Today, this group of German food retailers 
features across all IFS schemes. Considering the relevance of IFS Food, Figure 6.1 depicts the 
retailers and other actors involved in IFS Food 6: 
 
Figure 6.1. IFS Food 6 members. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates German retailers’ efforts to expand membership beyond the German and 
European borders by including major retailers from France, Italy, Switzerland, the USA and 
Canada, who in turn request compliance with the IFS from their respective manufacturers and 
suppliers. By 2012, IFS Food was translated into 20 languages, expanded into 96 countries and 
shows an annual increase in IFS audits by 9% (IFS News, IFS Food 6, 2011).  
Additionally, IFS Food counts major certification bodies, manufacturers and McDonalds 
among its members. Figure 6.1 highlights that IFS Food does not exist in isolation from other 
IFS schemes, other public food safety standards (such as the ISO 2200019) or the European 
                                                                
19 Despite parallels between the IFS and ISO 22000, there are significant differences: (1) ISO 22000 
addresses food safety, while the IFS also addresses food quality and legal requirements of food 
manufacturing, packaging, transportation. None of the ISO schemes address any of the following 
areas that are covered by the IFS: quality management, including compliance with contract 
specifications; product development and quality; packaging and quantity checks; complaints 
management from customers, consumers and public authorities; GMO; and subsidiary inspections.  
Moreover, ISO standards do not specify measurements or target levels to evaluate the degree to 
which companies comply with ISO standards or not. The ISO standard does not provide standard 
management tools (such as the IFS Integrity Program or IFS audit-portal database) to monitor 
audit quality and does not provide standardized audit checklists or report templates. This 
limitation allows each CB to design their own ISO-audit checklists. Because ISO standards are 
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and German legislations.   
Instead, there is reciprocal interaction between ‘IFS Food’ and the EU and German legislation: 
First, the IFS emerged as a response to the EU regulation mandating ‘due diligence’ verification 
on behalf of food businesses and simultaneously, the IFS development was supported by EU 
regulations promoting the development of own industry standards. Second, governmental 
authorities reportedly adopt IFS requirements in developing inspection guides such as the 
“Product-Safety Checklist” for governmental inspection authorities. Third, the subtlest 
interaction between the IFS and public regulations is the absence of further regulations, as the 
IFS delivers improvements limiting further need for regulation. 
6.4 Structure of the IFS 
IFS is financed by licensing IFS to certification bodies and collecting fees of 200 Euro per 
uploaded audit report20. IFS’ emphasis on its purpose as a “risk-based scheme” with a global 
approach (IFS Food 6, 2014, p.11) is reflected in its structure, which includes an international 
“IFS Board of Directors”, “Technical Committee”, “IFS sub working groups”, “National working 
groups” (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, USA) and the “IFS Review Committee”. Figure 6.2 
illustrates the interactions between these IFS bodies: 
                                                                
managed by several national bodies, it takes longer than the IFS to adapt ISO standards to new 
regulations and industry developments.  
20 The IFS is criticised for imposing a lump-sum fee instead of a percentage-based fee for audit 
reports. Moreover, the financing systems do not include retailer payments, who are key 
beneficiaries of the schemes. Retailers are mostly excluded from the fees, because the only IFS 
scheme for retailer certification - IFS Food Store launched in 2013 – is voluntary and most retailers 
do not impose certification against themselves. Hence, as retailers do not undergo IFS audits they 
do not pay fees.  
Suppliers typically invest significantly into the IFS certification process. An average supplier cost-
breakdown for IFS certification involves: 
→ Cost of external IFS consultant for audit preparation: 5-8,000 EUR  
→ Certification cost (payment for audit; uploading audit report): 800-1200 EUR  
→ Indirect costs incurred in certification: time invested by company management to implement 
the processes and documentation: 100-200h + cost for adjusting processes and plant facilities 
(i.e., windows, washbasins etc.); laboratory sample tests may range from 100-250 EUR per 
sample (depending on level of analysis and batch size) + training of quality managers to IFS 
specifications + managing a computer system for audit data, sample laboratory results, storing 
product samples; tracking data. 
 




Figure 6.2. IFS Structure. Adapted from IFS Organisation, 2015. 
The IFS Board of Directors oversees the general management and assumes representative 
functions, such as at the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI)21, which benchmarks industry 
food standards globally. Members of the Board of Directors reappear in each of the key IFS 
bodies, which highlights the retailers’ influence. The IFS Board of Directors interacts directly 
with the “IFS International Technical Committee” (IFS ITC) and the “Certification Bodies 
Forum”. IFS ITC members include representatives of retailers, manufacturers, certification 
bodies and food services. The IFS ITC develops, defines and tests technical IFS requirements, 
suggests and implements changes to the standard content, develops auditor training schemes 
and requirements for accreditation and certification bodies. To tackle diversification and 
specialisation of IFS schemes, the IFS ITC draws expertise from multiple sub-working groups. 
Closer inspection of the sub-working groups demonstrates the dominant influence of retailers, 
who occupy two of five sub-working groups, in addition to their already strong representation 
in the IFS ITC and Board of Directors. 
6.5 IFS certification process 
Prior to launching the IFS, retailers and manufacturers relied on second party audits 
administered directly by company-owned quality assurance departments. However, with the 
internationalization and increased number of businesses involved in supply and distribution 
activities, and the need for specialised expertise in auditing a variety of businesses, second 
                                                                
21 The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) was launched by the Food Business Forum – an 
association of European and US retailers in 2000. GFSI is a major industry funded body 
representing more than 75% of food retail revenue globally. GFSI benchmarks various industry 
standards, as it regards “food safety as a non-competitive issue, as any potential problem arising 
may cause repercussions in the whole sector” (GTZ Report, 2007, p.110).  
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party audits became ineffective. Modelled on the British Retail Consortium (BRC) standard, 
IFS relies on third-party auditing22, as illustrated in Figure 6.3: 
 
Figure 6.3. IFS certification process. 
Figure 6.3 depicts the IFS third-party certification process, consisting of interactions between: 
(a) the HDE Trade Services GmbH and Certification and Accreditation Bodies; (b) 
manufacturers and auditors; and (c) manufacturers and retailers. The ‘IFS Audit Portal’ 
database – denoted by the grey circle – provides the platform for recording all interactions 
and sharing information between selected members in real-time. 
Interaction between the HDE Trade Services GmbH and Certification and Accreditation 
Bodies 
 The HDE Trade Services GmbH grants IFS certification licenses to accredited certification 
bodies (CB). Eligible CBs must demonstrate accreditation according to ISO/IEC 17020 and 
ISO/IEC 1706523. ISO accreditation enhances the liability defence, credibility, legitimacy of 
contracted CB. The framework contract between HDE and CB specifies different audit 
requirements for each IFS scheme, including consent to surveillance audits, auditor 
examinations and selective sharing of audit results. 
For all IFS schemes except for IFS Food Store, the CB must upload the audit report to the ‘IFS 
audit portal’, which allows three user groups access to the audit report: CBs, retailers and 
certified companies. CBs use the portal to upload reports, suspend certifications, manage audit 
schedules (visible to the retailers). Retailers use the audit portal to identify and add certified 
                                                                
22 The first IFS Food reached 80% similarity with the BRC. The remaining 20% reflected differences 
originating from different food law requirements in the United Kingdom and Germany. Later IFS 
Food versions vary more significantly from the BRC due to the IFS’ development of the ‘IFS Integrity 
Program’ and diversification of IFS into fields such as logistics, brokering and packaging. 
23  The ISO/IEC 17020 is a standard for ‘conformity assessment’ and specifies requirements for 
audit performance. ISO/IEC 17065 offers requirements for bodies certifying products, processes 
or services.  
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companies to ‘favourites’ and receive real-time notification of certificate suspension. Certified 
companies use the audit portal to access and unlock their audit report to all retailers and 
manufacturers to disclose their certification results. The IFS Food Store is the only scheme 
prohibiting uploads and sharing of any IFS Food Store audit report in the IFS audit portal (IFS 
Food Store, 2013, p.32). 
Interaction between manufacturers and IFS auditors 
A manufacturer’s certification by IFS auditors comprises seven stages, illustrated in 
Figure 6.4: 
 
Figure 6.4. IFS certification. 
Each stage is trackable via the IFS audit portal. The IFS Food (see Table 6.2) provides the 
checklist for on-site audits, with results ranging from higher-, medium-level or failure.  
Interactions between retailers and manufacturers 
IFS certification is ‘de-facto mandatory’ for all businesses supplying German retailers. 
Typically, retailers request manufacturers’ IFS certification via retailers’ General Terms and 
Conditions or framework contracts. Non-compliance with GTC or framework contract 
requirements results is a breach of contract that may result in immediate contract 
termination. Manufacturers who reject “’voluntarily participating’ in the IFS” (ID 34) or fail 
certification are delisted from invitations to annual retailer negotiations. Moreover, 
manufacturers must meet higher-level IFS certification to remain listed as eligible suppliers, 
as the IFS audit portal ranking allows retailers to delist companies with lower IFS results. 
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Achieving even a medium-level IFS certificate is tied to the condition (stated in IFS Food 6 and 
respective framework contracts) that the certified company ensures all its sub-contractors, 
such as raw material suppliers, importers, packaging and labelling suppliers, and logistics 
partners, are certified according to relevant IFS schemes. This provision was added to IFS Food 
6 and other IFS schemes to ensure IFS adoption across all retailer-manufacturer supply and 
distribution relationships: The mechanism operates by tying the certification of one company 
to this company’s verification that all its business partners are IFS certified. Consequently, 
retailers’ preference for IFS certification manifests beyond their direct interactions with 
manufacturers.  
The standard document functions as a common reference interlinking the interactions 
between the HDE Trade Service GmbH, CBs, manufacturers, auditors, retailers and third 
parties such as logistics, packaging and laboratory service providers, regardless of the 
companies’ geographical location.  
6.6 IFS Food 6 
IFS Food 6 specifies, on 152 pages, product and process regulations ensuring food safety and 
quality. The standard document is the institutional and technical core of the IFS, containing 21 
requirements for ‘risk analysis’, demonstrating the standard’s focus on risk and food safety at 
the industry level. The standard’s core principle is process specification and documentation: 
Written evidence of process implementation is key to prove compliance for liability and due 
diligence reasons. Specifically, IFS Food regulates: 
a) Managerial responsibility for food safety, quality, environmental and social 
requirements; 
b) Internal and external processes for food safety and quality; 
c) Resource management; 
d) Production, manufacturing and purchasing specifications; 
e) Laboratory analyses; 
f) Food defence specifications. 
IFS requirements are very detailed (see Table 6.2) because the aim is to limit variability in 
food safety and quality processes across companies and markets. Table 6.2 provides a 
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Table 6.2. IFS Food 6 
K. O. criteria: Knock-out criteria are mandatory IFS requirements. Non-compliance with one 
k.o.-criterion results in certification failure. 
Sections marked in ‘red’ highlight changes to IFS Food compared to Version 5. 




1.1 K. O. 1: Documentation demonstrating assignment of senior management 
and employee responsibilities for food safety and quality. 
1.2 Senior management considers as a minimum: customer focus, 
environmental responsibility, sustainability, ethics and personal 
responsibility, product specifications. 
1.3 Designated IFS representative. 
1.4Food safety and quality department reports directly to senior management. 
1.5 System provisions updating management of relevant food safety and 
quality legislation, scientific/technical developments and industry codes of 
practice. 
1.6 The company informs its customers immediately of non-conformities with 
product specifications, including cautionary notifications raised by 
competent authorities. 
1.7 Documentation of customer needs’ analysis and expectations. 
1.8 Food safety and quality management systems are reviewed frequently, 
including at least: audit result reviews, customer feedback, preventive and 
corrective actions. 
1.9 Regular inspection of physical facilities. 




2.1 System provisions for food safety and product quality management. 
2.2 Reasons for document amendments related to product specifications are 
recorded in writing. 
2.3 All records related to product specifications are complete, updated and 
available on request. 
2.4 Records are legible, genuine and maintained so that subsequent 
manipulation of records is impossible. 
2.5 All records comply with legislation. 
2.6 K. O. 2: Implementation of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point- 
(HACCP) system based on Codex Alimentarius guidelines: The HACCP 
system covers all raw materials, products and processes. 
2.7 HACCP is reviewed following any modifications to products or processes. 
2.8 Designated HACCP team (cross-disciplinary, certified HACCP training). 
2.9 Implementation of hazard analysis for each ingredient and processing 
stage. 
2.10 Hazard analysis includes risk analysis related to physical, chemical and 
allergen elements. 
2.11 Each CCP is assigned critical limits to identify deviations. 
2.12 Monitoring provisions ensure HACCP system effectiveness (i.e., internal 
audits, sampling, complaints analysis by authorities, customers or end-
consumers). 
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2.13 All HACCP documentation are archived for at least one year following the 
expiration of respective products’ ‘use by’ date. 
3. Resource 
Management 
3.1 K. O. 3: Provisions ensuring personal hygiene (i.e., protective clothing, 
eating and drinking, fingernails, beards). Requirements consider risk to 
product and process specifications. 
3.2 Personal hygiene requirements are compulsory for all employees, 
contractors and visitors. 
3.3 Provisions and compliance with procedures for employees affected by 
infectious health issues. 
3.4 Visible jewellery (incl. piercings) and watches must not be worn. Guidelines 
for work and protective-wear laundry are implemented and reviewed 
regularly. 
3.5 Provisions and documentation of employee training regarding product 
specifications. Training must include seasonal or temporary workers. 
Records pertaining to each training event (date, attendance, content) are 
available on request. 
3.6 Staff facilities comply with highest levels of cleanliness (i.e., provision of 
hand contact-free fittings, liquid soap, waste containers with contact-free 
opening) to minimise food safety and contamination risks. 
3.7 Employees observe strict guidelines for brought-in foods. 
3.8 Provision for controlling hand hygiene effectiveness. 





4.1 Product and process specifications are agreed between contract partners 
before the contract is concluded. 
4.2 Changes to existing contracts must be in writing by both parties. 
4.3 K. O. 4: Compliance with customer specifications for all ingredients 
and end-products. Specifications are updated and comply with all 
destination markets’ legislation. 
4.4 K. O. 5: Compliance with customer product and process specifications. 
4.5 Documented shelf-life and laboratory tests. 
4.6Laboratory test validation for nutritional information and claims mentioned 
on labels. 
4.7 Monitoring purchasing of externally sourced products and services that 
may impact product safety and quality. Monitoring results are documented 
in the food safety and quality management system. Purchased products are 
monitored for authenticity and product specification compliance.  
4.8 Documentation of supplier approval and monitoring procedures.  
4.9 Supplier monitoring includes specific assessment criteria, audits, 
certifications, supplier reliability and complaints analyses.  
4.10 For retailer-brand products: Manufacturer ensures sub-contractor’s 
compliance with customer specifications of finished or semi-finished 
products. Audit report includes valid IFS-certifications of all sub-
contractors and lists all outsourced products or services.  
4.11 Regular hazard analysis for packaging materials. 
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4.12 Compliance with customer specifications and legislation for packaging 
materials and processes. 
4.13 Packaging hazard analysis for each product includes organoleptic tests, 
storage tests, chemical analysis, migration tests. 
4.14 Physical factory specifications (i.e., risk analysis of factory environment, 
such as ground, air, water, walls, windows, ceilings). 
4.15 K. O. 6: Risk analysis of foreign materials (i.e., glass, wood) to avoid 
contamination.  
4.16 No use of wood or glass in areas identified in the hazard analysis. 
4.17 Pest control complies with legislation and is performed by qualified staff. 
For external service providers, written contracts must be drafted.  
4.18 Pest control for incoming deliveries. 
4.19 Receipt of goods and storage: all incoming goods are checked for 
conformity with specifications. Documentation of test results. 
4.20 Storage and transportation of raw, semi-finished or finished goods must 
minimize cross-contamination.  
4.21 All third-party transportation or service providers are IFS-Logistics 
certified. 
4.22 Facilities repairs must not affect product safety or quality specifications.  
4.23 Equipment and tools used in direct contact with food are certified and 
compliant with legislation. 
4.24 Equipment and tools are clean. 
4.25 K. O. 7: Traceability (including GMO; allergens): full traceability 
system documented for product lots, raw materials and packaging. 
4.26 Downstream traceability records are available within the timeframe 
specified by the customer [most retailers specify four hours]. 
4.27 Annual testing and review of traceability system. 
4.28 Traceability system for GMO in all ingredients. 
4.29 Compliance with customer GMO specifications. 
4.30 Provisions preventing GMO cross-contamination. 
4.31 Declaration of allergens. 
4.32 Verified compliance with customer product and process specifications 







5.1 K. O. 8: Internal audits: At least annual performance of internal audits 
verifying compliance with IFS.  
5.2 Internal auditors are independent from audited departments. 
5.3 Internal audit results are communicated to senior management; 
improvements scheduled and communicated to all relevant employees. 
5.4 Provisions for prompt internal notifications, recording and monitoring of 
equipment malfunctions and process deviations. 
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5.5 Regular review and testing of calibration, adjustment, measurement and 
monitoring devices. All devices comply with legislation. 
5.6 Compliance with product specifications is verified with regular 
microbiological, physical and chemical analyses. 
5.7 External laboratories performing product analyses are ISO 17025 
accredited. 
5.8 Regular laboratory analyses and prompt result evaluation. 
5.9 Regular review of quantity measures. 
5.10 Verification of finished product quality with internal organoleptic tests. 
5.11 Regular cross-checks on product and packaging allocation. 
5.12 Product quarantine and release procedures for raw materials, (semi-) 
finished products, packaging materials. 
5.13 Complaints management system for authorities and customers. 
5.14 Justified complaints are addressed immediately. 
5.15 Complaints analysis and implementation of preventive measures to avoid 
re-occurrence. 
5.16 K. O. 9: Product withdrawal and recall management: Documented 
procedure defining responsibilities and processes for managing incidents 
affecting food safety and quality. Minimum requirements: designated and 
certified crisis team, alert contact list, legal advisory contact, customer 
information, internal and external communication plan. Customers must 
be informed immediately. 
5.17 Regular testing of recall and withdrawal procedures. 
5.18 Provisions for managing non-conformities in raw materials, (semi-) 
finished products and packaging materials. 
5.19 Permanent availability of designated person managing non-conformities. 
5.20 Immediate response procedures for correcting non-conformities.  
5.21 Products non-conforming with specifications are not delivered to 
customer. Exceptions are agreed in writing. 
5.22 K. O. 10: Corrective actions: documented provisions for analysing and 
preventing re-occurrence of non-conformities.  
6. Food defence 
and external 
inspection 
6.1 Designated and certified food defence team. 
6.2 Documented food defence hazard assessment based on legislation and 
consideration of plant and production security. 
6.3 Alert system implementation and regular testing. 
6.4 Adequate protection and monitoring of critical areas and access points. 
6.5 Protective measures preventing food tampering.  
6.6 The company’s food defence considers a visitor policy (i.e., visitor 
registration; restricted access areas). 
6.7 Annual employee training in food defence. 
6.8 Employee hiring and termination processes consider food security. 
6.9 Food defence provisions consider external inspections. 
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Table 6.2 highlights that IFS Food offers a comprehensive scheme addressing variation in 
product safety, quality and processes; variation in social and environmental standards and 
legal regulations. It is worth highlighting two characteristics of IFS Food relevant to dealing 
with risk: 
First, while EU and German law are outcome-based and company centred, IFS Food combines 
outcome and process specifications ensuring food safety (see, for example, 3.6; 6.8) beyond 
single companies. In requesting auditees’ sub-contractor compliance with IFS schemes, IFS 
Food automatically regulates outcomes and processes across food supply and distribution 
activities (see, for example, 4.10; 4.21). 
Second, IFS Food links certification to compliance with both legislation (see, for example, 2.5; 
4.3; 5.5) and customer specifications (see, for example, 4.1-4.4; 4.19), which facilitates 
retailers’ and manufacturers’ use of IFS certification for monitoring compliance with own 
contract specifications. With regard to legislation, IFS Food is designed to address legislative 
limitations and to manage food safety at the global level. For example, considering the 
shortcomings of the European RASFF (such as delayed or incorrect data entry) the IFS uses 
the ‘IFS Audit Portal’, which is globally accessible and provides full traceability; real-time 
updates on audit results, product recall notifications (with barcode level detail); and tracking 
of laboratory test results. Moreover, including various businesses such as brokers, logistics 
and packaging providers in the ‘IFS Audit Portal’ allows more efficient mobilization of actors 
for product recall. 
6.7 IFS monitoring and enforcement 
Launched in 201024, the ‘IFS Integrity Program’ monitors compliance with IFS schemes, 
sanctions non-compliance and resolves complaints and disputes between auditees, auditors 
and CBs, accreditation bodies and retailers. Figure 6.5 depicts the ‘IFS Integrity Program’ 
structure: 
                                                                
24 The ‘IFS Integrity Program’ was launched following a major food safety incident at the Bavarian 
company ‘Mueller Brot’, which was identified by public food inspection authorities as operating 
with extremely poor hygiene standards while remaining registered with a ‘high-level’ IFS 
compliance certificate.  




Figure 6.5. IFS Integrity Program. Based on IFS Food 5. 
To ensure audits comply with IFS requirements, the ‘IFS Integrity Programme’ employs two 
types of monitoring: preventive ‘surveillance audits’ and response-based ‘investigation 
audits’, both including CB office audits: on-site supplier audits and witness audits. All 
surveillance audits are performed regardless of whether the IFS received a complaint (IFS 
Food 6, p.38). On-site supplier audits are carried out independently of scheduled regular IFS 
audits, and witness-audits require an additional IFS Integrity audit, which assesses the 
assigned IFS auditor performance in real-time. Investigation audits are initiated in response 
to complaints. IFS solicit complaints via its website, employing e-mail or a contact form. Figure 
6.6 offers a screenshot of the complaint form, which can be completed by any natural person 
or legal entity:  




Figure 6.6. IFS complaint form. IFS website, June 5, 2015.  
Incoming complaints are reviewed by the IFS Management and may result in contacting the 
CB or accreditation body; conducting internal research or filing investigation audits. If 
investigation audits confirm deficiencies, the IFS Management anonymises and transfers the 
case to the IFS Sanctioning Committee, who decides on adequate sanctions. 
The Sanctioning Committee comprises a lawyer chairing, a food industry representative (i.e., 
a senior quality manager from a food manufacturing business), a retailer and CB 
representative. The CB representative has no voting rights and attends primarily for expertise 
provision on questions regarding accreditation, certification and auditing. Depending on the 
case severity, the Sanctioning Committee applies the ‘Sanctioning Cascade’ principle and 
records all actions in the ‘IFS Audit Portal’. Light sanctions include CBs refunding the costs for 
investigation audits to the IFS and launching auditor training schemes. Medium sanctions 
include issuing fines, auditor suspension and compulsory IFS academy attendance. The most 
severe sanctions include immediate termination of CB licensing contracts.   
Apart from monitoring and sanctioning activities, the ‘IFS Integrity Program’ administers 
dispute resolution by resolving complaints and non-compliance confidentially and prior to 
public food inspection authority involvement. Based on the cases processed by the ‘IFS 
Integrity Program’, the ‘IFS Technical Committee’ adapts remedial changes to respective 
standard schemes to prevent similar incidents. 
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6.8 Change to IFS schemes 
Changes to IFS schemes occur in three ways: (a) The launch of a new standard category (such 
as IFS Logistics); (b) the launch of a new standard version (such as IFS Food 6); or (c) changes 
within a valid standard version. 
The launch of a new standard category is typically triggered by experienced risks to food safety 
and quality that occur outside the scope of current standard schemes. For instance, IFS 
Logistics launched in 2006, following food safety incidents caused by inadequate product 
transportation and storage (ID 25).  
New versions of existent IFS schemes, such as the launch of IFS Food 6, occur when several 
companies experience limitations of existent standard regulations. For example, IFS Food 5 
was revised based on: 
a) Two major food safety precedent cases: bread contamination and the E.-coli- 
outbreak; 
b) The German government’s regulation of ‘health claims’ for food products and 
transnational free trade negotiations between the German and U.S. governments; 
c) Changes to ‘best practice’ guidelines for standard-setting bodies published by the 
GFSI; 
d) Repeated user complaints over the standards’ limited clarity. 
The introduction to IFS Food 6 (p.12) highlights that changes were necessary based on 
“experience, changes in legislation and a revision of the GFSI Guidance Document”. The most 
notable changes in IFS Food 6 comprise the development of the ‘IFS Integrity Program’; the 
introduction of unannounced audits; adoption of stricter and detailed hygiene regulations; the 
introduction of IFS Food Security requirements; and the adaptation of the k.o.-criterion 
requesting immediate customer notification in case of product recalls. This illustrates that 
changes to a standard document may result in structural changes, such as the creation of new 
IFS committees and processes. In response to EU and GFSI guidelines, the IFS allows for 
electronic submissions of standard revisions recommendations from all eligible members (see 
Figure 6.7, user survey), such as employees of IFS certified companies, of CB or accreditation 
bodies. This facilitates ensuring better acceptance of revisions and ‘bottom-up’ sourcing 
knowledge on standard performance. Figure 6.7 illustrates the change process from IFS Food 
5 to 6: 
 
Figure 6.7. Revision process of IFS Food 5. 
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While IFS Food 6 was published following one year of revisions, test-audits and translations, 
the ‘horsemeat incident’ demanded immediate changes to the standard in March/April 2013. 
The ‘horsemeat incident’ in December 2012-February 2013 refers to the meat adulteration 
case, where products labelled as ‘beef’ contained horsemeat or pork traces detected at DNA-
level analyses.  German retailers, including REWE, Aldi, EDEKA, Tengelmann, Lidl and Metro 
recalled72 tonnes of beef that was manufactured into 179,000 packages of various products, 
including retailer and manufacturer brands such as Buitoni and Nestle. The significant impact 
in terms of volume, complexity, product recall cost and damages to sales and consumer 
confidence caused the IFS Management to launch an emergency update to IFS Food 6, 
requesting mandatory DNA tests with immediate effect. 
The update was communicated via the IFS Newsletter and ‘IFS Audit Portal’ notifications, 
stating that: 
“The IFS expects manufacturers to develop a risk-based control plan to check 
authenticity of incoming raw materials and/or semi-finished products. … 
further tests, like DNA-tests, must be performed. The main objective of these 
amendments is to…ensure companies focus on checking the authenticity of raw 
materials and/or semi-finished products” (IFS E-mail, 2013). 
Additionally, modifications to IFS Food 6 became effective on April 1st, 2013. Figure 6.8 shows 
track-changes to relevant sections of IFS Food 6: 
 
Figure 6.8. Changes to IFS Food 6. IFS Food 6, p. 62 and p. 78. 
IFS explained the changes to IFS Food 6 in the IFS Doctrine, stating that: 
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“As a result of the most recent fraud case, experts from the food industry, retail 
and certification bodies from France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain 
and the USA have agreed to change the standard requirements.  The new 
requirements demand from each manufacturer to be able to produce 
according to retailer specification, regardless of whether the company 
produces the product itself or purchases the product or parts of it. The 
manufacturer must implement processes to ensure the authenticity of 
products, ingredients or raw materials purchased” (IFS Doctrine, Version 2, 
March 2013, p.10). 
Changes to IFS Food 6 following the horsemeat incident exemplify change processes to IFS 
standard schemes. While the IFS’ response to the incident was almost immediate, the German 
government was in the process of drafting an ‘Action Plan’, parts of which are still under 
consideration. While communication of updates via e-mail and IFS Portal notifications is 
reserved for emergencies, the usual communication includes a six-month notice and 
provisions of supplementary documents, such as the ‘IFS Doctrines’, IFS Presentations, 
translated versions of the standard and international ‘IFS roadshow seminars’ and training 
schemes. Since retailers’ and manufacturers’ GTC and contracts reference valid IFS 
certification, non-compliance with the latest IFS versions may be filed as breach of contract 
and therefore acts as an additional motivator to adopt the latest standard requirements.  
6.9 Benefits and limitations of using IFS Food for dealing with risk 
IFS Food signifies a change in dealing with risk by shifting from “controlling the final product 
to process-oriented quality assurance systems throughout all supply and marketing stages” 
(GTZ report, 2007, p.141). This has contributed to the benefits of: 
a) Limiting risks to food safety, consumer health and environment; 
b) Limiting legal ambiguity; 
c) Limiting liability risks verifying due diligence; 
d) Facilitating interaction between multiple actors involved in dealing with risk through 
shared regulations; product and process specifications; and information exchange 
systems (IFS Audit Portal). 
These benefits are evidenced in a measurable reduction in food safety and quality incidents: 
for example, surveyed manufacturers across several product categories report 17% reduction 
in food recalls, 27% reduction in customer complaints and 40% reduction in product defects 
(White Paper IFS Food, 2012, p.3). Retailer Metro reports a 90% reduction in product recalls 
over five years (Jurgen Matern, Vice President of Sustainability and Regulatory Affairs of the 
Metro Group, GFSI Conference, 2012). Limiting the occurrence of food safety and quality 
incidents translates in benefits to key company resources, such as the: 
“protection of the company, product and brand reputation; opportunities to 
enlarge customer base by serving customers requiring 3rd party certifications; 
use of the IFS logo in B2B relationships to signal compliance with highest food 
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safety and quality requirements” (IFS Fact sheet, IFS Food, Version 6, 2012, 
p.1). 
While the IFS significantly enhances food safety and quality beyond the German market, there 
remain two limitations: First, heavy reliance on auditing processes offers merely a snapshot 
evaluation of food safety and quality provisions. Second, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
preserve the parsimony and global applicability of IFS Food while continuously adapting the 
standard to precedent cases, technological and legislative changes (ID 14). Currently, IFS Food 
applies to all company sizes, across all food categories, globally. While it creates a global 
standard for dealing with risk, it necessarily involves ambiguity in the content of the IFS audit 
guidelines, which may result in variability in implementation and outcomes. Moreover, strong 
focus on quality attributes and retailer specifications exposed IFS Food to critiques from the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO): The WTO questions the legitimacy of IFS, suggesting that 
retailers use ‘food safety concerns’ to cover the enforcement of retailer-specific quality 
specifications that function as non-tariff barriers (WTO, 2010). Current concerns over 
sustainable use of soil, water and crops, ethical commodity trade and animal welfare are 
projected to influence future changes to IFS Food (ID 26). 
6.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how German food retailers and manufacturers use the IFS for 
dealing with risk in direct and indirect interactions. Following a series of food safety incidents 
in the 1990s and changes to the European and German food laws in the early 2000s, German 
food retailers developed the IFS with the aim of delivering a uniform, internationally valid, 
collective institutional system for ensuring food safety across the industry. The IFS content 
and structure demonstrate that the standard body provides and continuously adapts standard 
regulations, monitoring, sanctioning and dispute-resolution provisions in light of companies’ 
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CHAPTER 7. DEALING WITH RISK: THE USE OF GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter reports how retailers and manufacturers use General Terms and Conditions 
(GTC) for dealing with risk in direct and indirect relationships. GTC - also referred to as 
‘standard form contracts’ - are unilaterally drafted contracts that are designed by one party 
with the purpose of using the terms in multiple interactions. Drawing on evidence from in-
depth interviews and current GTC-in-use of four German retailers, this chapter describes how 
GTC facilitate dealing with risks across direct and indirect business interactions by limiting 
uncertainty and impact. 
Starting by describing the legal standing of GTC in business interactions, the chapter next 
utilises evidence from in-depth interviews and current GTC-in-use of four German retailers to 
examine the content of GTC. Finally, the chapter reports how actors share GTC across direct 
and indirect interactions, why and how GTC change and what constitute the benefits and 
limitations of using GTC for dealing with risk. 
7.2 Legal standing of GTC 
GTC are unilaterally drafted contracts that are legally enforceable under German private 
contract law. EU and German regulations regarding the content and use of GTC in business-to-
business interactions are brief compared to GTC intended for business-to-consumer 
interactions25. Indeed, there is no European regulation on the use of GTC in business-to-business 
interactions, as the EU Council Directive 93/13/EEC on “Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts” 
(1993) applies exclusively to GTC in business-to-consumer settings. According to the German 
Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, hereafter referred to as the BGB), GTC are defined as “all 
those contractual terms that have been formulated in advance by one contract party for the use 
in multiple contracts and which are presented to the other contracting party upon entering into 
a contract” (BGB §305 para.1). 
To qualify as GTC, the terms must be used in a minimum of three interactions and must be 
formulated by one party: The counterparty must not have an opportunity to alter clauses, yet 
must consent to the GTC as presented if the transaction is to be completed (Zerres, 2011). The 
GTC become effective if the contract party consented to the GTC: Consent does not require 
written or verbal confirmation, as the act of not dissenting in written or verbal form counts as 
                                                                
25The first monograph on GTC law written by Ludwig Raiser appeared in Germany only in 1935 
and the German legislature decided to (slightly) regulate the use of GTC as late as 1977 by issuing 
the “Law for regulating GTC” (Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen 
Geschäftbedingungen, AGB-Recht). The primary purpose of this law was, however, to regulate the 
use of GTC in business-to-consumer interactions to protect consumers from unfair trading practices. 
Hence, the regulation did not affect the freedom of use of GTC in business-to-business interactions. 
The regulation passed in 1977 is still valid today and was merely transferred on January 1st 2002 
to the BGB located at §305 onwards. 
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acceptance. This is referred to as “silent concurrence of wills” and is sufficient for GTC to 
become the legal basis for transaction(s)26. As a result, the use of pre-formulated terms and 
evasion of negotiations significantly speeds up the process of completing transactions.  
Negotiated clauses between parties take precedent over unilaterally defined GTC (BGB § 305 
b). However, there are strict requirements for ‘negotiation’ and both parties must verify it has 
taken place. For example, offering to choose between alternative clauses or filling in gaps in a 
contract do not qualify as ’negotiation’.  
GTC used in business-to-business interactions are granted significant freedom: GTC may be 
shared as a separate document with each party; as a placard displayed at the issuer’s premises; 
or as a contractual attachment. Font, length and complexity are also subject to the issuer’s 
discretion. The BGB offers one paragraph detailing the “test of reasonableness of contents” by 
stating that GTC become “ineffective if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, they 
unreasonably disadvantage the other party to the contract with the user” (BGB §30727). Hence, 
the BGB limits the regulation of GTC in business-to-business interactions mostly to §305 
para.1, §306, §307 and §310, which emphasize that “…reasonable account must be taken of 
the [habitual] practices and customs that apply in business dealings” (§310, para.1). Such 
provisions preserve considerable freedom in using GTC in business-to-business interactions, 
while maintaining GTC standing as enforceable contracts. This allows the issuer to use GTC for 
addressing legal loopholes28 and limit exposure to risk by creating a favourable ‘liability 
regime’ (ID 15) that is protected by German private contract law and is valid beyond the 
German market.  
                                                                
26 In the case that both parties insist on using their own GTC, the German courts typically apply the 
“doctrine of congruence” (Zerres, 2011, p.10). According to this doctrine, the terms and conditions 
of both parties that are identical or similar in meaning are retained and the terms and conditions 
that differ become replaced with German statutory law provisions of the BGB. This doctrine 
replaces the earlier application of the principle of the ‘last word’ to resolve such cases. According 
to the ‘last word’ principle, those GTC would take priority that have been referred to last in 
contractual negotiations. However, applying this principle required close analysis of the parties’ 
communications ex post, which were sometimes difficult to verify and track.  
27 The BGB § 308 and § 309 regulate in detail GTC content intended for business-to-consumer 
interactions, including a comprehensive list of prohibited clauses, such as (a) price increases at 
short notice; (b) lump-sum claims for damages; (c) contractual penalties (such as payment default); 
(d) exclusion of liability; and (e) provisions by which the user modifies the burden of proof to the 
disadvantage of the other party to the contract (cf. BGB § 309). BGB §310 specifically excludes §308 
and §309 from application to GTC used in business-to-business interactions. 
28 In contrast with British law, German law relies on a civil law system, which comprises 
comprehensive statutes regulating all areas of legal conduct. For instance, the BGB comprises more 
than 2300 sections specifying regulations of various contract types, including sales, loan, service 
contracts and GTC. However, more recent contract types, such as franchising, leasing or factoring 
contracts, are not addressed by the BGB or any other legal statutes, and rely on most occasions on 
companies’ own development of contractual devices, often drawing on GTC. 
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7.3 Business actors 
This section examines the use of GTC in interactions between retailers Alpha, Beta, Gamma 
and Delta29 and direct and indirect relationships with manufacturers and the manufacturer’s 
suppliers. The examined GTC include those of discounters (Alpha, Beta) and regular retailers 
(Gamma, Delta). Figure 7.1 offers a simplified illustration of GTC use in four sets of retailer-
manufacturer interactions: 
 
Figure 7.1. GTC in retailer-manufacturer interactions. 
Figure 7.1 is a simplified illustration, because: (a) the actual number of actors involved is 
significantly higher, typically reaching four-digit numbers per retailer; (b) other actors, such 
as wholesalers, transportation or packaging providers are excluded for illustrative clarity; and 
(c) actual retailer-manufacturer-supplier relationships are significantly more interdependent, 
as each actor tends to maintain more than one retailer or manufacturer account. Nevertheless, 
Figure 7.1 captures three important observations: 
(1) Retailers issue GTC (R§) to regulate multiple interactions with manufacturers and all 
retailers’ GTC show strong similarities. 
(2) Retailers’ GTC are accepted in full by manufacturers (symbolized by the one-directed 
arrow). As retailers are aware of manufacturers’ complex sub-contracting activities, 
the retailer’s GTC typically require the manufacturer to ensure that all direct and 
indirect sub-contractors adhere to the retailer’s GTC. Manufacturers meet this 
requirement by “copy-pasting” paragraphs from the retailer’s GTC and adding these 
                                                                
29 To preserve confidentiality, the retailers’ revenue, market share or headquarters location are not 
disclosed. Anonymised details of six German retailers, including Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta are 
reported in Chapter Four. 
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to the manufacturer’s GTC (RM§). This is typically repeated by the manufacturer’s 
suppliers (RMS§). 
(3) Most manufacturers interact with multiple retailers, therefore consenting to multiple 
GTC. While strong similarity between retailers’ GTC facilitates efficient compliance 
with multiple GTC, it also locks-in manufacturers and suppliers into a ‘liability regime’ 
of unequal risk distribution (see Section 7.5).  
The distribution manager of a retailer- and manufacturer-brand supplier, who delivers to all 
German retailers, explains why and how the company deals with retailers’ GTC by accepting 
and passing on the retailers’ GTC to its suppliers. His account of the interaction with Gamma 
reflects common practice: 
“Retailer purchasing managers are very difficult to deal with. Before you are 
even invited to negotiations, they throw at you their GTC. […] They have huge 
power, they know and use it. They even have huge power compared to bigger 
companies than us, such as Coca-Cola, so you can imagine how much we can 
do about negotiating GTC. Nothing. We take it and pass it on.  
Our challenge is that we stand in between retailers and importers or other 
suppliers, so we have risks related to purchasing products, related to 
manufacturing some products and risks regarding the distribution. …Our main 
business is importing products from countries that German retailers classify as 
“developing”…. The main risks we fear are related to product quality, storage, 
packaging… According to the retailers’ GTC, the retailers may claim damages 
from us and we must administer all product recalls. 
So, what we do is, we take the retailers’ GTC and copy-paste passages about 
product specifications, claims for damages and recalls into the GTC we have 
for our suppliers. We pass on the costs one-to-one to our supplier. In 90% of 
our contracts, we use GTC we developed with our lawyers. We get very specific 
and hard GTC from our customers [retailers]. So we take some passages from 
the retailer’s GTC, which were imposed on us and we attach them to the back 
of our GTC. We do it, because we have learned that the compensations retailers 
demand from us are super high. They can charge up to 50 000 EUR per batch…. 
Plus, you must consider that we can be asked to request laboratory tests, which 
are expensive. So, we write our own version of GTC and attach the retailers’ 
GTC to take that risk off our shoulders. That’s because we have seen that if you 
agree to the retailers’ GTC, you will be carrying all risks all by yourself. …In 
short, let’s say we try transferring those risks that retailers burden us with. […] 
In most cases, our suppliers accept the GTC that we have written…because 
most of them want to enter the German market.... they agree to play by our 
rules or they go. A little percentage of our suppliers, probably less than 10%, 
are very big companies. With them, we cannot demand agreement with our 
GTC and negotiate a lot” (ID 21). 
This account illuminates how and why GTC travel across a retailer’s supplier network and how 
the GTC are used to transfer risk impact, regardless of the companies’ geographical location. 
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Retailers’ GTC govern most food production and distribution processes even beyond the 
retailers’ direct relationships with manufacturers. A former quality manager at a German 
poultry manufacturer further explains this dynamic:  
“If you supply to a discounter-retailer … then you have specifications for 
everything! What you must do, with whom, from where you get any product or 
packaging supplies or other services, whom you must monitor and who will 
monitor you. The retailers sometimes write that into their GTC or they 
formulate the GTC in quite general terms and then they attach these pages of 
specifications. Delta30 has written everything into the GTC. Discounters Alpha 
and Beta have quite general GTC…and then you get tons of specifications 
attached” (ID 14). 
The use of GTC by retailers to ‘dictate’ the processes (i.e., how to produce, distribute), 
outcomes (i.e., product specifications) and interactions (i.e., whom to monitor) demonstrates 
how more powerful companies, such as retailers and some manufacturers, capitalize on the 
freedom granted to GTC under private contract law31 to codify and share standardized 














                                                                
30 The original names of the mentioned retailers have been substituted with the anonymized 
identification of the retailers.  
31 In the civil law system, which applies to Germany, private law refers to that part of the legal 
system that regulates interactions between private entities, such as individuals or corporations. 
The use of GTC is part of contract law, which is, among other things, an element of private law. 
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7.4 Content of GTC 
This section reports the content of four German retailers’ GTC. While GTC typically span one 
to seven pages, they form part of a document set that includes a “Request for Information” 
(RFI32); a catalogue of industry standards such as the IFS, BSCI and/or a retailer’s “Code of 
Conduct” (CoC); and a catalogue of proprietary retailer product specifications, typically 
comprising retailer-specific requirements for each product category (such as dairy, meat, fruit 
and vegetables). 
Positive evaluation of RFI is a necessary precondition for a contracting party to receive the 
retailers’ GTC. The retailers’ and manufacturer’s GTCs are highly standardised. Table 7.1 
provides an overview of the GTC of Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta. To facilitate the comparison, 
clauses addressing similar issues are coloured similarly across the four GTC: 
White Retailer specific clauses (i.e., Beta’s ‘Gift Policy’; Delta’s ‘Market Development 
Funds’) 
Green Warranties, product defects, due diligence, product liability and insurance 
Red Product withdrawal and recall; compensation and damages  
Orange Pricing and payment terms  
Grey General regulations, scope of applications, procedure for order placement 
Yellow Regulations regarding deliveries, transportation, passing of risk and delivery 
delays  
Light Blue  Product (quality) specifications  
Dark Blue Start and termination of contract(s)  
Turquoise Confidentiality, data protection and property rights 
Lilac General legal provisions, such as severability clauses, venue and court of 
jurisdiction 
                                                                
32 RFI span four to twenty pages and are used prior to the distribution of GTC or contract 
negotiations to screen potential contracting partners. RFI request insurance, certification and 
financial performance proofs and cover a range of confidential information such as “Does your 
company sub-contract or franchise-manufacture products? State how many and which activities 
are sub-contracted and how many products/ingredients in % are purchased from low-wage 
countries”; “State the number of court judgements in the last three years”; “Provide details of 
current customers”; “Has your company experienced premature contract termination? If yes, 
why?”  
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Table 7.1. German food retailers’ General Terms and Conditions. 
Alpha (Discounter) Beta (Discounter) Gamma (regular supermarket) Delta (regular supermarket) 
Date GTC were distributed and length of document 
June 2012, Germany; 1 page (font ~ Arial 8, single 
spaced)  
 
June 2011, Germany; 7 pages (font ~ Arial 11, 
single spaced) 
2011, Germany; 2 pages (font ~ Arial 8, single 
spaced) 
October 2011, Germany; 5 pages (font ~ Arial 10, 
single spaced) 
1. Contract Regulations 1. Scope of Application 1. Scope of Application A. General Regulations 
2. Deliveries 2. Pricing 2. Orders 1. Scope of Application 
3. Warranties and Product Defects 3. Deliveries and Delays 3. Delivery and Performance-times 2. Conclusion of Contract 
4. Damages to Reputation and Business, 
Product Recalls and Withdrawals 
4. Deliveries and Passing of Risk 4. Delivery Terms and Conditions 3. Pricing, Payment Terms, Cut-off Period for 
Reclaims 
5. Legal Consequences and Violation of 
Obligations  
5. Delay of Payment 5. Warranties 4. Market Development Funds (MFD) and 
Others 
6. Reservation of Proprietary Rights and 
Prohibition of Assignment  
6. Invoicing Practice 6. Products and Dates 5. Deliveries, Damages Caused by Delay and 
Covering Purchases 
7. Payment and invoicing 7. Warranties in Case of Product Deficiencies, 
Due Diligence 
7. “Grüner Punkt” (German Packaging 
Recycling Policy) 
6. Transportation and Passing of Risk 
8. Termination of Contracts 8. Limitations of Actions (Verjährung) 8. Transportation Packaging (Disposal) 7. Reservation of Proprietary Rights 
9. Customer Data 9. Product Quality 9. Recall, Withdrawal and Other Product 
Safety Measures 
8. Product Specifications, Quality and 
Documentation 
10. Venue, Court of Jurisdiction 10. Confidentiality 10. Traceability 9. Warranties and Compensation 
11. Severability Clause 11. Data Protection  11. Product Returns and Compensation 10. Product Liability, Insurance and 
Manufacturer Liability 
 12. Property Rights 12. Place of Contract Performance 11. Crisis Management, Recall and 
Withdrawal, Warning of Public 
Stakeholders; Compensation for Damages 
to Image 
13. Obligation to Inform 13. Certificates of Origin B. Delivery Quotes 
14. Attachments 14. Force Majeure 12. Contract Penalty Fines in Case of 
Underperforming Delivery Quantities 
15. Gift Policy 15. Termination of Contract C. REACH 
16. Venue, Court of Jurisdiction 16. Severability Clause D. Shelf Services 
17. Other Terms and Conditions 17. Venue, Court of Jurisdiction E. Concluding Terms and Conditions 
 13. Compliance with Social Standards 
14. Confidentiality 
15. Severability Clause and Venue, Court of 
Jurisdiction  
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Similarity across the retailers’ GTC highlights that the strength of GTC lies not in exploiting the 
legal freedom to design retailer-specific GTC, but in the standardization of terms across 
multiple retailers’ interactions. GTC limit variety in geographically dispersed interactions by 
standardizing a variety of activities, including warranty management, payment and product 
recall procedures. Moreover, retailers’ GTC are not isolated from industry standards or 
German legal provisions, but strongly embedded in both: For example, by cross-referencing 
the IFS and BSCI in retailers’ GTC, these ‘voluntary’ industry standards become legally 
enforceable. On the other hand, the very enforceability of GTC relies on German statutory law 
and all GTC emphasise the contracting party’s compliance with relevant legal regulations.  
7.5 The use of GTC for dealing with risk 
Table 7.2 reports the content of retailers’ GTC and how the clauses address risk: Typically, a 
clause identifies the risk (such as delayed delivery, price increase, deficient product safety or 
quality) and then defines the contracting party’s (CP) obligations in response to the risk. 
The following list of identified risks is illustrative, rather than exhaustive, comprising: 
(1) Variation in product safety/quality; non-compliance with legal and/or retailer’s 
specifications;  
(2) Variation in packaging, labelling and transportation; 
(3) Variation in delivery volumes or time;  
(4) Price increases (i.e., due to fluctuating commodity prices or taxes) 
(5) Infringement of intellectual property rights (i.e., concerning brands, recipes, 
packaging, products) 
(6) Variation in social, ethical and environmental standards by the CP or any of its sub-
contractors;  
(7) Variation in a supplier’s portfolio of sub-contractors;  
(8) Force majeure; 
(9) Limitation of retailer’s contracting freedom due to contractual commitment to the CP;  
(10) Variation in applicable legal requirements. 
These risks are mapped onto relevant GTC clauses in the left-hand column below: 
Table 7.2. Content of General Terms and Conditions. 
1. Industry and 
Retailer 
Standards   
[Standard requirements are attached to the GTC or stated in the RFI] 
(1) Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) 
(2) International Featured Standards (IFS) 
(3)  Retailer’s proprietary specifications 
2. Scope of 
Application 
Risks: 1,6,7,10 
(1) GTC underpin all further interactions, unless clauses are explicitly excluded in 
writing. 
(2) Retailer’s GTC supersede any CP’s GTC. No terms of CP’s GTC are accepted 
unless the retailer has decided otherwise in writing. 
(3) The CP must not pass on the performance of duties to a 3rd party, unless he/she 
has gained the retailer’s written agreement. 
(4) All changes to the GTC must be stated in writing. 
3. Delivery 
Risks:2,3 
(1) Delivery dates are fixed and must be strictly complied with. 
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(2) The CP must immediately inform the retailer in case of any delivery 
disruptions, potential delay, cause of disruptions and the next possible 
delivery dates. 
(3) The retailer may claim damages of up to 5% of the net price of the missing 
delivery in addition to its right for compensation.  
(4) The CP must stock product deliveries for up to 10 retail outlets. 
4. Warranties 
Risks:1,2,5 
The CP guarantees that: 
(1) The products conform to all legal and retailer specifications; 
(2) The products conform in composition, packaging and labelling to the latest 
legal    requirements for German and all other destination markets; 
(3) The products do not infringe any 3rd party rights. In case the CP infringed 3rd 
party rights, he/she is responsible to free the retailer from any claims for 
damages or compensation immediately. 
(4) The retailer will practice due diligence and notify the CP (orally or in writing) 
immediately [within two weeks] of any infringements. 
(5) The CP cannot claim the retailer to deficiently practice due diligence if the 
deficiencies discovered were known to them or could have been overlooked by 
them only in case of culpable negligence. 
5. Pricing 
Risk:4 
Prices agreed in framework contracts are fixed maximum prices valid for the 
duration of the contract [typically one year]. 





If the product quality does not meet legal or retailer requirements, the retailer can 
demand: 
(1) Supplementary performance,  
(2) Rectification of defects,  
(3) Compensation deliveries,  
(4) Removal of products (at CP’s expense). 
If the CP does not perform, the retailer will remove the delivery at the expense of 
the CP. If the product delivery is deficient, the retailer may demand full refund of 
already delivered and paid products, as well as any other product delivered by 
that supplier. The CP must protect the retailer from any claims for damages from 





(1) To sub-contract any contractual duties towards the retailer, the CP must gain 
the retailer’s written agreement.  
(2) If the CP intends to switch suppliers or any sub-contractors of any ingredients 
for a product supplied to the retailer, the CP must inform the retailer within 




Crisis management, recall and public warning, damage claims and 
compensation for image damages 
(1) The CP guarantees maintaining a functioning crisis management system 
(CMS). This CMS must define the responsibilities, communication flow and 
contact details [24/7] within the company to guarantee correct crisis 
management. The retailer must receive all contact details of the company’s 
crisis manager(s). 
(2) If product recalls do not affect retailer-brand products, the manufacturer must 
inform the retailer’s buying department in writing immediately of the affected 
products and the reason for recall. The CP must cover all recall costs, including 
disposal, payment for substitute products and compensation to the retailer.  
(3) The CP must manage all aspects of the recall. 
(4) If public authorities reasonably claim that a product poses health risks, the 
retailer may refrain from any future transactions with the CP and the CP will 
be responsible for removing all ordered and/or delivered products. The same 
applies if the health risks are alleged and not yet confirmed but are reported 
by the media. 
(5) For every product recall due to product deficiencies, the CP owes the retailer 
a lump-sum amount of EUR 25 per retail outlet. 
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(6)  In case of public product recalls authorized by public authorities, the CP owes 
the retailer a lump-sum payment for damages to reputation of EUR 100,000. 
This fee is only waived if the product deficiencies are not attributable to a fault 






(1) The retailer imposes strict product specifications. Product quality is tested 
systematically by independent laboratories and retailer-internal sensory 
examinations. 
(2) The retailer reserves the right to conduct CP audits themselves or instruct 3rd 
party audits. 
(3) The retailer directs attention to product category related quality standards. 
I.e., in the case of fruit/vegetable supplies, the retailer accepts a maximum of 
70% of the legally permitted Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs). For the 
retailer’s own brand, the retailer accepts maximum residue levels of 50% of 
those legally permitted in Germany. To monitor the MRL, the retailer runs a 
proprietary database, where all values are plotted and serve as a rapid alert 
system. 
(4) The CP guarantees that all products comply with the national food 
requirements of the destination market; if no specific market is identified, the 
German regulations apply. 
(5) The CP guarantees that all products delivered to the retailer comply with the 
German requirements outlined in the Lebensmittel- und 
Futtermittelgesetzbuch (LFGB); the Rückstandshöchstmengenverordnung 
(MRL regulations) and all other food regulations and competition law. All 
relevant products must meet the safety requirements of VDE-TÜV-GS-CE. 
(6) 1st, 2nd and 3rd party inspections: The retailer may engage in product 
inspections at any time or assign a 3rd party to carry out the product 
inspections. Raw materials used in the final product may be inspected 
separately. The CP is exclusively responsible for any product or raw material 
deficiencies identified by the retailer or another inspecting authority. 
Therefore, the CP must demonstrate constant product quality inspections 










The CP must ensure that all suppliers and sub-contractors comply with BSCI 
standards: 
1. Legal regulations: laws, regulations and industry standards must be met.  
2. Freedom of Association & Right to Collective Bargaining 
3. Prohibition of discrimination  
4. Remuneration 
5. Working Hours 
6. Health and Safety at the Workplace 
7. Prohibition of child labour 
8. Prohibition of certain disciplinary practices 
9. Prohibition of forced and compulsory labour 
10. Environmental and safety concerns  





(1) The CP is liable for any product defects, covering all product recall cost. 
(2) The CP must provide the retailer with extended product liability insurance 




(1) The retailer retains property rights over any documents, calculations and 
pictures. No 3rd party may see or access these materials without the retailer’s 
written consent. 
(2) Reservation of proprietary rights: The retailer owns all products, even in case 
of recall, until all payments are fulfilled by the CP. 
The CP frees the retailer of any claims for damages, product liability, claims of 
material defects and compensation for personal suffering from 3rd parties, when 
the cause for the claims lies with the CP or any of their sub-contractors. 







(1) The CP conforms to the “Grüner Punkt” [recycling policy] packaging 
requirements. 
(2) The CP is liable for any deviations from EU or German packaging regulations. 
In case of infringement, the CP takes full responsibility and frees the retailer 
of any claims.  




(1) The CP guarantees continuous and full traceability of all products, ingredients 
and packaging according to EG Nr.178/2002 and any future regulations. All 
ingredients (raw materials, additives, preservatives, aromas and flavours) 
must be traceable. Traceability documentation must specify the time, 
location and used packaging materials. 
(2)  The CP must provide all information to the buyer and/or the authorities if 






(1) The CP informs the retailer immediately if ‘Stiftung Warentest’ or ‘Öko-Test’ 
claim any product deficiencies. 




(1) FM frees both parties of any duties for the time of the incident. Both parties 
must inform each other to the best of their ability of the time, nature, scope 
and duration of the incident and to adapt their contractual responsibilities to 
the best of their knowledge and in good faith. 
(2) The retailer may reject any orders if the FM incident caused decreased 
demand. 




(1) The CP guarantees compliance with all German data protection regulations. 
(2) The CP guarantees the protection of any confidential documents exchanged 
as part of the agreement. 
(3) The CP guarantees the retailer or a 3rd party assigned by the retailer to inspect 
its data protection measures at least annually. In case of non-compliance, the 
CP must pay minimum damages of 0.15% or maximum damages of 5% of the 








The retailer may terminate contracts immediately if the CP: (a) breaches the 




(1) Both parties agree to keep trade secrets confidential. 
(2) The CP must not share trade secrets originating from contracting with the 
retailer to any CPs, with the exception of the information necessary for a 3rd 
party to complete its business. 
(3) The CP agrees to return any documentation from engaging with the retailer to 
the retailer as soon as the contract expires. Data storage media must be 
destroyed using the CP’s data eraser programs. 
(4) The CP is liable for any damages resulting from disclosing trade secrets or 
data originating from exchanges with the retailer. The CP is liable for the acts 
of his employees, subcontractors, other CPs and freelance contractors. 
21. Court of 
Jurisdiction 
Risk:10 
(1) Exclusive court of jurisdiction is the German court of ‘Town x’. The retailer 
reserves the right to sue the CP at his local venue. 
(2) The contract is subject exclusively to the law of the German Federation, 
excluding the provisions of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, CISG. 
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Table 7.2 illustrates how GTC clauses facilitate dealing with risk: (1) GTC limit variability in 
interactions by excluding other options apart from the one option preferred by the retailer (such 
as the court of jurisdiction; MRLs; applicable industry standards; procedures for data 
protection). (2) GTC identify potential outcomes associated with non-compliance with the 
retailer’s specifications (such as product recall due to product deficiencies; third-party rights 
infringement). (3) GTC define a ‘liability regime’ (ID 15) that effectively transfers impact to 
the CP (such as payment for reputational damages; compensation for product recalls).  
Moreover, the table illustrates that GTC may offer more than one clause to address risks. For 
example, variability in product quality is one of the retailers’ main concerns and is addressed 
in the sections: 
1. Scope of application (limiting product quality variability by demanding exclusive 
compliance with retailer’s specifications);  
3. Warranties (specifying CP guarantees in case of non-compliance) 
6. Claims for damages, recall and compensation (transferring the impact of product 
safety and quality risk to CP) 
7. Contracting alternative suppliers (limiting product quality variability by limiting the 
CP’s (sub-)contracting options) 
8. Crisis Management (limiting impact by limiting variability in product recall 
response) 
9. Product quality, composition and documentation (limiting product quality variability 
by specifying retailer’s product quality specifications; provision for first, second 
and third-party inspections) 
11. Product liability and insurance (transfer liability for product quality variability) 
14. Traceability (limiting impact and re-occurrence of product quality variability) 
15. Information clause (limiting impact of product quality variability through early 
response and data sharing in the retailer-database). 
Using GTC, the issuer can create a ‘liability regime’ that standardizes interactions and transfers 
risk impact serving “the principle of protecting your own resources” (ID 20). 
7.6 Monitoring and enforcing GTC 
GTC include clauses for monitoring and enforcing compliance through legal and non-legal 
sanctions, which may take effect beyond the retailer’s direct relationships. Monitoring 
involves direct and indirect inspections performed by the retailer or third-party auditors at the 
manufacturer’s and their sub-contractor’s sites (see Table 7.2, Clause 9). Moreover, retailers 
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can request regular supplier’s verification of sub-contractor auditing. A quality manager at a 
poultry supplier describes direct retailer audits by Beta and Delta as: 
“…pickier than the IFS audits… Beta has the right to come at any day or night 
time! They do the audit, write an audit report and give you some deadlines and 
what they think you must improve. In response, we write a statement about 
how we will address it. Usually, they will come unannounced again to check if 
we did what we said […] Beta focuses on auditing its direct suppliers…but Delta 
is known to go visiting its suppliers’ suppliers, too. If Beta wants to know how 
sub-suppliers perform, they ask us to do it and forward the audit and test 
results to Beta” (ID 14). 
In response to the retailer’s GTC requesting suppliers to audit sub-contractors, a major 
German meat manufacturer, Xion, incorporates the retailer’s request into its own GTC, stating 
that: 
“§8. Quality Assurance and Audits. Xion has the right to conduct on-site 
audits at the contracting party’s sites with prior announcement and within the 
supplier’s regular working times…” 
In addition to on-site inspections, Beta requests that its contracting parties perform ‘social-
audits’ at their own and sub-contractor’s sites to verify compliance with the ‘Beta Code of 
Conduct’, which draws on the BSCI requirements. This requirement is present in Beta’s and 
Xion’s GTC, with the latter stating: 
“§2. BSCI Standards and Animal Welfare. For all Xion suppliers and sub-
contractors, the latest version of BSCI standards applies. The supplier must 
accept and implement the standard at site. The supplier must be able to verify 
compliance with BSCI standards, possibly through Xion on-site audits.” 
In addition to direct monitoring, retailers and manufacturers rely on IFS third- party audits for 
indirect monitoring. The IFS Food Version 6 includes ‘compliance with customer‘ [i.e., retailer] 
specifications as a ‘knock-out criterion’, resulting in immediate certification failure in case of 
non-compliance. 
The effectiveness of (in-) direct monitoring depends on the activation of legal and non-legal 
sanctions in case of detected non-compliance. A senior member of the IFS Sanctioning 
Committee highlights the importance of sanctions by stating that: 
“Part of adequate control is consistent sanctioning in case of non-
compliance…If you do not sanction breaches, with measures that have been 
known to other parties in advance, you devalue the rules and undermine trust 
created in that framework of rules” (ID 13).  
Legal sanctions refer to the mobilization of punitive actions through (inter-) national legal 
authorities, such as issuing formal inspections by food authorities or litigation. Legal sanctions 
typically result in requests for compensatory payments or immediate annulment of contracts. 
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However, due to public exposure in litigation cases and absence of tailored solutions, hardly 
any breaches of GTC are sanctioned with litigation (ID 21). Instead, both parties rely on the 
‘looming potential’ of legal sanctions and in fact invoke non-legal sanctions that may involve 
product delisting, payment of additional fees or suspension from future business. The actual 
exercise of sanctions in German food retailer-manufacturer interactions depends on relative 
bargaining power: 
“It is the practical market power deciding who sanctions and how. Mostly, 
these are the retailers and they don’t even necessarily look into their GTC or 
contracts to issue sanctions. They simply rely on saying: ‘You will do this and 
that now, if you want to keep in business with us. You must take the recalled 
products back at your own cost and dispose of it. Then you give us free of 
charge substitute deliveries if you want to continue business.’… Any kind of 
litigation would only harm the relationship and image of some company and 
in the end, possibly only produce a request for fines or contract termination. 
An internal way of sanctioning is more pragmatic. For many suppliers, one 
retailer can be a major source or even the only source of revenue. They really 
will do anything to preserve that relationship. And big retailers know that” (ID 
12). 
Clauses specifying non-legal sanctions are transferred by manufacturers to sub-contractors in 
a similar way to other GTC clauses. For example, meat manufacturer Xion states in its GTC that 
in case of delivery delays, Xion can demand “compensation of 0.1 % of the delivery value per 
day of delay but not more than up to 5% of the delivery value…and in the case of a supplier 
not meeting the guarantee of delivering products according to Xion product specifications, 
Xion may demand compensation of 5% of the delivery value. This payment does not exclude 
Xion from the right to issue further claims for compensation” (Xion GTC, 2013). The relatively 
lower compensatory payments specified by Xion demonstrate on the one hand Xion’s relative 
bargaining power towards its suppliers and on the other hand, the relatively high claims 
issued by retailers, reaching up to 20% of a delivery’s value. Xion’s GTC largely replicate the 
GTC of its major competitor in the German meat manufacturer market.  
7.7 Dissemination of GTC 
Three clauses ensure that the GTC become the exclusive basis for interaction in direct and 
indirect food retailer-manufacturer relationships: 
(1) The “General Regulations” or “Scope of Application” clause typically specifies that the 
issuer’s (typically the retailer’s) GTC are the exclusive basis for interaction and no 
changes are valid without the issuer’s written consent. This clause automatically 
annihilates any CP’s GTC and ensures the issuer’s control over changes. 
(2) Clauses specifying ‘Product quality and inspections’ ensure GTC dissemination beyond 
direct interactions, because the issuer demands rights for unannounced audits at the 
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CP’s and all sub-contracting parties’ sites. The direct contracting party typically ‘copy-
pastes’ the issuer’s GTC into its own GTC exchanged with its sub-contractors.  
(3) GTC clauses requesting IFS certification draw on 3rd party auditors to ensure that the 
direct CP and its sub-contractors comply with the issuer’s GTC. This is because 
compliance with customer specifications (i.e., the retailer’s GTC) is one of the ‘IFS 
knock-out criteria’ resulting in immediate certification failure in case of detected non-
compliance.  
The greater the issuer’s bargaining power vis-à-vis its CPs, the greater tends to be its capacity 
to use its GTC without adaptation across a high number of direct and indirect interactions. The 
reach of GTC is not defined by geographical boundaries, but by the issuer’s relative power and 
the location of its direct and indirect CPs.  
7.8 Changes to GTC 
Dealing with risks that may originate from geographically dispersed interactions requires 
retailers and manufacturers to learn from experience and adapt to changes in food technology, 
legal regulations and consumer preferences. One of the most important characteristics of 
using GTC for dealing with risk in business interactions is the efficiency and immediacy with 
which changes are administrated: Unilaterally adapting, deleting or adding clauses or 
attachments without affecting the remainder of the document (due to the severability clause) 
make GTC a flexible, yet stable set of regulations.  Moreover, given the in-built mechanisms for 
GTC dissemination, the changes become effective immediately throughout the issuer’s focal 
network.  
Typically, changes to GTC are issued in response to: 
a) Negative experience with clauses in the current version of GTC; 
b) Precedent cases, which have affected (or have the potential to affect) a considerable 
number of industry actors;  
c) Changes to legal regulations;  
d) Changes to market and consumer preferences. 
7.9 Benefits and limitations of using GTC for dealing with risk  
GTC offer retailers and manufacturers two benefits in dealing with risk: First, GTC link industry 
standards and contract terms. Cross-referencing industry standards such as the IFS or BSCI 
reduces variability in food processing, manufacturing, distribution and final product 
outcomes, and renders compliance with standards legally enforceable regardless of a supplier’s 
location, local jurisdiction and business customs. Moreover, the issuer relies on monitoring and 
sanctioning specifications stated in the GTC and the IFS infrastructure to ensure direct and 
indirect parties' compliance with GTC. Although contract agreements override GTC, the GTC 
provide a vital body of default regulations: If contracts fail to specify a clause or it is deemed 
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ambiguous, the parties can resort to GTC. This is vital when retailers and manufacturers 
interact beyond the confines of the German market, as the issuer can specify which jurisdiction 
applies and GTC take precedent over otherwise applicable law. Second, GTC allow retailers 
and manufacturers to create a private, standardised ‘liability regime’ that regulates multiple 
direct and indirect interactions, despite jurisdictive contradictions or loopholes. For instance, 
while the EU Reg. 189/2002 requires limited traceability, which challenges efficient hazard 
identification and recall, retailers’ GTC require ‘full traceability’ of all ingredients and 
packaging materials. 
However, using GTC as privately agreed ‘liability regimes’ raises at least three concerns: While 
GTC facilitate transferring risk impact de-jure, this may not reflect the actual capability of the 
contracting party to effectively bear the impact. While de-jure, the party receiving the GTC has 
the right to dissent, this rarely occurs in German food retailer-manufacturer interactions: Due 
to retailer consolidation, there are few alternatives. Moreover, retailers’ GTC hardly differ and 
anecdotal evidence suggests that suppliers may become ‘blacklisted’ following attempts to re-
negotiate retailer’s GTC. A former quality manager at a German poultry manufacturer refers 
to the retailers’ practice of using GTC to transfer risk liabilities as the ‘Persilschein’, which  
“is a kind of guarantee-for-everything. They want a 100% guarantee that the products 
will forever be free from dioxin, GMO, pesticides, etc. Sometimes, you cannot even really 
guarantee what they want!” (ID 14).  
7.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how German food retailers and manufacturers use GTC for dealing 
with risk in direct and indirect interactions. Drawing on original GTC, this chapter 
demonstrates that across food retailers and manufacturers, GTC are highly similar, which 
facilitates dealing with risk by: (1) limiting variability in interactions across geographically 
dispersed direct and indirect actors; and by (2) defining a ‘liability regime’ that transfers risk 
impact from the issuer to the receiver of GTC. The strength of GTC rests in the parsimony of 
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CHAPTER 8. DEALING WITH RISK: THE USE OF FRAMEWORK CONTRACTS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports how retailers and manufacturers use framework contracts for dealing 
with risk in direct interactions. Framework contracts are a mutually negotiated record of 
agreed rules for guiding repeated future interactions. In contrast to GTC, terms are mutually 
negotiated and offer a platform for dealing with risks specific to the direct relationship. 
This chapter starts with stating the legal standing of framework contracts and then draws on 
a sample of two representative framework contracts between retailer Gamma and 
Manufacturer-M2 and between Manufacturer-M2 and Supplier-S2.2 to report the content and 
use of framework contracts. The chapter examines how actors monitor, sanction and negotiate 
changes to framework contracts, and closes with an evaluation of the benefits and limitations 
of using framework contracts for dealing with risk in direct relationships.  
8.2 Legal standing of framework contracts 
In contrast to GTC, framework contracts are not regulated by the “Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch” 
(BGB). Instead, framework contracts are subject to general freedom of private contract law 
that is codified in German constitutional law (Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
GG). The use of framework contracts in business-to-business interactions is hardly regulated 
regarding content and form. Contractual freedom is granted if the clauses do not infringe legal 
regulations such as the German food law, or are subject to unconscionability. 
Unconscionability refers to unfair terms clearly favouring one party and may render a contract 
void. As the term indicates, framework contracts provide a ‘frame’ for future transactions, 
which are then further detailed in additional ‘transaction contracts’, specifying product, 
volume, delivery schedules, pricing and payment requirements.  
8.3 Business actors  
This section offers a simplified illustration of actors involved in using framework contracts. 
Figure 8.1 illustrates the use of framework contracts in two sets of retailer-manufacturer 
interactions: between retailer Delta and manufacturer-brand manufacturer-M1 and between 
retailer Gamma and retailer-brand manufacturer-M2. In the case of M2, it was possible to 
access the framework contract negotiated between M2 and supplier S2.2, who provides 
ingredients that M2 needs for Gamma’s retailer-brand products. This sample of framework 
contracts is chosen because it is illustrative of the framework contracts used across German 
retailer-manufacturer interactions. 
 




Figure 8.1. Framework contracts in retailer-manufacturer interactions. 
Despite the freedom to customise framework contracts, the sample retailer-manufacturer and 
manufacturer-supplier contracts are still characterised by high similarity: Due to asymmetric 
bargaining power, most framework contracts reflect the retailer’s preferences and leave 
limited scope for mutual retailer-manufacturer negotiations. Since most retailers’ key 
interests regarding liabilities, product specifications or payment terms are similar and, 
additionally, the drafting process is frequently completed by the same lawyers specializing in 
food retailer-manufacturer relationships, framework contracts tend to be standardised. 
Moreover, framework contracts become highly modularised by using references to industry 
standards such as the IFS. In fact, one of the consulting lawyers to German food retailers 
observes that high standardisation of framework contracts leads to their replacement with 
GTC: 
“In practice, ‘framework contracts’ consist in our context [of food retailer-
manufacturer relationships] of pre-defined clauses, and because retailers do 
not tolerate much change, these clauses tend to be preserved. Framework 
contracts become like GTC. I know of buyer-supplier relationships who waived 
framework contracts and now rely only on GTC and transaction contracts” (ID 
13). 
Similar to the manufacturer’s use of retailers’ GTC, manufacturers ‘copy and paste’ several of 
the retailers’ clauses to include in their own ‘framework contracts’, which results in further 
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standardization of contracts in direct and indirect interactions. Yet, as is evident in the 
following section, framework contracts remain more detailed in addressing idiosyncratic 
issues in direct retailer-manufacturer relationships.  
8.4 Content of framework contracts 
Framework contracts typically span twelve to twenty pages and are included in a document-
set that comprises insurance policies, certification confirmation (typically IFS), proprietary 
product specifications and transaction contracts.  
Framework contracts must be written, as in some jurisdictions written contracts are a 
necessary requirement for a business relationship to exist in legal terms: 
“The written form is indispensable, because it is the only way to prove at a later 
stage, what both parties actually agreed to…Writing down requirements such 
as product specifications in as much detail as possible is crucial to make the 
contracting party’s performance measurable. With product specifications, you 
can define what attributes the product must have, what laboratory tests must 
be met etc. …Apart from that, if you wrote it down once, you can spread and 
adapt the specifications to an almost unlimited number of partners much 
easier” (ID 13). 
Moreover, the importance of the written form [‘Schriftlichkeitsprinzip’] is manifested in the 
‘Written Form Clause’ [‘Schriftformklausel’], which states that any changes must be made in 
writing. 
Apart from clauses negotiated within a specific direct relationship, framework contracts 
include references to industry and retailer specifications: Drawing on established ‘industry 
standards’, both parties make use of modular contract clauses (referred to as ‘building blocks’ 
by one of the respondents) to save time and cost. Moreover, modular clauses facilitate 
standardising high numbers of agreements and respective interactions, which translates into 
limited variability in multiple, future interactions: 
“A retailer who orders the same product from five different manufacturers 
must ensure that each manufacturer delivers exactly the same quality. That is 
why food standards like the IFS have such a tremendous focus on compliance 
with product and process quality requirements, and also check for compliance 
with a retailer’s own specifications, which they typically clip on to contracts. 
They build a contract by using a set of building blocks: For example, if you want 
to regulate social issues, you take the ‘BSCI building block’. With ‘BSCI’ comes 
a whole system of regulations, audits, certification. For example, you have BSCI 
regulations for maximum working hours, which must not exceed 60 hours per 
week. All this comes with putting in just one ‘building block’: ‘BSCI’” (ID 13). 
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Table 8.1 offers an abbreviated sample framework contract33 negotiated on March 25, 2011 
between retailer Gamma and manufacturer M234 for the supply of retailer-brand products. 
The contract remains valid to date. The retailer’s bargaining power is evident in the 
distribution of liabilities and the fact that all retailers’ framework contracts analysed for this 
research bear the retailer’s logo exclusively, on the first contract page. 
To facilitate comparison of how GTC and framework contracts are used for dealing with risk, 
the left column in Table 8.1 denotes risks addressed in respective clauses. A list of relevant 
risks was presented in Chapter Seven, Section 7.5.  
Table 8.1. Retailer-manufacturer framework contract35.  
Framework Contract [RETAILER LOGO] 
For Retailer-Brand Products 
Between 
[M2] and [Gamma] 
Preamble 
Retailer Gamma contracts M2 for exclusive manufacturing of retailer-brand and 
retailer-exclusive products. M2 is the producer and bears all legal 
responsibilities and product liabilities for the products manufactured for the 
Gamma Group. 
Retailer-brand products refer to products bearing a label belonging to the Gamma 
Group. Retailer exclusive products are such products, which bear a label 
belonging to the manufacturer, but which are exclusively available to the Gamma 
Group. 
This framework contract does not oblige Gamma to place any orders. This is 
subject to additional ordering agreements. To regulate the principles for 
interaction – which are valid independently of individual ordering agreements – 





The manufacturer guarantees that contracted products are exclusively of their own 
production. The manufacturer must inform Gamma proactively of all changes at its 
production sites. 
Transfer of production responsibilities to third parties is only permissible with 
Gamma’s written consent. The manufacturer remains fully liable to Gamma for all 
contractual duties: It is the manufacturer’s responsibility to ensure that a third 
contracting party complies with all terms agreed between Gamma and the 
manufacturer in the framework contract, the ordering agreement and product 
                                                                
33 The sample contract is chosen because it is representative of framework contracts analysed for 
this research, including those of retailers Beta and Delta. The latter only show minor differences 
regarding ‘alternative dispute resolution’ and ‘crisis management’ clauses, which are revisited 
later. 
34 It is worth highlighting that framework contracts typically include an insurance policy 
confirmation letter. However, as mentioned by several respondents, insurance policies have 
limitations, because “they cover a very specific set of events. It is good, if something happens that 
it fits with the insurance specifications of the event.  But sometimes, things happen in a different 
way and the insurance will not cover” (ID 21). 
35 The original contract is in German and has been translated into English by the researcher. 
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specifications. To ensure third party compliance, the manufacturer must regularly 
inspect their production sites. Gamma has permission to inspect the manufacturer’s 
production sites. § 83136 applies to the interactions between Gamma, the 




Gamma’s product specifications 
1. The quality requirements for products, including packaging, product 
characteristics, analytical values etc., are developed by the manufacturer and 
Gamma and are recorded in Gamma’s product specifications (from now on 
referred to as ‘specifications’). The manufacturer is responsible for compliance 
with specifications for every product supplied to Gamma prior to the first 
delivery to Gamma by contacting Gamma’s Quality Assurance Division.  
2. Any changes to specifications must demonstrate Gamma’s prior written 
agreement. 
3. Product specifications are classified as a Gamma trade secret. The manufacturer 
guarantees handling product specifications with the utmost confidentiality. Any 
copies (including fractions of the document) and any dissemination to third 
parties are strictly forbidden. The only exception is the use of specifications by 
the manufacturer’s employees in administering the manufacturing process. The 




Legal compliance  
1. The manufacturer guarantees that products fully comply with the specifications 
and prototypes. […] 
2. If no product specifications are agreed, the manufacturer guarantees full 
compliance of all product features (including ingredients, packaging, labelling 
etc.) with German legal requirements. The product must be marketable on the 




Genetically modified organisms 
1. The product manufacturing for Gamma must be performed in such a way that 
no indication of potential use or residues of GMO must be indicated on the 
packaging. The requirements must comply with EU Reg. 1829/2003 and EU Reg. 
1830/2003 regarding labelling and traceability of GMO in food and feed. 
2. The use of GMO is only permissible in individual cases with written agreement 






1. The manufacturer must comply with all product and process specifications and 
ensure the quality of all aspects of production – including packaging - by 
constantly updating internal quality assurance and monitoring processes 
(including chemical analyses, sensory tests, physical-technical and application 
tests) at their own expense. The manufacturer must inform Gamma (Quality 
Assurance Division) of the extent, type and frequency of quality assurance and 
monitoring measures at any time. 
                                                                
36 The § 831of the BGB regulates the liability for vicarious agents and specifically includes two 
relevant articles: 
“(1) A person who uses another person to perform a task is liable to compensate for the damage 
that the other unlawfully inflicts on a third party when carrying out the task. Liability in damages 
does not apply if the principal exercises reasonable care when selecting the person deployed and, 
to the extent that he is to procure devices or equipment or to manage the business activity, in the 
procurement or management, or if the damage would have occurred even if this care had been 
exercised. 
(2) The same responsibility is borne by a person who assumes the performance of one of the 
transactions specified in subsection (1) sentence 2 for the principal by contract.”  
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The manufacturer must obtain certification from a Quality Assurance 
Programme recommended by Gamma (the IFS). The manufacturer must 
inform Gamma immediately of the manufacturer’s certification results and offer 
unlimited access to unabridged audit reports.  
The manufacturer bears all cost for external laboratory analyses. If Gamma 
contracts laboratory tests for a manufacturer’s product and the results deviate 
from agreed product specifications, the manufacturer bears all costs for the 
tests and all remedial actions. For further details, the agreement from annual 
negotiations must be consulted. 
2. The manufacturer must inform Gamma (Quality Assurance and Purchasing 
Division) immediately in case of any internal or external incidents that may 
affect the product’s compliance with specifications. The manufacturer must 
inform Gamma of any inspections or notifications by governmental food 
inspection authorities, even when the notifications obviously do not have any 
factual/objective grounds.  
The manufacturer must inform Gamma of any cases where the manufacturer 
encounters requests for information regarding the contracted products on the 
grounds of the freedom of information law, consumer information law or 
environmental laws. In all these cases, the manufacturer must provide Gamma 
the opportunity to co-develop the statement to public/governmental 
authorities, third parties, etc. 
3. Gamma’s appointed third parties or employees have the right to inspect the 
manufacturer’s production sites, including quality assurance and monitoring 
processes, and to take any product and ingredient samples.  
4. The manufacturer must grant access to Gamma, third parties nominated by 
Gamma and governmental authorities to the manufacturers’ documentation of 





1. The manufacturer guarantees continuity and completeness of traceability 
regarding its products and all ingredients. Traceability must comply with EU 
Reg. 178/2002 and future governmental regulations. In addition to product 
traceability, the manufacturer must fully trace all used materials (ingredients, 
raw materials, supplements), production times, packaging materials and 
manufacturing steps. The manufacturer must provide Gamma on request (i.e., a 
food inspection authority’s request; consumer complaints) with all necessary 
information immediately. 
2. For traceability, the manufacturer must report to Gamma: product batch 
identification, scope and volume of affected batches, who (store, warehouse) 
received affected batches. 
VII. Information duties 
1. The manufacturer must inform Gamma (Purchasing and Quality Assurance 
Division) immediately of any regulatory changes or other regulations (i.e., DIN 
Norms, Recommendations of Industry Associations) affecting the contracted 
products. 
2. If the product specifications include a competing manufacturer-brand product 
as a reference, it is the manufacturer’s duty to monitor any changes in the 
composition of the competing manufacturer-brand product (i.e., recipe, 
labelling, and packaging). If the manufacturer notices any changes and identifies 
the need for adapting the product specifications to match the new product 
benchmark, the manufacturer must inform Gamma immediately to arrange for 
necessary adaptations. It is the manufacturer’s duty to suggest changes to meet 
the competing product characteristics. 
VIII. Contract penalties 





1. The manufacturer guarantees in any of the following cases affecting deliveries 
to Gamma to pay Gamma 50,000EUR: 
a) Non-compliance with product specifications or other agreed benchmarks; 
b) Deliveries contain GMO (breaching clause IV); 
c) Deliveries do not comply with governmental regulations (breaching clause 
II).  
The manufacturer may avoid the penalty if he can prove within a specified 
timeframe that any of the above situations was not his fault. 
2. Product specification requirements are classified as ‘not met’ if the mean value 
of at least three product samples from one batch does not meet the requirement. 
Sampling and product testing must be performed by an independent laboratory 
nominated by Gamma.  
3. The contract penalty applies once per defect product batch.  
4. Gamma’s right to claim compensation remains valid in addition to VIII (1). 
Gamma may add another penalty fine to the contractual penalty stated in VIII 
(1). 
IX. Compensation 
Apart from other compensation claims that Gamma may raise due to deficient 
deliveries, the manufacturer must cover all costs arising from product incidents 
noticed by inspection authorities, including any administrative offences or 
prosecution. This includes all recall and legal costs (payment of damages, 





1. If Gamma faces third party claims regarding contracted products, it guarantees 
to forward the claim to the manufacturer. The manufacturer must explain 
within ten working days if it can defend Gamma against the claim(s). 





1. Product and transportation packaging must comply with all legal regulations, 
including the regulations for utensils and contact materials37.  
2. The manufacturer must co-ordinate the ordering of the volume of packaging 
material with Gamma. Gamma bears the liability for the packaging material. If 
the contract ends, Gamma compensates the manufacturer for remaining 
packaging. The manufacturer must return packaging materials to Gamma or 
dispose of the packaging material at Gamma’s expense. 





In case that Stiftung Warentest or Ökotest rate any of the contracted products 
negatively, with a ‘satisfactory’ or lower rating, Gamma may remove the product 
from the shelves at the manufacturer’s expense.  
XIII. 
Risk3 
Supply and distribution 
                                                                
37 There are currently thirteen regulations regarding packaging materials that manufacturers must 
comply with, including the EU packaging framework regulation EU Reg. 1935/2004; the EU plastics 
regulation EU Reg. 2002/72; the EU migration regulation EU Reg. 82/711; EU regulation on testing 
migration of plastic materials in contact with foodstuffs EU Reg. 85/572; Good Manufacturing 
Practice regulation 2023/2006; as well as a number of packaging standards including IFS Pac.  
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1. Retailers of the Gamma Group will order the products from the manufacturer 
directly. Gamma nominates eligible retailers. The manufacturer guarantees that 
products are delivered exclusively to nominated Gamma retailers. 
2. Gamma also signs this agreement on behalf of the nominated retailers […]. 
XIV. Gamma Retail Group 




International distribution  
This agreement equally applies to all deliveries to international markets. If the legal 
regulations for the manufacturer’s product differ from German regulations, the 
manufacturer is liable for complying with those regulations once Gamma notifies 




1. This contract is valid from the time both parties signed the contract and remains 
valid for an indefinite time. The contract can be terminated by either party with 
an advance notice of three months prior to the end of each calendar year. 
2. Contract termination must be performed in writing and sent as a registered 
letter with reply notice. 
3. The right for contract termination for significant reasons with immediate effect 
remains valid. Significant reasons include on the part of Gamma the non-
compliance of deliveries with agreed product specifications; the acquisition of 
the manufacturer by another organization; manufacturer’s insolvency; public 
disreputability of the manufacturer’s product or the manufacturer’s company 
(for instance caused by negative test results published by Stiftung Warentest or 
Ökotest). 
4. Gamma may refrain from ordering products from the manufacturer at any time 
if the manufacturer does not comply with any requirements of this agreement. 
5. This framework agreement remains valid regardless of any letter of termination 




1. Both parties agree to absolute confidentiality regarding the content of this and 
any following agreement. 
The manufacturer must handle all content confidentially and not grant access to 
third parties, especially the media. The manufacturer may grant access to this 
information only to employees who administer necessary steps in delivering the 
product to Gamma. These employees must guarantee confidentiality prior to 
being handed relevant information. This process must be documented. 
2. ‘Confidential information’ includes: all information, data and documents from 
and about companies belonging to the Gamma Group, about the manufacturing 
and delivery agreements. This information may take any form, including written 
and verbal communication, it may be stored on devices and it may or may not 
be classified as ‘confidential’.  
Non-confidential information must verifiably fall into one of the following 
categories: 
a) Information, which is at the time of publication already publicly available or 
information which becomes public without the manufacturer’s 
interference;  
b) Information that must become public due to regulatory or public 
authorities’ requests. In such a case, the manufacturer must inform Gamma 
- prior to the publication – that such a publication will happen. 
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Regardless of the above exceptions, the manufacturer must treat information 
confidentially, if what is known publicly captures only parts of the information 
available to him. 
3. Gamma may share with the manufacturer current or future product prices and 
calculations. Gamma may ask the manufacturer to print prices on the 
packaging. In that case, both parties agree to the following: 
 
a) Gamma has the exclusive and supreme right to determine the product price. 
b) The manufacturer guarantees to treat all information regarding current and 
future prices, calculations and adaptations (from now on referred to as 
Gamma-retail prices and Gamma-calculations) as strictly confidential trade 
secrets. Specifically, the manufacturer must not share this information with 
any third party, and especially not his suppliers or other retail customers.  The 
manufacturer must use Gamma retail price and calculations only for the 
purposes necessary to complete the delivery to Gamma. The manufacturer 
refrains from ever using Gamma retail price and calculation information for 
any other business purpose. 
(External) third parties may include subsidiary companies working with the 
manufacturer to manufacture products for Gamma, provided that the subsidiary 
party agrees to all aforementioned strict confidentiality requirements. This must 
be documented. 
Within the manufacturer’s company, the manufacturer will make information 
about Gamma retail prices and calculations available only to those persons who 
are directly involved in the processing of Gamma’s orders. These persons 
guarantee strict confidentiality of the information indefinitely. 
4. The manufacturer ensures the enforcing of the duties listed in XVII 1. and 2. on 
any representatives acting on behalf of the manufacturer, employees and any 
other parties involved in the processing of Gamma’s orders.  
5. The period for which the XVII clause remains valid reflects the period of this 
agreement plus 5 years from the time the last delivery was performed by the 
manufacturer to Gamma under this contract. 
6. The manufacturer is obliged to return to Gamma or destroy all documents, 
files, data storage devices or other information containing data about Gamma 
retail prices and calculations. The latest date for the complete destruction of 
the data is the date when all contractual duties have been performed and none 
are agreed for the future. 
7. If the manufacturer or any other party acting on behalf of the manufacturer, 
including employees, third parties or subsidiary companies, infringes any of 
the duties listed under XVII, the manufacturer must pay 50,000 EUR to 






Gamma has the right to immediate contract termination if the manufacturer 
infringes any of the terms stated in I, III, IV, VI, and XII. Gamma has the right to 




Adaptations of contract and the “General Terms and Conditions” 
1. Any adaptations to this agreement must bear written consent. 
2. Gamma’s General Terms and Conditions complement this agreement. 
XX. Expired Contracts 
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Severability Clause  
If any provisions in this agreement become void, or if there is a void provision in this 
contract, all other terms remain valid. To address the invalid or void provision, there 
must be negotiated an adequate provision. That new provision must – as far as this 
is legally possible – be congruent with what the parties would have agreed in the 




Place of jurisdiction 
1. The place of jurisdiction in all cases of conflict, from this or other agreements, is 
in [city of retailer Gamma’s headquarters]. 
2. For the contract period, both parties agree that the German law, excluding the 
UN law for the sale of goods, applies. 
Signatures by 
[Manufacturer M2CEO] and [Gamma’s Director of Purchasing] 
 
The framework contract between retailer Gamma and manufacturer M2 was drafted on a ‘take 
it or leave it’ basis. Manufacturer M2 reports copy-pasting Gamma’s framework contract 
clauses for his own use in interactions with suppliers involved in the production of Gamma’s 
products, which results in over 95% similarity of the clauses. For this reason and scope 
limitations, Manufacturer M2’s framework contract is not reported. In both cases, the 
framework contracts are attached to ordering agreements containing specific information 
regarding volume, price, delivery times and payments. While several framework contract and 
GTC clauses are similar, framework contracts emphasise the retailer’s proprietary and 
confidential product specifications. These specifications are drafted, monitored and adapted by 
retailers’ internal quality assurance divisions, who employ auditors to conduct inspections 
across all stages from primary produce and raw materials, manufacturing, packaging and 
logistics. Each retailer has their own specifications, which typically exceed legal and industry 
(i.e., IFS) specifications across several parameters, including final product and ingredient 
quality; environmental, social and ethical responsibility; and traceability38. 
                                                                
38With the exception of Gamma, all German retailers’ process specifications are linked to industry 
standards, such as SA 8000 for social responsibility and labour conditions, or EN 45001/GLP for 
laboratory tests. SA 8000 governs working conditions and is modelled on the ISO 9000 quality 
standard. In contrast to ISO 9000, SA 8000 defines concrete performance standards, which cover 
nine areas, including child labour, health and safety, forced labour, freedom of associations and 
collective bargaining, discrimination, disciplinary practices, working hours, compensation, and 
management systems.  
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8.5 The use of framework contracts for dealing with risk 
Framework contracts’ form and content facilitate dealing with risk in direct food retailer-
manufacturer relationships. ‘Form’ refers to the contract’s purpose, length, legal standing and 
involved actors. ‘Content’ refers to the contract clauses and attached documents. Retailers and 
manufacturers rely on framework contracts, because the: 
“…purpose of the contract is to equip parties for [dealing with] the next 
incident. …Contracts are mostly made for ‘bad times’. Even if some put it in the 
drawer, they take it out once an incident strikes” (ID 8). 
In addition to ‘equipping parties for dealing with the next incident’, framework contracts equip 
retailers and manufacturers for dealing with unknown incidents: 
“Framework contracts are created for the future, for long periods of 
uncertainty. We speak of uncertainty here in ‘Knight’s’ sense. You can address 
some incidents, but you cannot address uncertainty with equal precision” (ID 
33). 
Framework contracts address the uncertainty of future interactions by providing a set of 
modularized, mutually agreed and continent rules, which function as a ‘modus operandi’ (ID 
33) or a ‘corset’ (ID 13) enhancing the predictability of future interactions. This is evident in 
two industry lawyers’ descriptions of framework contracts: 
“The framework contract has the quality of not being too specific and yet 
providing a common ‘modus operandi’ [Latin: ‘way of operating’]. … 
Essentially, you can see framework contracts as private codifications” (ID 33). 
“The main function of drafting framework contracts between trading partners 
is to create a corset for potential future contingencies.… They create a common 
ground ex-ante to have a calculable security over how to resolve conflicts” (ID 
13). 
As the term ‘framework’ itself suggests, such contracts provide a contingent: 
“…frame, without specifying in detail every possible issue. This gives me the 
opportunity to define a framework without robbing myself of flexibility and 
packing my customer and suppliers in such a narrow corset that none of us can 
move. With framework contracts, we can address variable raw material prices, 
variable product volumes, and variable transport volumes. Where we need an 
‘emergency response’ we have pre-defined processes, because you cannot start 
thinking about how to mutually resolve a problem when it is an emergency” 
(ID 8). 
The precision and detail in framework contracts depends on how much the parties know 
about potential incidents: 
“The more concretely you anticipate an incident, the better you can address it. 
In the food business, it is crucial to address how product recalls are handled. 
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You can and must be very specific about that. At the same time, the contract 
should be flexible, like when you agree to revise the contract annually. The 
advantage is that in areas where you feel uncertain, you can make corrections 
later” (ID 13). 
Framework contract clauses reported in Table 8.1 confirm that anticipated incidents are 
addressed in detailed clauses: For example, the contract between retailer Gamma and 
Manufacturer M2 addresses variability in delivery in detail (Section XIII); breach of 
confidentiality (Section XVII); variable product quality (Sections II; III, IV; V; VI) and negative 
test result publication by ‘Stiftung Warentest’ (Section XII). Given that variable product quality 
is a prime concern for both parties, the framework contract moves beyond product 
specifications: Sections I, II and V address product quality variability that might originate 
beyond the contracting party’s direct operations. Moreover, in contrast to GTC, framework 
contracts address risks idiosyncratic to the relationship: for example, the contract between 
Gamma and Manufacturer M2 addresses idiosyncratic risks emerging from contracting 
retailer-brand products (see Sections I, II, VII.2, XI.2, XI.3 and XVII.3).  
In addition to clauses addressing anticipated incidents, framework contracts include force 
majeure, re-negotiation, and dispute resolution clauses to facilitate dealing with ‘uncertain 
areas’. For example, in the case of Gamma’s agreement with Manufacturer M2, the force 
majeure clause is not replicated in the framework contract, but is included in Gamma’s GTC. 
The force majeure clause states that: 
“§14.1 Force majeure frees both parties for the duration of the 
incident/disruption and depending on the impact of the disruption from 
contractual duties. Both contracting parties must inform each other to the best 
of their abilities about the type, scope and duration of the disruption and to 
mutually adapt the contract in good faith” (Gamma’s GTC, 2011). 
The above example illustrates that force majeure subsumes incidents that may be unknown 
yet detrimental to the companies’ business performance. To offer effective guidance: 
“[a]helpful force-majeure clause will include: (a) specification of incidents 
considered ‘force majeure’; (b) both parties’ duty to inform each other as early 
as possible; (c) both parties’ duties to come up with solutions on how to get out 
of the situation; (d) that both parties agree to work together on getting out of 
the situation. […] The main thing in force majeure clauses is to set priorities, 
some general rules for behaviours, preferences, information and co-operation 
duties, which help to make the response more palpable in advance” (ID 13). 
Apart from force majeure, the re-negotiation clause allows for contingent contract terms 
adaptations based on market or regulatory developments. 
The comparison of framework contract content between retailer Gamma and Manufacturer 
M2, and between Manufacturer M2 and Supplier S2.2, demonstrates that framework contracts 
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facilitate transferring risk impact from the party with higher bargaining power, similar to the 
use of GTC. For instance, the framework contract (Table 8.1) between retailer Gamma and 
Manufacturer M2 transfers risk impact to Manufacturer M2, who agrees to: 
a) Cover product liability and recall costs (Sections I, V, IX, X),  
b) Bear litigation costs, civil and criminal law implications (Section XII) and third-party 
claims (Sections IX, X) 
c) Gamma’s rights to contract termination (Sections XVII). 
In response, Manufacturer M2 replicated the framework contract clauses in their interaction 
with Supplier S2.2, who agrees to: 
a) Cover all product liability and recall costs (Sections VII, VIII) 
b) Bear all costs arising from third party claims (Section VIII) 
c) Manufacturer M2’s right to contract termination (Section XIV). 
Transferring risk impact serves the objective of safeguarding tangible and intangible 
resources: Transferring recall costs and defining compensatory payments directly safeguards 
financial resources. Additionally, both framework contracts specify clauses protecting the 
companies’ property rights over resources, such as brand ownership (see Gamma’s contract, 
Table 8.1: Sections I, II, VII and XVII and in Manufacturer M2’s contract: Sections II, IX, XII), 
product recipes, packaging and pricing calculations. Both contracts contain clauses to protect 
the companies’ brand and company reputation: in the case of the retailer-manufacturer 
contract by reserving the retailer’s right to immediate contract termination and ‘dissociation’ 
from the supplier (Section XVI.3, XVIII) and the retailer’s right to intervene and stay informed 
on interactions between Manufacturer M2 and third parties such as governmental authorities 
(Section V.2), media (V.2) or the consumer protection group “Stiftung Warentest” (Section V.2, 
XII). The reputational impact of Stiftung Warentest’s potentially negative product tests is of 
such concern that Gamma dedicates a clause regulating the interaction with this third party 
only.  
8.6 Monitoring and enforcing framework contracts 
Framework contracts rely on a combination of provisions for first, second and third-party 
monitoring, as well as legal and non-legal sanctioning. A consultant lawyer to German food 
retailers and manufacturers refers to monitoring as ‘screw drivers’ used to limit variability in 
performance: 
“Framework contracts always include audit monitoring: First-party audits by 
the company itself, …second-party audits by the retailers, third-party audits by 
the IFS and then you have the governmental inspections. So you employ a few 
‘screw drivers’ to influence compliance” (ID 13).  
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The framework contract in Table 8.1 comprehensively captures first party monitoring in 
Section V. A retailer-label confectionery manufacturer reports 60 audit days per year, with less 
than half of the days dedicated to third party IFS audits (ID 14) and the remaining days split 
between first and retailer second party audits. Retailer audits typically happen once annually, 
without prior notification: 
“Retailers reserve the right per contract or GTC to visit the supplier at any day 
or night time. Retailer audits take less time than the IFS and may last 4-5 hours. 
They will issue a report with points that the company needs to address over a 
short period of time. Then they come again, unannounced, to check if we did it” 
(ID 14). 
In addition to the manufacturer’s agreement to first and second party audits, the manufacturer 
typically accepts responsibility for auditing sub-contractors. For example, Beta requires its 
manufacturers to: 
“address non-compliance with BSCI guidelines at their respective suppliers’ 
sites. If the manufacturer notices any issues, they must remedy them. Only if 
the encountered issues are beyond the manufacturer’s power to be rectified 
must they notify Beta and Beta will consider offering support measures” 
(Lebensmittelzeitung, August 2013). 
In case of incidents exposed to added media or NGO scrutiny, such as ‘palm oil’ production or 
pesticide use, retailers extend second party audits beyond Germany and sometimes 
implement local training initiatives to enhance compliance rates with product and process 
specifications: 
“The benefit of introducing local training schemes and checking the products 
and processes on site, even in distant markets like China, is that you can be sure 
the products comply with the quality required. … [A major German retailer] 
told me recently that they want to know the issues happening locally, because 
once the products are on their way, it is too late” (ID 13). 
When second or third-party monitoring reveals non-compliance, retailers and manufacturers 
activate legal and non-legal sanctioning provisions: 
“If you do not sanction non-compliance with measures that were anticipated 
and known in advance, you deviate from the rules and undermine trust created 
in this framework” (ID 13). 
Sanctions are exercised to penalise non-compliance and enforce future compliance. While 
legal sanctions exercised by governmental authorities are deemed ineffective due to under-
staffed auditing divisions and low fines, retailers and manufacturers draw on a range of non-
legal sanctioning provisions such as compensatory payments for damages, fees or 
(temporary) contract termination. Such non-legal sanctioning provisions are considered 
‘customary law’ (‘Gewohnheitsrecht’, ID 14). Even minor deviations from contract terms can 
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mobilise non-legal sanctioning provisions, as reported by the former quality manager at a 
poultry manufacturer:  
“We were delivering to [retailer] Gamma and their contract requires a 98% 
delivery threshold. This means we may never deviate from their ordering 
volume by more than 2%. But this can happen very quickly! We were once …not 
able to deliver …they threatened us with draconian penalty payments. …if we 
were a smaller company … such penalties can break the neck” (ID 14). 
Retailer Beta uses a combination of financial sanctions, such as deducting 5-10% of the 
ordered product value plus a lump-sum payment of 3000 Euro per delivery.  In addition, non-
legal sanctions involve changes to contract terms (such as increased compensatory payments, 
more frequent audits) and temporary or finite contract termination: 
“It is common practice among retailers to ‘block’ a certain manufacturer from 
further delivery contracts for some time following an incident. Sometimes this 
is necessary to signal to the media and consumers that the retailer is ‘doing 
something’ about it. The retailer distances himself for some time and may re-
list if the manufacturer promises to play by the retailer’s rules again” (ID 40). 
Contract termination or ‘blacklisting’ suppliers in internal databases are the most powerful 
non-legal sanctions (ID 1). Hence, protecting a company’s reputation and continuity of 
business relationships is a vital concern for retailers, manufacturers and other suppliers. To 
achieve this, most framework contracts specify out-of-court dispute resolution provisions, 
including negotiation and arbitration. A consultant lawyer to German food businesses 
highlights that: 
“no one wants to bother public courts with an issue in your business 
relationship. In practice, this happens very rarely…. The purpose of framework 
contracts is not to prepare for or facilitate court settlements, but to facilitate 
an ongoing relationship with as little recourse to the courts as possible” (ID 
13). 
This observation is echoed by a senior member of the ‘German Industry Association for Food 
Law and Science’ who highlights pragmatic reasons for settling disagreements ‘entre nous’: 
“ultimately what decides how an issue is settled is very pragmatic: …The bigger 
companies do not go to court because they do not want to stand in potentially 
negative limelight even if they have the capital and good chances to win. 
Smaller companies do not go to court because they do not have the capital and 
are afraid of catapulting themselves out of business. A lot of things are settled 
‘entre nous’ through negotiating, threatening, offering. A court settlement 
mostly only promises to damage the relationship somehow …An internal 
agreement is much more cost effective” (ID 12). 
Hence, most retailer-manufacturer framework contracts consulted for this research include 
provisions specifying willingness for mutual negotiation to resolve potential conflict. 
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Negotiation and arbitration are important provisions supporting sanctioning non-compliance 
without reverting to public courts for three reasons: (1) Both take place in a closed 
environment and remain unknown to media, consumers or competitors; (2) In case of 
arbitration, companies draw on industry experts specialised in resolving industry specific 
cases, enhancing speed and fairness; (3) In contrast to public court settlements that typically 
result in compensatory payments or contract termination, the objective of negotiation and 
arbitration is the continuity of the agreement. 
8.7 Negotiating framework contracts 
In contrast to GTC, framework contract negotiations require personal meetings between the 
two parties and typically proceed in two steps: Prior to the negotiation, a 
manufacturer/supplier screening process is launched to evaluate a company’s qualification 
for contract negotiations. Screening involves the consultation of the company’s performance 
registered in the IFS database, second-party audits and issuing of a comprehensive supplier 
screening questionnaire that often covers questions moving beyond the screened party’s on-
site business (ID 3). If the screening is successful, the manufacturer or supplier typically 
qualifies for a ‘conditional offer’: 
“This is not a contract yet, but the company qualifies to become an eligible 
supplier. We then have negotiations where we ask specifically for the 
capacities, product development investments, potential for exclusivity etc. 
Comprehensive screening is crucial for the company performing the screening, 
because it pays off in better insurance terms and less potential for risk later” 
(ID 4). 
The following contract negotiations are strongly characterized by relative power distribution, 
leaving manufacturers and suppliers often to: 
“either consent to the contract the retailer typically pre-drafted anyway or to 
leave the table. This is less a question of freedom of contracting and more a 
question of exercising power” (ID 14). 
Manufacturer M2 reflects on the negotiation experience with retailers Gamma and Delta by 
stating that: 
“We have no chance to negotiate the contract terms and the whole 
‘negotiation’ is a very unpleasant process. Usually, our managing director and 
distribution manager are invited to ‘take’ the contract. On the retailer side, 
there is usually the purchasing manager and sometimes, the quality assurance 
manager. If we want to change even one word, they can become very rude, 
leave the room, or just say that if we do not want the contract, we can leave. 
So, we take it” (ID 21). 
Once the contract is signed, Manufacturer M2 copies and pastes most sections of the retailer’s 
framework contract into their own supplier contracts and follow a similar negotiation 
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strategy. The manufacturer’s ‘copy-paste’ strategy leads to a replication of contract terms that 
contributes to the proliferation of retailer terms beyond the retailers’ direct contracting 
parties. 
8.8 Changes to framework contracts 
Changes to framework contracts are an exception and typically occur incrementally. Two 
clauses in framework contracts address change: the re-negotiation clause and the clause 
requesting all changes to be confirmed in writing. Manufacturer M2 highlights continuity and 
stability when reflecting on changes to framework contracts over recent decades: 
“We have annual meetings with all retailers, where we re-negotiate supply 
conditions. … what are the conditions we need to meet to supply the retailer 
for another year? Currently, we have had successful relationships with them 
[the retailers] since 1998 and we always delivered higher sales. The retailers 
want to have a share of profit from those sales, and if it increases, they will 
change the conditions. Let’s say if one year the retailer had a share in our sales 
of 4.5%, at the next re-negotiation, they will want 4.7%. However, these 
changes are made to the conditions, which are written in the ordering 
agreement. Our framework contract… the last version we hold is from 2000 
and has not changed since. It stayed exactly the same. The re-negotiations are 
always concluded verbally and then the retailer writes it down and sends it to 
us. And for each year, we clip the ordering agreement on to the framework 
agreement” (ID 21). 
Retailer Delta’s compliance manager echoes this view, highlighting that 
“…, framework contracts follow time-tested principles and rarely, re-
negotiations will result in major changes…In negotiations, both parties think 
about ‘what has stood the test of time? What shall we retain, what shall we 
change?’ You change things, for example, by including issues that you could not 
have thought about before and add them…you can definitely speak of a 
perpetuating nature of framework contracts” (ID 4). 
The ‘addition’ or change of terms in framework contracts occurs in two ways: (1) adaptation 
or addition of clauses within the contract; or (2) addition of attachments to the contract. Both 
types of changes typically follow significant precedent cases, such as changes in governmental 
regulations. For example, following the European legalization of GMO in foods, most German 
retailer framework contracts started to include a ‘GMO free’ clause in framework contracts 
(see Table 8.1, section IV). Another example is retailer Delta’s introduction of the ‘crisis 
paragraph’ in its framework contract following product recall incidents. Delta’s compliance 
manager speculates on the cause of the ‘crisis paragraph’: 
 “Such changes were typically implemented after a major recall went 
thoroughly wrong. Maybe the supplier was not available for administering the 
recall or he provided incomplete information and we [at Delta] said: ‘This 
recall went so badly, we will learn from this negative incident.’ We state now 
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for example: We need a reliable contact person who is available 24/7. We want 
to be informed immediately about any information requests by media or 
authorities. Such clauses are then often copied by other companies, because 
such things ‘go around’ and I bet in half a year, every retailer will have 
something like this clause” (ID 4). 
In addition to adapting clauses within the framework contract, a common way to administer 
changes is by updating or adding attachments to framework contracts, including (updated) 
product specifications, insurance policies or ordering agreements. Manufacturer M2 reports 
that: 
 “Framework contracts become thicker over the years, because there are more 
specifications attached to them. In 2011, some discounters added the BSCI 
regulations to their contracts. Retailer Beta even created a “Society & 
Environment” division which works with their Director of Purchasing. They 
supply purchasing managers with know-how on sustainability…This division 
most likely added the BSCI. […] Then, we often have changes to product 
specifications, because we must match retailer-brand products to 
manufacturer-brand equivalents” (ID 21). 
The challenge in adapting framework contracts rests in responding to precedent cases, while 
safeguarding the parsimony and contingency of framework contracts (ID 13). 
8.9 Benefits and limitations of framework contracts 
Framework contracts offer retailers and manufacturers two benefits in dealing with risk: 
First, framework contracts provide a parsimonious ‘modus operandi’: a brief set of stable, 
contingent and legally enforceable rules. Framework contracts limit variability across retailer-
manufacturer and manufacturer-supplier interactions, as well as ambiguity emerging from 
varying legal provisions by defining a default set of rules that precedes public law provisions 
and GTC. Framework contracts are legally enforceable, regardless of a contracting party’s 
geographical location, and allow retailers and manufacturers to subject international 
suppliers to German law. Moreover, private contract law freedom allows negotiating an 
idiosyncratic ‘liability regime’. Second, while the analysed framework contracts share high 
degrees of standardization and similarity across the food retail industry, adapting framework 
contracts from addressing idiosyncratic risks of special concern to either party is not 
precluded.  
The limitations of using framework contracts for dealing with risk are primarily rooted in 
potential discrepancies between agreed contract terms and actual performance. This may 
result from over-drawn contract terms, which set up one of the contracting parties to under-
perform. For example, a former quality manager of one of Germany’s largest poultry 
manufacturers reflects on over-drawn guarantee-clauses by stating that: 
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“Throughout my career in the meat industry, I read hundreds of contracts and 
wondered how anyone could agree to them. Our distribution manager would 
just pass the contract and specifications to me and I would be the first one to 
actually read them. They sign it, but they don’t read it! Then I say: ‘We cannot 
fulfil all the requirements stated here’. And in response, they [the distribution 
manager] say: ‘We cannot change it anyway, that’s the way it is.’ … these 
contracts are not worth the paper they are written on” (ID 14). 
Beyond the German market, market factors may lead suppliers to agree to contract terms 
standing in stark contrast to suppliers’ actual performance: 
“For any supplier, especially in markets like Bangladesh, China …a contract 
with a big European retailer is the key to the door opening opportunities to 
new markets. The suppliers from such countries who sign all the contracts with 
big retailers, including Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta…know perfectly well 
that they cannot really comply with everything stated there, but these 
companies desperately want to have the contract and will never go to the 
retailer and say: ‘Look [at the contract]: ‘§14. Child Labour.’ We cannot 
guarantee you that! If you want the products at that cheap price you request 
here.’ For the retailers, the suppliers or importers bear the risk. If anything 
happens, it is the supplier’s fault and the retailers have nothing to do with it, 
at least de-jure” (ID 23).  
In sum, the main limitation of contractual means for dealing with risk emerges from potential 
discrepancies between the contract terms agreed de-jure and the parties’ de-facto capacity to 
deliver agreed performance.  
8.10 Conclusion  
This chapter has examined how German food retailers and manufacturers use framework 
contracts for dealing with risk. Analysis of the framework contracts-in-use demonstrates that 
these contracts area modular, standardized and contingent record of agreed rules. While 
modular and standardized clauses limit variability across direct interactions similar to GTC, 
retailers and manufacturers can use framework contracts: (a) to negotiate clauses addressing 
idiosyncratic risks relevant to one or both parties; and (b) to transfer risk impact to the party 
with less bargaining power. The practice of ‘copy-pasting’ passages from retailer-
manufacturer contracts into manufacturer-supplier contracts alongside monitoring and 
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CHAPTER 9. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
9.1 Introduction 
Analysing the empirical evidence, this chapter discusses the research questions “What 
constitutes risk in business networks?” and “How do companies deal with risk in business 
networks?” 
In addressing the first research question in Section 9.2, ‘Risk in business networks’, this 
chapter draws attention to risk as a relevant empirical and conceptual problem in business 
marketing research. Building on the empirical evidence presented in Chapter Five, this section 
refines our understanding of risk in business networks by adopting an uncertainty-based 
conceptualization. Building on this understanding of risk, Section 9.3, ‘Dealing with risk in 
business networks’ responds to the second research question by discussing an institution-
based explanation of how companies deal with risk in business networks. Drawing on empirical 
evidence from Chapters Six to Eight, the discussion focuses on how companies use institutional 
devices, including industry standards, General Terms and Conditions and framework 
contracts, for dealing with risk at three interdependent levels of interaction: network, focal, and 
dyadic interaction.  
The institution-based explanation enhances our understanding of how companies deal with 
risk in business networks in three ways: First, the institution-based explanation highlights 
how companies use institutional devices - such as industry standards, GTC and framework 
contracts - for dealing with risk (see Table 9.1). Institutional devices provide companies with 
shared, parsimonious rules for interaction in the face of uncertainty and facilitate companies’ 
protection of resources from impact. Second, the institution-based explanation highlights how 
companies actively codify, monitor, enforce and adapt institutional devices for dealing with 
risk. This finding is captured in Figure 9.7: The integrative framework of how companies deal 
with risk in business networks crystallizes the conceptual synthesis of the network and 
institution-based research by mapping companies’ use of institutional devices onto the three 
levels of network interaction. Third, the institution-based explanation illuminates how 
institutional devices facilitate dealing with risk interactively across direct and indirect 
relationships, because their manifestation in ‘business artefacts’ enables transcending time 
and space. Figure 9.8 conceptualizes this finding by integrating business artefacts into an 
extended version of the Actor-Resources-Activities (ARA) model. 
9.2 Risk in business networks 
‘Risk’ is remarkably absent from existing business marketing research. The literature review 
highlights that understanding ‘risk’ has preoccupied generations of scholars from various 
disciplines. The quest to conceptualise risk became a contested arena, with leading 
researchers admitting to deliberately abstain from defining the term, resolving “to use the 
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colloquial sense” of risk or “offering both a risk-based interpretation… and sometimes an 
uncertainty-based interpretation…To that extent, [pleading] guilty” (Vermeule, 2015, pp.6-7). 
However, the literature review and empirical evidence indicate that examining more 
rigorously what constitutes risk in business networks enhances our understanding of how 
companies deal with risk, because the nature of the phenomenon influences the means used 
to address it. Therefore, this discussion begins with ‘what constitutes risk in business networks’: 
The empirical evidence presented in Chapter Five questions the probability-based 
conceptualization of risk that underpins most business and management research. In an 
embedded, multi-actor context of business networks, risk defies the practicality of probability-
based measures and instead requires the consideration of an uncertainty-based 
conceptualisation of risk. The uncertainty-based conceptualization of risk informs the 
subsequent discussion of how companies deal with risk, presented in Section 9.3. 
Developing an uncertainty-based conceptualisation of risk offers a first step towards 
introducing risk to the agenda of business marketing and network researchers and alerting 
researchers to the relevance of rethinking the probability-based conceptualisation of risk. This 
step responds to two relevant limitations in existing research on risk in business marketing: 
First, risk has not been systematically investigated in business marketing and network 
research from an empirical and conceptual perspective.  Second, existing research across 
relevant business and management disciplines does not yet consider a conceptualisation of 
risk generated from a multi-actor perspective. Instead, existing research tends to either adopt 
probability-based risk conceptualisations from the fields of economics and finance research 
(Bernstein, 1998) or use the terms risk and uncertainty interchangeably without subjecting 
the phenomenon to further empirical or conceptual development (for example, Miller, 1992; 
Hallikas et al., 2004; Vermeule, 2015).  
It is worth noting that this research does not dismiss existing business and management 
research on risk. However, by changing the unit-of-analysis to a multi-actor perspective and 
developing an uncertainty-based conceptualisation of risk limits the transferability of findings 
from the existing research of how companies deal with risk to a business network context. The 
main argument developed in this section is that the moment when risk is considered in the 
multi-actor setting of business networks, both assumptions – probability-based and unilateral 
risk management - appear of limited relevance. Drawing on the observed discrepancy between 
the empirical evidence presented in Chapter Five and probability-based risk research 
dominating existing literature, this thesis illuminates the limitations of applying probability-
based conceptualisations to capturing the locus and impact of risk in retailer-manufacturer 
networks. 
The empirical evidence demonstrates that the distributed locus and impact of risk, which 
originate from the embeddedness of actors in direct and indirect interactions, prevents actors 
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from isolating and predicting risk events and from dealing with risk unilaterally. Specifically, 
empirical evidence from German food retailer-manufacturer networks illuminates that 
companies encounter multiple loci of risk emerging from network complexity, variability in 
outcomes, processes and consumer perceptions and legal ambiguity, which collectively 
contribute to the uncertainty dimension of risk and may result in damages to tangible and 
intangible resources. The locus and impact of risk in business networks are dynamic, in that 
they can migrate across direct and indirect interactions to affect seemingly unrelated actors, 
resources and activities ‘at the other end of the network’. This finding confirms supply chain 
research on risk, which concludes that interaction in a “network causes transfer of risk 
between companies” (Hallikas et al., 2004, p.51, emphasis added) and that risks “in global 
supply chains are linked to each other in complex patterns with one risk leading to another, 
or influencing the outcome of other risks” (Manuji & Mentzer, 2008, p.192).  Similarly, Harland, 
Brenchley and Walker (2003, p.51) suggest that risk is “shifting around supply networks…the 
location of risk has shifted through complex changing supply networks.” The risk dynamics 
emerging from interdependent network interactions resemble the non-linearity of complex 
systems and defy assumptions of equilibrium, precise cause-effect links, complete foresight 
and the possibility for centralized control (McMillan, 2004; Stacey et al., 2000). Yet, most of 
these assumptions underpin probability-based conceptualisations of risk which has 
significantly informed existent research on risk. Figure 9.1 captures these observations by 
proposing an uncertainty-based conceptualisation of risk in business networks: 




     Figure 9.1. Risk in business networks. 
Dealing with Risk in Business Networks 
186 
 
The uncertainty-based conceptualisation emerged organically from investigating risk in a 
multi-actor setting and echoes the observations of institutional economists (for instance, 
Knight, 1921; Hardy, 1923; Beckert, 1996) as well as the practical considerations evidenced 
in consulting reports (for example, Pergler & Lamarre, 2009) and the recent move by the ISO 
(Guide 73, 2009), who emphasize uncertainty as an inextricable property of risk in business 
interactions.  
The first-order concepts in Figure 9.1 are illustrative of the substance underpinning higher-
order concepts. Figure 9.1 highlights that several second-order concepts, including variability 
in outcomes, processes, consumer perceptions, and legal ambiguity are aligned with findings 
from existing research in supply and operations management (for example Svensson, 2002; 
Zsidisin et al., 2005; Oke & Golapakrishnan, 2009). Similarly, the second-order concepts 
‘damages to tangible and intangible resources’ are congruent with attempts to categorize risk 
according to impact or loss (for example, Harland et al., 2003; Sheffi & Rice, 2005). Yet, Figure 
9.1 conceptually captures three important observations which move beyond the reproduction 
of existing typologies and contribute to refining the conceptualization of risk in business 
networks:  
First, Figure 9.1 captures the empirically generated second-order concept of ‘network 
complexity’, which has not featured in existing research on risk that has predominantly 
approached investigated risk from a single actor unit-of-analysis. Recognising ‘network 
complexity’ significantly enriches our understanding of risk in business networks, because it 
captures that: 
a) Risk emerges from and migrates through direct and indirect interactions of inter-
dependent actors; 
b) Actors are embedded in known and partly unknown interactions with other actors’ 
activities and resources; 
c) The scale and global dispersion of actors, resources and activities precludes accurate 
foresight; 
d) Dynamic cascading and geographic distribution may preclude accurate cause-impact 
identification. 
The first-order concepts comprising ‘network complexity’ defy necessary assumptions to 
satisfy probability-based conceptualisations of risk and instead correspond more closely to 
the way previous research conceptualized conditions for uncertainty (for example, Duncan, 
1972; Milliken, 1987; Carson, Madhok & Wu, 2006). Moreover, positioning ‘network 
complexity’ above the other second-order concepts deliberately illustrates that variability in 
outcomes, processes, consumer perceptions and legal ambiguity are seen in the light of 
‘network complexity’. 
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Second, the second-order concepts are not isolated. The interdependency of second-order 
concepts reflects the dynamics of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘impact’ dimensions of risk in business 
networks. Hence, the following dissection of second- and third-order concepts in this chapter 
must be understood primarily as a methodological device to systematically report this 
conceptualisation of risk in business networks. This structured reporting of ‘what constitutes 
risk in business networks’ shall therefore not conceal that the challenge in dealing with risk 
originates from the difficulty of clearly isolating and predicting the locus and impact of risk ex-
ante.  
Third, Figure 9.1 conceptualises risk as an aggregate of two third-order concepts: Uncertainty 
and impact. This finding is important for three reasons: 
a) The identification of first- and second-order concepts is one of the few empirically-based 
attempts at identifying concepts constituting risk. Previous research tended to adopt an 
existing definition of risk and subsequently focus on investigating ‘risk management 
strategies’ from a single company perspective. Such research appears to operate in an 
analytical vacuum (see, for example, Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Jung, Lim & Oh, 2011), which 
does not question the validity and transferability of adopted risk conceptualisations. 
Reconsidering the conceptualisation of risk in empirical and conceptual terms is 
important, because it informs the way we research how companies deal with risk.  
b) Further, considering risk as an aggregate of the third-order concepts ‘uncertainty’ and 
‘impact’ is a significant refinement, because it addresses the issue in existing research, 
which suggests that risk is directly constituted by those concepts that in Figure 9.1 feature 
as second-order concepts. 
In other words, existing research often assumes a direct link between ‘risk’ and ‘second-
order concepts’ such as ‘regulations’, ‘outbreaks’ or ‘product hazards’ (for example, Oke & 
Gopalakrishnan, 2009). Such a conceptualisation proliferates throughout most business 
and management research, which adopts a particularistic approach to researching ‘single 
risks’ such as ‘regulatory risk’ (Smallman, 1996) or ‘information-systems risk’ (Finch, 
2004). Similarly, existing research suggests a ‘direct link’ between first or second-order 
concepts of impact and risk, which leads to research on ‘reputation risk’ (i.e., Schwartz & 
Gibb, 1999) or ‘asset risk’ (Simons, 1999). The problem with such conceptualizations is 
that it simplifies risk to the extent that it either equates the locus with risk itself 
(overlooking the impact dimension) or equates the impact with risk with less attention 
dedicated to the locus. The result is a proliferation of particularistic approaches to risk 
(Miller, 1992), which is more adaptable to probability-based risk conceptualisations, but 
rarely corresponds to the complexity of ‘risk’ that companies encounter in network 
interactions.  
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c) Finally, the conceptualization in Figure 9.1 gives further impetus to efforts directed at 
disentangling the concepts of uncertainty and risk without using the terms 
interchangeably or equating one with another (Beckman, Haunschild & Phillips, 2004, 
p.26039).  
The remainder of this section discusses the uncertainty and impact dimensions of risk 
presented in Figure 9.1. 
9.2.1 Uncertainty dimension of risk 
Existing research on risk has rarely questioned the validity and transferability of probability-
based risk conceptualizations in a business marketing context. However, critically reflecting 
on two key assumptions underpinning probability-based risk conceptualisations illuminates 
how and why the uncertainty-based conceptualisation of risk proposed in this section is more 
appropriate to inform our understanding of risk in business marketing.  
First, research adopting probability-based risk conceptualisations assumes the quantification 
of uncertainty as measurable risk, because it allows ‘editing out uncertainty’ for modelling 
purposes: Uncertainty has been understood as the “Achilles-heel of economic theory” 
(Beckert, 1996, p.834) because it defeats the function of rational choice theory. Similarly, 
‘double contingency’ of interaction is edited out by “assuming rational action on the side of 
both agents” (ibid., p.826)40. While these assumptions facilitate risk measurement and 
modelling in experimental settings, these assumptions do not reflect empirical manifestations 
of risk.  
Second, existing research on risk could afford to neglect validity and transferability concerns 
of the probability-based risk conceptualisation, because it avoids confrontation with issues of 
uncertainty and contingency of business interactions by adopting a single actor unit-of-
analysis. This methodological choice significantly channelled a majority of research on risk 
                                                                
39 While there are many examples offering a liberal treatment of the concepts ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’, it is 
worth noting Miller’s publication (1992) due to its frequent citation in management and business research. 
Miller (1992, p.311) mentions in the first sentence of the paper’s abstract that “[t]reatments of risk in the 
international management literature largely focus on particular uncertainties to the exclusion of other 
interrelated uncertainties” (emphasis added) while he sets out to address the issue that “the strategic 
management field lacks a generally accepted definition of risk”. The inter-changeable use of ‘risk’ and 
‘uncertainty’ evident in the quoted passage is not further addressed or resolved in the paper or subsequent 
publications. 
40 The problem of double-contingency has been conveniently minimized in economic and financial 
experimental modelling of risk by assuming that  
“agents can anticipate rationally the choices of other [rational] agents using the 
information they hold from the observation of past behaviour of the agent. The models 
assume that economic actors behave as if they know the structure of the economy so they 
can deduce optimal forecasts despite the ongoing changes in the economy…This claim 
has been empirically challenged with the argument that the degree of fore-knowledge 
and rationality attributed to agents in these advanced economic models becomes 
increasingly sophisticated and it becomes more and more unlikely that economic actors 
understand all relevant variables of the model properly” (Beckert, 1994, p.811). 
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into the ‘Robinson Crusoe fallacy’ (Brennan & Buchanan, 2008 [1985]), which metaphorically 
reflects the assumption that a single actor operates in a contextual vacuum, where he is 
confronted with a faceless environment and can impose unilateral survival strategies. These 
assumptions contradict most business settings in which actors “cannot choose the dynamic 
for their industry or their organization because the dynamic emerges from the interaction 
within the whole population of organizations in an industry” (Stacey et al., 2000, p.127, 
emphasis added). Consequently, key assumptions that cemented the success of probability-
based research on risk offer limited validity in business network research, which considers 
multi-laterally contingent and embedded interactions as its building blocks. 
While limitations of probability-based risk conceptualizations were repeatedly exposed (for 
example, Knight, 1921; Duncan, 1972; McGoun, 1995; Bernstein 1998; Boy, 2015) this critique 
is rarely considered in business and management research on risk. This may be attributable 
to three reasons: First, advances in quantifying uncertainty as probability-based risk have 
been lauded for decades as a breakthrough in transforming economics and finance research 
(Hicks, 1931; Bernstein, 1998). Second, probability-based risk conceptualisations appear as 
more reliable and legitimate reference points in organisational decision-making (Leca & 
Naccache, 2011). Third, critics of probability-based risk conceptualisations offer limited 
systematic research into alternative conceptualisations of risk and, respectively, dealing with 
risk. The latter is particularly well-illustrated in research by Das and Teng (1999, p.51), who 
conclude that: 
“[i]n risk analysis, managers assign probabilities to a range of possible 
outcomes ... A computer program then calculates the distribution of net 
present value (NPV) of each strategy. Managers choose the one with the most 
desirable distribution of NPV. In reality, though, managers may not know 
about the kinds of possible outcomes, and it is very difficult for them to assign 
reasonable probabilities to possible outcomes …. That is why managers 
usually do not rely on probability estimation. Quantifying risk, while desirable, 
may not be the best approach in aiding complicated strategic decisions.” 
Das and Teng echo conclusions from scholars in business and institutional research (for 
example, Norton, 1902; McGoun, 1995), who observe that “in many business situations, one 
cannot know the set of alternatives or foresee all outcomes in the first place” (Mousavi & 
Gigerenzer, 2014, p.1673) and that therefore we cannot study how actors should deal with risk 
without understanding how risk manifests and how actors are able to deal with risk. For this 
reason, the remainder of this section discusses the first- and second-order concepts 
underpinning the uncertainty-based conceptualisation of risk, including network complexity; 
variability in outcomes, processes and consumer perceptions and legal ambiguity. 
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9.2.1.1 Network complexity 
‘Network complexity’ is a pivotal second-order concept informing the uncertainty-based 
conceptualization of risk. ‘Network complexity’ is used as an umbrella term capturing 
characteristics of network interactions that contribute to actors’ uncertainty over future risk. 
This reflects Beckert’s (1996, p.820) observation, who identifies complexity as the primary 
reason for uncertainty, because complexity of “relations in the social world…leads to 
unintended consequences and prevents the anticipation of outcomes”. Due to the 
predominant focus on the single actor unit-of-analysis, ‘network complexity’ has not featured 
systematically in existing risk research. Empirical evidence from German food retailer-
manufacturer networks generated five first-order concepts underpinning ‘network 
complexity’: 
1) Embeddedness of actors, resources and activities; 
2) Global dispersion of actors and large scale of operations; 
3) Limited traceability and network transparency; 
4) Simultaneous co-occurrence and dynamic cascades of events; 
5) Limited understanding of the locus and impact of events.  
Figure 9.2 captures illustrative evidence underpinning ‘network complexity’: 
 
Figure 9.2. Network complexity. 
‘Network complexity’ emerges from companies’ embeddedness in a heterogeneous 
“environment that consists of other organizations responding to their environment, which 
consists of organisations responding to an environment of organizations’ responses” 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p.149). This phenomenon is known as double-contingency (Beckert, 
1996). Since network interactions comprise three or more actors, contingent (inter-) actions 
and resulting uncertainty are inherent in business networks. Once uncertainty is coupled with 
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potential damages to tangible and/or intangible resources, it becomes a ‘risk’. The following 
discussion briefly reviews the first-order concepts underpinning ‘network complexity’: 
Embeddedness of actors, resources and activities: This first-order concept captures the 
observation that food retailers and manufacturers rely on closely interdependent interactions 
with a variety of  
a) Actors, such as food brokers, processors and manufacturers, packaging and logistics 
providers; 
b) Resources, such as ingredients, tracking systems, manufacturing facilities; and 
c) Activities, such as joint manufacturing, product recalls or laboratory testing.  
For example, the embeddedness with other business actors who “may provide ingredients, 
ingredients of ingredients, packaging of ingredients and so forth” (Interview ID 23) is 
visualized in the multi-actor map of ‘distributed risk’ (see Chapter Five, Figure 5.3). 
Embeddedness highlights a single actor’s limited ability to ‘act’ unilaterally and in isolation 
from a wider context, regardless of an actor’s relative power in a network, and relates to the 
observation that business interactions are highly context bound (Holmlund & Törnroos, 
1997). Embeddedness extends beyond the notion of economic interdependence to encompass 
the “contextualization of economic activity in ongoing patterns of social relations and captures 
the contingent nature of an economic actor’s activities” (Choi & Kim, 2008, p.8). In other 
words, embeddedness recognizes the contextual interdependency of actors, resources and 
activity networks in the wider social, legal, political and technological structures, which shape 
and are shaped by actor’s (inter-) actions within those structures. Embeddedness of 
heterogeneous actors, resources and activities is at the heart of business network research 
and have been recognized as key network characteristics contributing to network complexity 
(Baraldi et al., 2007, p.887). Similarly, (global) dispersion of interdependent actors, resources 
and activities as encountered in the German food retailer-manufacturer networks were 
recognised to “lead to formidable uncertainties …and a high degree of unpredictability” 
(Mouzas & Ford, 2006, p.1248).  
Although embeddedness has been repeatedly recognized as a key concept in network research 
(Holmlund & Törnroos, 1997; Ford, Gadde, Håkansson & Snehota, 2003) to capture actors’ 
activities in accessing and sharing resources, existing research consistently neglects the 
liability of embeddedness (Uzzi, 1998). In the context of risk in retailer-manufacturer 
networks, embeddedness can manifest as a liability because: 
a) Embeddedness of interactions forms conduits for potential risk to migrate across 
direct and indirect relationships; and  
b) Actors have limited freedom in responding to risks unilaterally due to the contingency 
and interdependency of an actor’s activities and resources on other actors. 
Global dispersion of actors and large scale of operations: Network complexity emerging 
from companies’ embeddedness in a wider network is amplified by actors’ geographical 
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dispersion and large-scale operations. This precludes direct monitoring of most actors, 
although the final products’ safety and quality may depend on the activities taking place at 
various preceding stages, as has been illustrated in the contamination cases in Chapter Five. 
Actors’ geographic dispersion contributes to companies’ perception of operating in networks 
of “infinite size and complexity” (Ford & Redwood, 2005, p.649), which raises two implications 
for understanding risk in business networks: Given the network complexity emerging from 
the geographic dispersion of actors, resources and activities, and scale of operations, 
companies may not be able to identify all relevant actors, yet still be “affected, however 
distantly, by what happens between all other [actors]” (Ford & Mouzas, 2008, p.11). Hence, 
companies must widen their horizon to consider events beyond their immediate domain and 
the confines of national borders. This observation confirms Ford and Redwood’s (2005, p.649) 
finding that companies face the dilemma that “significant events may take place in distant 
parts of the network, or ‘another’ network, not fully associated with the main or obvious one. 
… threats of the future … often come from unexpected locations.” 
Limited traceability and network transparency: This first-order concept captures actors’ 
limited insight and understanding of network interactions, which is evident when actors face 
“subcontracting and subcontracting until the company at the top of the chain might not be 
certain where it ends” (Noble, 2012). Limited traceability and transparency is illustrated, for 
example, by the ‘nuts for spices’ incident and the observation that almost half of all product 
contamination cases registered by the RASFF from China are not traceable to the 
manufacturer. In contrast to the dominant perspective in risk research, adopting a multi-actor 
perspective fleshes out companies’ limited ability to unilaterally deal with risk due to the 
“pattern of interdependencies in a network, the distribution of resources, the limits of 
knowledge and the reality of interaction” (Ford & Mouzas, 2008, p. 34). The empirical evidence 
confirms that each company faces limited transparency in direct and indirect interactions due 
to limited knowledge about the “simultaneous networking of many other companies” (Ford et 
al., 2002, p.20). While actors attempt to establish greater transparency, empirical evidence 
confirms actors’ realization that there remains potential for “where anything can happen and 
where we could not even think of it yet” (ID 4).  
Simultaneous co-occurrence and dynamic cascades of events: Contrary to existing research 
on risk, which invested considerable effort into ‘isolating’ risk events (for example, Miller, 
1992; Brindley, 2004), this first-order concept captures the observation that events may occur 
simultaneously and may manifest in dynamic cascades. This is evident, for instance, in Nestle’s 
‘risk map’ titled “Zone CNN” (see Chapter Five, Figure 5.1), which features more than 26 risks 
of concern to the manufacturer that occur simultaneously and globally. The simultaneous co-
occurrence of events is compared to an ‘avalanche’ (ID 20), which is tightly coupled with the 
experience of cascades of events, which refers to the process of one event triggering a potential 
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series of other events, which may eventually ‘become relevant to seemingly distant 
businesses’. In the context of food retailer-manufacturer networks, the most obvious form of 
risk cascades emerges from the physical contamination of food.  However, cascades of events 
can also emerge from incidents that have no direct physical impact on food safety or quality, 
such as when incidents of unethical trading practices result in product boycotts, which 
consumers hold responsible for promoting those incidents.  
The above observations confirm findings from research on risk in supply networks, which 
recognises risk not a contained event, but as “shifting around” (Harland, Brenchley & Walker, 
2003, p.51) and that “different risk events in global supply chains are linked to each other in 
complex patterns, with one risk leading to another, or influencing the outcome of other risks” 
(Manuj & Mentzer, 2008, p.198). Wider business network research highlights that 
interdependent relationships function as transmitters (Halinen, Salmi & Havila, 1999) where 
“apparently isolated change in one relationship may cause effects in a number of relationships 
within a network” (Håkansson & Johanson, 1992, p.132), a phenomenon which became known 
as the ‘domino effect’ (Lamming, 1996; Hertz, 1998; Ritter, 2000).  
Limited understanding of the locus and impact of events: This concept is tightly coupled 
with the preceding first-order concepts and refers to actors’ limited ability to identify and 
predict the locus and impact of events. Empirically, this first-order concept is grounded in two 
observations: First, limited understanding of the locus and impact of events may originate 
from actors’ limited understanding “of their own value chains and what may affect them and 
what may not” (ID 8). In other words, actors may be unable to assess the locus and impact of 
events due to the complexity of identifying sequences of interactions within a network. This 
observation is well-documented in research on networks and uncertainty (Milliken, 1987; 
Beckert, 1994; Klijn and Teisman, 1997; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Ford and Mouzas (2008, 
p.7) conclude that “the sheer unknowability of effects and outcomes in a network means that 
we may even conclude that the effectiveness of strategies … is likely to be largely a matter of 
luck.” 
Second, actors may experience limited understanding of the locus and impact of events due to 
the constant development of unprecedented food technologies or testing methods that are 
subject to ongoing research. Examples of such technologies constitute the use of genetically 
modified organisms, new pesticides or methods in food preservation and laboratory analyses 
that are capable of detecting new substances.  This observation reflects Milliken’s concept of 
‘effect uncertainty’ (1987, p.137), which refers to the dilemma that actors may expect the 
development of new technologies, but may not be able to understand the impact. This raises 
an important implication for our understanding of risk in business networks, because it 
highlights that even if actors can predict an event, such predictions may be limited in guiding 
actors’ understanding of the potential impact. In other words, even if it was expedient to 
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identify probabilities for future events, such assessments may become of limited value beyond 
the prediction of the event itself. This concern was raised in existing research most 
prominently by Huffman (2004), in his paper on “Why environmental scanning works, except 
when you need it”. He concludes that environmental scanning systems, which generate 
algorithm-based probabilities for predicting the occurrence of future events, become useless 
once an organization experiences the event. Zsidisin et al. (2005, p.3403) highlight a similar 
concern, citing lack of “awareness of all the relevant events as well as confidence in the 
estimated probability of those events occurring and of their impact.” 
9.2.1.2 Variability in outcomes and processes 
Variability in outcomes (or products) and processes are of primary concern to food retailers 
and manufacturers, due to potential hazards to consumer health and safety. In contrast to 
existing research on product and process risk (for example, Manuj & Mentzer, 2008; 
Akkerman, Farahani, & Grunow, 2010) this research emphasises the potential variability in 
outcomes and processes. Variability accounts more accurately for the variety in which 
deviations in outcome and/or processes manifest.  
Figure 9.3 presents selective evidence of first-order concepts underpinning outcome and 
process variability: 
 
Figure 9.3. Variability in outcomes and processes. 
‘Outcome variability’ may emerge at different stages and locations of processing, 
manufacturing, packaging and distribution. In addition to variability in ingredient or product 
composition, outcome variability comprises variable quantity, which is coupled to harvest and 
price fluctuations. Outcome variability amplifies with increasing product sophistication, the 
number of product touchpoints and novel food technologies, such as the use of Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMO). The potential for migration of product contaminants and 
detection of unknown substances with new laboratory tests demonstrate that actors 
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encounter unprecedented incidents, even within a recognised locus of risk. In contrast to 
outcome variability, process variability is difficult to measure and verify, as it refers to 
differences in food production processes, which are typically not perceivable by taste or 
laboratory tests, and to date remain mostly unregulated. 
9.2.1.3 Variability in consumer perception 
While variability in outcomes and processes are recognised dimensions in business and 
management research on risk, variability in consumer perception receives significantly less 
attention, despite its relevance for marketing managers. This second-order concept captures 
those consumer-related factors that contribute to the “social amplification of risk” (Harland, 
Brenchley & Walker, 2003, p.51). Figure 9.4 illustrates the first-order concepts underpinning 
‘variability in consumer perception’: 
 
Figure 9.4. Variability in consumer perception 
First-order concepts, such as public perception of events or media and NGO influence are 
difficult to measure or predict with accuracy. This may explain why these first and second-
order concepts have received less emphasis in probability-based risk research. However, 
variability in consumer perception is an important concept for understanding risk in business 
marketing. For instance, empirical evidence demonstrates that consumers tend to hold 
retailers and manufacturers directly accountable for food safety incidents occurring anywhere 
in the business network, ranging from plantation management to animal welfare and the 
preservation of natural resources.  
9.2.1.4 Legal ambiguity 
Empirical evidence from German food retailer-manufacturer networks demonstrates that the 
‘legal system’ is not necessarily a ‘stable’ or ‘uniform’ context for business interactions, but 
ambiguous and dynamic, as actors face: 
a) A diversity of legal regulations relevant to global sourcing, processing, transportation, 
packaging, distribution and retail activities;  
b) A complex ‘jungle of regulations’ (ID 21), which may expose legislative ‘loopholes’ or 
contradictory requirements; 
c) Contribution of non-experts to new and often controversial regulations; 
d) Discrepancies between de-jure and de-facto requirements. 
Figure 9.5 captures illustrative evidence of first-order concepts underpinning legal ambiguity:  




Figure 9.5. Legal ambiguity. 
Despite the observation that “any commercial actor and/or transaction is likely to be subject 
to multiple, and often conflicting, national rules” (Cohen, 2007, p.61), and that actors often 
differ in their perceptions of the same legal requirements and in their respective decisions 
about how to act (Carson, Madhok & Wu, 2005), limited research has been devoted to 
understanding legal ambiguity. Research closest to the concept of ‘legal ambiguity’ focused on 
‘institutional distance’ (Yang Su & Fam, 2012) and ‘institutional uncertainty’ (Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004). However, while ‘institutional distance’ refers only to uncertainty emerging from 
operations in an unknown market ‘institutional uncertainty’ is even more general in that it 
refers to “uncertainty generated from the incompatibility of the institutions involved” 
(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.114).  Both terms equate the legislative systems with a liberal 
treatment of the term ‘institutions’, which is too general for the purposes of this discussion. 
Therefore, the term ‘legal ambiguity’ is chosen to denote the uncertainty arising from actors’ 
interactions with and within multiple and evolving legislative systems. Actors’ uncertainty over 
changing legislative requirements and respective liability distribution may result in risk from 
infringing legal requirements and thus generate damages to tangible and intangible resources.  
9.2.2 Impact dimension of risk 
Risk impact on companies’ tangible and intangible resources is a key concern for marketing 
researchers and practitioners for two reasons: Conceptually, impact sets the concept of ‘risk’ 
apart from ‘uncertainty’. Empirically, impact materializes in damages to tangible and 
intangible resources, which concern marketing and company performance.  
Figure 9.8 illustrates evidence underpinning the second-order concept of damages to 
resources: 




Figure 9.6. Damages to resources. 
The identification of impact dimensions of risk is congruent with existing research (Harland 
et al., 2003; Cavinato, 2004; Sheffi & Rice, 2005) which, however, focused on identifying and 
ranking discrete types of impact from the perspective of a single company and often equating 
one type of impact with ‘risk’. In contrast, empirical evidence from Chapter Five demonstrates 
that isolated treatments of discrete types of risk impact present a simplified view of how risk 
impact manifests in business networks. Specifically, the empirical evidence supports three 
findings, which refine our understanding of ‘risk impact’ in a business network context: 
First, risk impact rarely manifests in a confined fashion. Instead, embeddedness of actors, 
resources and activities function as a conduit for the migration of risk impact and promote a 
contagious spread of damages. Migration of risk impact may result in seemingly distant actors 
experiencing damages to tangible and/or intangible resources from incidents emerging ‘at the 
other end of the network’, to which the affected actors had no direct relation. This finding is 
partly acknowledged in research by Harland, Brenchely and Walker (2003), Hallikas et al. 
(2004) and Manuji and Mentzer, (2008), who recognise the dynamics of risk impact in 
business interactions. Examining risk impact in a network context further highlights that 
direct and indirect business interactions function not only as conduits for accessing resources, 
but also as conduits for the migration of risk impact and potential damages to resources. 
Second, risk impact is likely to simultaneously affect tangible and intangible resources. This is 
evidenced by simultaneous damages to tangible resources, such as costs incurred in recall and 
product re-design alongside damages to intangible resources, such as loss of consumer 
confidence or decreased regulatory freedom.  
Third, the same incident may result in different impact for different actors in the network. For 
example, variable product quality from subcontractors who do not adhere to food safety 
regulations is likely to result in severe damages to German food retailers’ financial 
performance and brand reputation, while less affecting the subcontractor, who may lose the 
retailer account yet continue operations with other customers.  
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The above discussion illustrates that adopting a business network approach refines our 
understanding of risk impact, because it illuminates that risk impact may migrate; 
simultaneously, it may affect a combination of tangible and intangible resources and affect 
actors in different ways. These findings demonstrate that it is difficult to accurately isolate and 
predict risk impact, which is conceptually captured in the interdependency of the third-order 
concepts ‘impact’ and ‘uncertainty’ in Figure 9.1. This conceptualisation reveals a richer 
understanding of ‘risk’, which is hardly reducible to an event with a static probability. To 
reflect these dynamics, the second-order concepts underpinning ‘uncertainty’ are not reduced 
to ‘static descriptors’ such as ‘product risk’ or ‘legal risk’.  Instead, the concepts of ‘network 
complexity’, ‘product and process variability’, ‘variability in consumer perception’ and ‘legal 
ambiguity’ carry a variable spectrum that give rise to the uncertainty of risk in business 
networks. This finding is congruent with McGoun’s (1995, p.515) observation that “it is 
unquantifiable variation that creates uncertainty.” 
While the identified first- and second-order concepts are difficult to quantify, assuming those 
concepts away would not refine our understanding of risk or of how companies deal with risk. 
Indeed, the uncertainty-based conceptualisation of risk contributes in four ways to our 
understanding of risk in business networks: First, it addresses in empirical, conceptual and 
practical terms some of the concerns raised regarding the validity of probability-based 
conceptualisations of risk in business interactions. Second, it offers an initial step forwards 
developing an alternative, empirically informed conceptualisation of risk that is sensitive to 
companies’ interactions in business networks. Third, this conceptualisation contributes to 
disambiguating and refining our understanding of risk and uncertainty in business networks, 
and offers impetus for further critical development of these concepts in network research. 
Finally, the uncertainty-based conceptualisation of risk offers an alternative foundation for 
understanding how companies deal with risk in business networks, which is discussed in the 
following section. 
9.3 Dealing with risk in business networks: An institution-based explanation 
The realization that companies consider uncertainty and impact in dealing with risk bears 
important implications for our understanding of how companies deal with risk. Existing 
research has left open the question of how companies deal with risk in webs of interdependent 
direct and indirect relationships, where risk can migrate and affect seemingly distant actors, 
resources and activities. Adopting a multi-actor unit-of-analysis and uncertainty-based 
conceptualisation of risk raises the following implications:  Dealing with risk must consider 
interactions beyond the confines of single companies or direct relationships and must be 
sensitive to both uncertainty and impact. 
To answer how companies deal with risk it is insufficient to analyse the empirical evidence 
from a business network perspective. While network research provides a relevant alternative 
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ontology of business markets and contributes conceptual tools for capturing a complex 
business reality, network research does not extend into the realm of systematically explaining 
how companies deal with risk. To inform our understanding of how companies use a 
combination of institutional devices, such as industry standards, General Terms and Conditions 
and framework contracts at three levels of network interaction, this discussion draws on 
institutional research. In this way, the thesis offers one of the first ventures in proposing an 
institution-based explanation of how companies deal with risk in business networks. The 
building blocks of institutional devices are not numeric algorithms, but systems of rules which 
are codified and shared through business artefacts. The term ‘institution-based’ explanation 
builds on terminology proposed by Peng (2002) and Peng et al. (2009), who advocate more 
systematic use of institutional research in the ‘strategy tripod’ in management and business 
studies, including business marketing. The ‘institution-based explanation’ of how companies 
deal with risk is a relevant contribution to a growing body of research that explores business 
marketing and network research from an institutional point of view (Owen-Smith & Powell, 
2008).  
The synthesis of network and institutional research provides the conceptual groundwork for 
the discussion of the empirical evidence presented in Chapters Six to Eight. The discussion of 
the institution-based explanation of how companies deal with risk proceeds in three steps: 
First, the discussion focuses on how companies use institutional devices - such as industry 
standards, GTC and framework contracts - for dealing with risk. Institutional devices provide 
companies with shared, parsimonious rules for interaction in the face of uncertainty and 
facilitate companies’ protection of resources from impact (see Table 9.1). Second, the 
discussion highlights how companies actively codify, monitor, enforce and adapt institutional 
devices for dealing with risk. This finding is captured in Figure 9.7: The integrative framework 
of how companies deal with risk crystallizes the conceptual synthesis of network and 
institution-based research by mapping companies’ use of institutional devices onto the three 
levels of network interaction. Third, the discussion illuminates how institutional devices 
facilitate dealing with risk interactively across direct and indirect relationships, because their 
manifestation in ‘business artefacts’ enables transcending geographic, legislative and time 
boundaries. Figure 9.8 conceptualizes this finding by integrating business artefacts into an 
extended version of the Actor-Resources-Activities (ARA) model in Figure 9.8). 
The empirical findings on the use and content of the International Featured Standard, General 
Terms and Conditions and framework contracts in German retailer-manufacturer networks 
highlight how and why companies rely on the combination of such institutional devices for 
dealing with risk at three interdependent levels of network interactions: the network, focal 
and dyadic levels, respectively. These institutional devices offer parsimonious means for 
dealing with risk by limiting uncertainty and impact. Table 9.1 maps out how institutional 
Dealing with Risk in Business Networks 
200 
 
devices, such as the IFS, GTC and framework contracts address risk at the network, focal and 
dyadic levels of interaction. While the distinction between the three levels of interaction is a 
methodological device facilitating a systematic dissection of how institutional devices address 
uncertainty and impact of risk, it is vital to highlight that the power of institutional devices in 
dealing with risk rests in the reciprocal reinforcement that emerges through the combined use 
of standards, GTC and contracts. This finding is important, because existent research tends to 
investigate the content and use of one institutional device in isolation from relevant other 
devices (see for example Garud, Jain &Kumaraswamy, 2002; Blois, 2003; Mouzas, 2006). Yet, 
empirical evidence demonstrates that institutional devices are used in combination, because 
of the synergy effects that companies achieve by utilizing cross-referencing and the different 
reach and purpose of institutional devices. Table 9.1 offers a summary of how the IFS, GTC and 
framework contracts are used to address uncertainty and impact of risk by drawing on the 
uncertainty-based conceptualisation of risk developed in Section 9.2: 
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Table 9.1. The use of institutional devices for dealing with risk 
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Table 9.1 demonstrates how institutional devices address uncertainty and impact of risk at 
three levels of network interactions. Reduction in uncertainty is primarily achieved through 
the standardization of multiple interactions over time and across geographical borders 
according to shared systems of rules, which channel multiple actors’ behaviours into more 
predictable, and possibly preferred, patterns of activities that limit the occurrence of adverse 
events. In other words, by standardising multiple interactions, institutional devices limit the 
“choice set of …actors and thereby reduce the uncertainty of the situation” (Beckert, 1996, p. 
813). The analysis of how and why companies use institutional devices for dealing with risk 
confirms Beckert’s conceptual argument that  
“actors do not increase their calculative capabilities for determining 
probabilities in order to master uncertainty. Rather they, rely on social 
‘devices’ and restrict their flexibility and create a rigidity in the responses to 
changes in an uncertain environment” (p.819, emphases in original).  
Reduction in risk impact is achieved in two ways: By limiting the occurrence of adverse events 
ex-ante (through establishing and monitoring food safety regulations, for example) and by 
regulating the distribution of risk impact. Consequently, institutional devices facilitate dealing 
with risk by reducing uncertainty through decreasing variability in interactions according to 
previously agreed patterns and by regulating the distribution of risk impact. While existing 
institutional and network research recognises that the fundamental function of institutional 
devices is to reduce uncertainty (North, 1990; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Peng, Sun, Pinkham & 
Chen, 2009), much less attention is devoted to understanding how institutional devices are 
used to create a ‘liability regime’ that protects resources from risk impact. Yet, it is the 
combination of limiting uncertainty and impact that make institutional devices efficient means 
for dealing with risk in business networks. 
Table 9.1 articulates how exactly the IFS, GTC and framework contracts are used 
interdependently to limit uncertainty and impact of risk across direct and indirect interactions. 
The table presents original insights as it is grounded in the interdependent analysis of 
artefacts-in-use (instead of template documents). While existing research has focused on 
examining the issue of contracts for dealing with risk in direct business relationships, our 
understanding of how companies use institutional devices at higher levels of aggregation, such 
as the focal and network levels, remains limited (Ford & Mouzas, 2008). Systematically 
analysing the content and use of the IFS and GTC in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 contributes to our 
understanding of how two under-researched institutional devices perform interdependently 
with framework contracts in limiting risk at three levels of network interaction.  
As detailed in Chapter Six, the IFS was deliberately deployed in an act of institutional 
entrepreneurship (Meyer, 2008) by a small group of German food retailers who aimed at 
limiting risk to food safety across the value chain. The outcome was the development of the 
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IFS, which allows any company choosing an IFS scheme to use a privately developed and 
globally valid certification system for dealing with risk at any stage of the food processing, 
manufacturing, packaging and retail business. In this way, the IFS transcends the confines of 
direct relationships and facilitates addressing “risks in the network [which] are dependent on 
the behaviour of the interconnected systems of companies” (Hallikas et al., 2004, p.7).  
Specifically, the IFS facilitates dealing with risk by codifying, monitoring and enforcing 
standardised sequences of activities, responsibilities and liabilities for different parties (see 
Table 9.2). Additional tools, such as IFS Portal, IFS Integrity Committee and auditor training 
schemes further limit risk by establishing standardized records of actors’ risk-related 
performance in relation to IFS criteria. By codifying and monitoring compliance with 
standardized product and process specifications, the IFS predefines “patterns of conduct which 
channel [interactions] in one direction against the many other directions that would 
theoretically be possible” (Berger & Luckmann, 1984, p.72). Simultaneously, the flexible 
nature of the standard enables rapid and efficient implementation of globally valid changes in 
light of ongoing experiences of dealing with risk.  
Limiting legal ambiguity remains a key purpose of the IFS, since the EU and German legal 
systems simultaneously underwent profound reforms. Specifically, the IFS allows German 
food retailers and manufacturers to address risk emerging from existent ‘gaps’ and ‘loopholes’ 
in legislative practices. By setting up transnational standards, the IFS is designed to offer a 
standard set of ‘meta-rules’ that spans across a patchwork of different legislations. The benefit 
of using the IFS in dealing with legal ambiguity is twofold: First, it allows companies who set 
up the standard to “better represent and reflect the needs of the relevant players, their 
difficulties and possibly avenues of response than legislation” (Birnhack, 2004, p.3). Second, 
the IFS allows companies to apply these ‘meta-rules’ regardless of the legislative or geographic 
boundaries of network interactions.  
In terms of limiting risk impact, the IFS evidences success in reducing the number of food 
safety incidents and operates on the basis allocating risk impact to the certification provider 
and certificate holder. For example, the certificate holder (auditee) bears impact from 
incidents to food safety, which may manifest in compensatory payments for damages to be 
paid to the retailer, payment of fines to inspection authorities and costs of re-certification or 
training. In cases where risk impact is transferred to a third party, such as the certification 
body and/or respective auditors, the party is charged by the IFS Sanctioning Committee (HDE) 
for overlooking non-compliance with the standard and may temporarily or finitely lose its 
license to operate.  
The reason for discussing first how the IFS limits both uncertainty and impact of risk is that 
GTC and framework contracts reference the IFS, among other standards, and in that way 
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render compliance with the IFS legally binding. This mechanism for legally enforcing 
‘voluntary’ standards in private contracts (such as GTC or framework contracts) rests on the 
“constitutional principle of private autonomy … [which gives] authorization for designing 
private transactions” (Schanze, 2007, p.171). This observation is important for two reasons: 
On the one hand, it demonstrates the relevance of researching institutional devices in context 
of each other, as these are used inter-dependently and often designed to reinforce each other. 
On the other hand, it becomes increasingly impossible to understand the content of GTC or 
framework contracts without the reference to external standards such as the IFS. 
At the focal level, GTC allow actors to unilaterally define sets of default rules for dealing with 
risk in a way that transcends direct dyadic relationships. GTC provide a default set of standard 
regulations that are valid globally between directly connected actors, such as retailers and 
manufacturers and indirectly connected actors, such as retailers and a manufacturer’s 
suppliers. Existent research predominantly focuses on dyadic contracts and offers limited 
insight into the content and uses of GTC-in-use in business marketing in general, and 
particularly in the context of dealing with risk. An exception offers the research by Mouzas and 
Furmston (2008, p.42), who find that GTC “are used to pass on risks and liabilities to other 
contractual parties.” This is congruent with the evidence presented in Table 9.1, which shows 
that GTC limit risk impact by transferring impact either directly to a contracting party or 
indirectly, by involving third parties such as insurances. Transfer of risk impact typically 
manifests in clauses regulating the payment of damages, costs of product recall and testing, or 
product liability fines.  
However, beyond mere transfer of risk impact, the empirical evidence offers two original 
insights into how GTC facilitate dealing with risk: The first insight relates to the standardised 
content of GTC across different retailers and manufacturers, which contributes to limiting 
uncertainty in direct and indirect interactions across the wider network. Despite the legal 
freedom available to actors who can unilaterally design GTC, the striking similarity across GTC 
demonstrates that GTC derive their power from limiting uncertainty through standardization 
of interactions across multiple actors, which explains the high degree of deliberate 
convergence among different retailers’ and manufacturers’ GTC. The standardization of GTC 
offers a mechanism for providing a predictable, industry-wide scaffolding of rules within 
which all actors, irrespective of their geographic location, operate. Considering that a major 
source of uncertainty in networks emerges from the complexity and contingency of network 
interactions, as “any company’s action is contingent on the action, reactions, as well as 
perceptions of others within the business network that the company is embedded in” (Oeberg, 
Henneberg & Mouzas, 2012, p.1270), GTC offer an efficient way of channelling interactions 
between high numbers of actors into previously agreed, foreseeable patterns.  
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For example, GTC limit uncertainty emerging from legal ambiguity by offering a set of default 
rules across several jurisdictions, by defining one preferred jurisdiction and out-of-court 
dispute resolution procedures. Another way in which GTC limit uncertainty is by way of 
limiting product and process variability across the operations of multiple actors and product 
touchpoints by including modular references to standard requirements, such as the IFS or the 
BSCI. In this way, standards function like ‘institutional modules’ (Schanze, 2007, p.179), which 
can be ‘plugged’ into the GTC “with the assurance that they ‘function’ whenever the 
contingency arises” (ibid). Moreover, by ‘plugging-in’ industry standards into the GTC, actors 
constrain not only the outcomes at which other actors’ behaviours should be directed but also 
the means by which those ends are achieved, as the IFS meticulously regulates activities 
related to the certification requirements.   
The second insight addresses the question of how GTC transcend the confines of direct 
interactions to facilitate dealing with risk in indirect interactions. The wide reach of GTC is 
instituted in three types of GTC clauses that ensure the terms and conditions become the 
exclusive basis for interactions in direct and indirect relationships (see Chapter Seven for a 
detailed account). These clauses include the provision that the issuer’s GTC are the exclusive 
basis for direct and indirect interactions; the provision regulating sub-contracting and 
specifying eligible partners; and provisions stating the issuer’s auditing rights. Through 
standardization and high reach, GTC offer parsimonious devices for dealing with risk within 
the modest confines of one to five pages. 
The analysis of how companies use framework contracts for dealing with risk in Table 9.1 
illustrates the strong similarities between framework contracts and GTC. In addition to the 
standardisation of interactions, framework contracts facilitate dealing with risk by offering a 
shared platform to address risks idiosyncratic to direct dyadic interactions. Moreover, the 
findings illustrate that contracts do not function in isolation but close interdependency with 
GTC and standard specifications. Similar to GTC, framework contracts often include 
modularised references to preferred standard schemes and product specifications, which are 
monitored through first-, second- and third-party audits specified in the framework contract, 
the GTC and the standard regulations. By contextualising the analysis of framework contracts 
in light of other institutional devices, this research illuminates new ways in which companies 
use contracts for dealing with risk. 
Having established how institutional devices facilitate dealing with risk in direct and indirect 
interactions, this discussion substantiates the institution-based explanation of how companies 
deal with risk by drawing on the critical realist logic of ‘causal mechanisms’ (Sayer, 1992; 
Easton, 2010). This research examines the concept of ‘rules’ as a causal mechanism operating 
at the heart of the institution-based explanation. The articulation and ascription of causal 
powers to rules helps distinguishing between the concepts of rules and institutions, and 
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elevates the institution-based explanation from a descriptive to a conceptual level. Drawing 
on the critical realist concept of causal explanation, the remainder of this section dissects the 
causal powers of rules to explain why institutional devices facilitate dealing with risk. To recall, 
“a causal explanation is one that identifies the objects and their mechanisms and the way they 
combine to cause events” (Easton, 2002, p.105). Applying the logic of outcome, context and 
mechanisms (Pawson & Tilley, 2013), the findings suggest that the outcome of reduced 
uncertainty and risk impact in the context of using institutional devices in retailer-
manufacturer networks rests on the causal mechanism of rules, which form the building blocks 
of institutional devices. Ascribing ‘powers’ to rules is “to say something about what it will or 
can do, in the appropriate conditions, in virtue of its intrinsic nature” (Tsang & Kwan, 1999, 
p.762, emphasis added).  
In the context of this research, rules are referred to as a parsimonious, socially transmitted 
order taking the form of “in circumstances X do Y” (Hodgson, 2006, p.3), which can be used to 
constrain the choice set of actors and to channel future interactions between multiple actors 
across time and space in agreed ways. The following list articulates a list of causal powers 
inherent to rules, which form the ‘mechanism’ explaining the use of institutional devices in 
dealing with risk: 
1) Rules are parsimonious devices that gain relevance in contexts where multiple actors need 
to interact in complex environments with limited resources. Rules would not need to exist 
if each actor existed in a vacuum and resources were available in abundance. Rules are 
necessary in an environment of limited resources and multiple actors who compete for 
and who protect resources under limited knowledge of the future. 
2) Rules reduce the complexity of future interactions by excluding ex-ante certain actors and 
sets of potential actions (Ostrom, 2005), which reduces complexity and variability in 
network interactions.  
3) Rules facilitate the collective adaptation under conditions of uncertainty (cf. Hayek, 1973, 
p.50). 
4) Rules are dynamic entities that reflect actors’ sedimented experience. Changes to rules 
tend to occur incrementally in light of actors’ experience and learning from precedent 
cases.  
5) While rules structure the behaviour of actors, in interaction, rules are also formed by 
actors (cf. Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.76).   
6) Rules do not exist in isolation but are contextually contingent and often operate 
interdependently with other rules.  
7) In contrast to norms, rules rely on explicit agreement and codification of principles.  
8) Codifying rules yields the benefits of defining the actors sharing the rules, identifying 
breaches of rules and explicitly communicating monitoring and enforcement activities (see 
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Table 9.2). Codifiability contributes to the objectification of rules, which elevates 
interactions between two or more actors beyond the subjective realm of individuals. In 
this way, rules have the capacity to transcend direct interactions between actors. 
9) Rules promote predictability and efficiency in interactions between multiple actors, 
particularly when rules are replicated across multiple interactions.  
10) Rules are not neutral principles regulating interactions. Instead, rules are invested with 
interest of the parties creating the rules.  
11) Codification of rules does not necessarily guarantee that all actors understand the rules 
equally and (inter-)act in compliance with them. Rules and performance may vary, which 
draws attention to the danger of conflating “the rule with its enactment” (D’Adderio, 2008, 
p.14). 
Building on this understanding of rules informing the institution-based explanation of how 
companies deal with risk in business networks, the following section discusses the integrated 
framework (Figure 9.7), which conceptualises the institution-based explanation. 
9.3.1 Integrated framework: Dealing with risk in business networks 
The preceding section established how and why institutional devices facilitate dealing with 
risk by zooming in to the heart of institutional devices: the concept of rules. While the 
parsimony of rules is a strength of using institutional devices for dealing with risk in complex 
network interactions, empirical evidence and existing research demonstrate that rules 
become consequential only when enacted through monitoring and enforcement activities 
(Ostrom, 2009; D’Adderio, 2011). Analysing evidence on the content and use of the IFS, GTC 
and framework contracts highlights that companies invest in codification, monitoring, 
enforcement and adaptation of institutional devices, considering ongoing experience in dealing 
with risk in direct and indirect interactions. Figure 9.7 offers an integrated conceptualisation 
of companies’ use of institutional devices at three levels of network interaction: 
 
Figure 9.7. Integrated framework: Dealing with risk in business networks. 
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Figure 9.7 transforms the empirical evidence of how companies deal with risk into theoretical 
terms: By combining the conceptual idea of network, focal and dyadic network interactions 
with the codification-monitoring-enforcement and adaptation of institutional devices, the 
framework articulates an institution-based explanation of how companies deal with risk in 
business networks. 
While existing research emphasises that “networks and institutions mutually influence one 
another” (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008, p.599), it is recognised that  
“we know relatively little about the specific dynamics within and between 
these different institutional layers [and that] more analytical concepts that 
integrate structural features of these different layers with relational and 
process approaches need to be developed in order to discern interactions 
between the different layers” (Djelic & Quack, 2008, p.317).  
The integrated framework in Figure 9.7 addresses this observation by offering a systematic 
approach to understand how actors use industry standards, GTC and framework contracts in 
interaction with each other. The double-arrows between the dyadic, focal and network levels 
of interactions indicate the embeddedness and interdependency of companies’ use of 
institutional devices.  
The empirical evidence on codification, monitoring, enforcement and adaptation of 
institutional devices corresponds with a more fragmented treatment of these activities in 
existing institutional research, most notably Elinor Ostrom (2009, p.269), who lists these 
activities, among others, as ‘institutional principles’. Table 9.2 substantiates the integrated 
framework presented in Figure 9.7 by offering illustrative evidence of how codification, 
monitoring, enforcement and adaptation manifest in the use of the IFS, GTC and framework 
contracts in retailer-manufacturer networks: 
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- Written standard 
catalogues of 150 pages; 
records of previous 
versions 
- IFS Doctrines 
- IFS Newsletter; e-mail 
updates 
- Audit reports and 
certificates 
- IFS Database Portal 
- Announced and unannounced 
3rd party audits by auditors 
from IFS approved 
Certification Bodies  
- 3rd party audits monitor 
quality of 1st party audit 
(requested in GTC and 
framework contracts) 
- Witness and surveillance 
audits monitor the 
performance of 3rd-party 
auditors 
- Continuous monitoring of 
past, present and potential 
business partners’ 
performance through IFS 
Database Portal 
Gradual sanctions towards the contracting 
partner: 
- Delay or withdrawal of certificate  
- IFS Sanctioning Committee may 
temporary or finitely delist certificate 
holders 
- ‘Blacklisting’ of contracting partner in 
IFS Database 
Gradual sanctions towards certification 
bodies or individual auditors: 
- Request for additional auditor training 
at IFS Academy 
- Payment of fines to IFS and/or auditee 
- Temporary or finite suspension of 
certification body or auditor(s).  
The IFS is adapted in response to 
precedent cases, which may originate 
from: 
- Precedents affecting food safety and/or 
quality 
- Legal or technical developments 
Three ways of standard adaptation: 
- Adaptations within an existing 
standard version  
- Launching a new standard version 
- Addition of a new standard scheme 
Changes to IFS standards are 
communicated via: 
- IFS newsletter 
- IFS e-mail 









- GTC comprise 1-4 pages 
- Attachment of BSCI 
standard (1-2 pages) 
- Attachment of product 
specifications  
- Request for information 
questionnaire 
- GTC agreement via ‘silent 
concurrence of will’ (no 
signature) 
- Changes to GTC must be 
in writing  
GTC monitoring requests: 
- 3rd party audits (i.e. IFS, BSCI)  
- Regular test results from 
specified laboratories 
- 2nd party audits (performed 
by issuer of GTC) 
- Verification of 1st party audits 
 
GTC Legal enforcement: 
- GTC define the preferred court(s) of 
jurisdiction in case of litigation  
GTC non-legal enforcement: 
- Gradual financial penalties 
(compensatory payments, fines) 
- Temporary de-shelving; de-listing 
- Temporary or finite 
(immediate)contract termination  
GTC are adapted in response to 
precedent cases, such as  
- Incidents to food safety/quality (i.e., 
horsemeat incident) 
- Changes in legal regulations (i.e., 
traceability requirements) 
- Consumer/market trends (i.e., 
accusation of discounter stores over 
social exploitation of workforce 
outside the EU) 
GTC are typically adapted in two ways: 






Codification Monitoring Enforcement Adaptation 
- Attachment of letters or e-
mail confirming 
agreement to changes. 
- Severability clause 
(preserves the validity of 
all clauses if one clause is 
changed) 
1. Incremental changes to clauses 
within the document  
2. Attachment of additional terms and 
requirements to existing GTC (i.e., 
BSCI)  
Changes to GTC are communicated 








- Framework contracts 
comprise 4-9 pages 
- Attachment of BSCI 
standard (1-2 pages) 
- Contract agreement 
sealed with signatures 
- Changes to framework 
contract must be in 
writing  
- Severability clause 
(preserves the 
Attachment of  
- Letters or e-mail 
confirming agreement to 
contract changes. 
- Product specifications 
(varying between 20-100 
pages) 
- Insurance policy 
confirmation 
- Certification according to 
requested standard (i.e. 
IFS, BSCI)  
Framework contracts repeat all 
GTC monitoring requirements 
and in addition request access 
to contracting party’s 3rd party 
audit reports performed by 
German and/or European food 
authorities. 
 
Similar combination of legal and non-legal 
enforcement as in GTC, plus additional 
provisions for non-legal enforcement: 
- Specification of private negotiation and 
arbitration arrangements to avoid 
public litigation in court 
- Private ‘blacklisting’ of contracting 
partner following contract termination 
Framework contracts are adapted in 
response to precedent cases, which may 
be idiosyncratic to the relationship  
Framework contracts are typically 
adapted in two ways: 
- Annual re-negotiation and subsequent 
incremental adaptation of framework 
or transaction terms 
- Attachment of new requirements (i.e., 
new product specification; standard 
requirements) 
 
Changes to framework contracts are 
communicated directly in face-to-face 
negotiations and in writing via (e-) mail. 
Requirement for mutual signature for 
changes to become effective.  
The value of the integrated framework rests in highlighting that codification, monitoring, 
enforcement and adaptation occur interdependently at multiple levels of interaction and can 
be better understood in context of each other. This finding offers empirical substance to the 
conceptual argument in existing research, suggesting that the network, focal and dyadic levels 
of interactions are interdependent and must be studied in context of each other (Moeller & 
Halinen, 1999; Lomi, Negor & Fonti, 2008; Yang & Su, 2014). Similarly, this finding extends 
previous research, which confined analysis of institutional devices to one level of interaction, 
predominantly focusing on contracts. 
Focusing on codification, monitoring, sanctioning and adaptation is critical to understanding 
how companies use institutional devices for dealing with risk, because it demonstrates that 
institutional devices are not static but actively developed devices. Codification is important, 
because it enables sharing and replicating institutional devices across direct and indirect 
interactions (Hodgson, 2006; Kadens, 2012). Codification can manifest in actors’ writing, 
revising standards or contract clauses or attaching new specifications. By codifying rules, 
actors formulate action situations and outcomes that limit uncertainty across multiple (future) 
interactions and regulate the distribution of impact, in this way addressing risk in network 
interactions.  
To verify compliance with the codified rules, actors rely on the interdependent use of first, 
second and third-party monitoring activities, which typically manifest in inspections and 
audits. The power of monitoring activities rests in the looming enforcement of codified rules 
by way of mobilising legal and non-legal sanctions. The illustrative evidence in Table 9.2 
confirms existing research on the types and interdependent use of legal and non-legal 
sanctions (for example, Charny, 1990; Jolls, 1997; Carson, Madhok & Wu, 2006). Consistent 
with existing research, the empirical evidence confirms that non-legal sanctions such as 
payment of damages or potential contract termination and loss of future business offer 
stronger enforcement (Mouzas &Furmston, 2008).  
While standardization and stability of institutional devices was highlighted as a key feature in 
limiting uncertainty (see Table 9.1), Figure 9.7 draws attention to the observation that actors 
incrementally adapt institutional devices in light of precedent cases that may be observed 
during the monitoring of enforcement stages. This observation confirms existing research 
suggesting that institutional devices are dynamic (Grewal & Dharwadkar, 2002) and offer 
“contrived and transient solutions to problems…experimental and pragmatic, [subject to] a 
process of trial and error in search of workable solutions” (Van de Ven, 1993, p.150). 
Continuous adaptation of institutional devices aims at “closing off any source of systematic 
future error” (Epstein, 2004, p.12) and has been illustrated throughout Chapters Six, Seven 
and Eight, describing how and why companies engage in adapting the IFS, GTC and framework 
contracts.  
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9.3.2 The use of business artefacts in dealing with risk 
This discussion draws our attention to the relevance of analysing and integrating business 
artefacts-in-use into our understanding of how companies deal with risk. Instead of treating 
industry standards, GTC and contracts as ‘institutional context’ for business interactions (for 
example, Grewal & Dharwadkar, 2002; Peng, Sun, Pinkham & Chen, 2009) this research 
analyses business artefacts-in-use as strategically designed institutional devices for dealing 
with risk. To date, limited empirical research exists on the structure, content and uses of 
business artefacts, particularly with regards to industry standards and GTC. While there is a 
body of research focusing on the use of (umbrella) contracts (Mouzas & Ford, 2006; Mouzas & 
Furmston, 2008), there is no evidence of a systematic approach considering the 
interdependent use of several business artefacts in embedded business interactions. Yet, the 
proposed institution-based explanation of dealing with risk in business networks fleshes out 
the central role of business artefacts as ‘o-rings’ (Suchman, 2003) and carriers of institutional 
devices that transcend temporal, geographic and legislative boundaries in network 
interactions (Meyer, 2008). This finding has informed the extension of the actor-resources-
activities (ARA) model (Håkansson & Johanson, 1992, p.29): 
 
Figure 9.8. Extended ARA-model: The use of business artefacts in dealing with risk. 
While the existent version of the ARA-model is an invaluable conceptual tool in network 
research, the original ARA-model does not capture the embeddedness and interdependency 
of dyadic, focal and network interactions. The extended ARA-model illustrated in Figure 9.8 
captures the central role of business artefacts in network interactions and demonstrates how 
such artefacts transcend direct dyadic interactions. The extended ARA-model illustrates how 
the combined use of business artefacts orchestrates business interaction between multiple 
actors (i.e., retailers, manufacturers, laboratories), interdependent activities (i.e., 
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manufacturing, packaging, recalling) and resources (i.e., production capacity, laboratory 
facilities). The findings support Suchman’s observation (2003, p.114) that “the greater the 
number of players, the greater the importance of having a cognitively tractable reference 
document that can link the individual parts into a coherent and meaningful whole.” This is 
accomplished, for example, when contracting parties agree that any of their subcontractors 
will adhere to the same industry standards and GTC. The ensuing ‘cascading effect’ (Johnsen, 
Lamming & Harland, 2010) explains how institutional devices are used in dealing with risk 
beyond direct interactions. Chapter Six on the use of the IFS and Chapter Seven on the use of 
GTC for dealing with risk describe which standard and GTC clauses ensure direct and indirect 
dissemination of artefacts beyond the confines of direct interactions. In methodological terms, 
this finding demonstrates the relevance of analysing different sets of business artefacts as 
devices for capturing network interactions beyond dyadic relationships, such as focal and 
network interactions.  
9.4 Conclusion 
Building on an uncertainty-based conceptualisation of risk, this chapter has discussed an 
institution-based explanation of how companies deal with risk. This explanation is grounded 
in the analysis of companies’ use of industry standards, GTC and framework contracts as 
institutional devices that facilitate dealing with risk by addressing both uncertainty and impact 
at three levels of network interaction. The empirical evidence demonstrates that companies 
engage in an adaptive process of codification, monitoring and enforcement considering their 
ongoing experience. Figure 9.7 captures this adaptive process. 
The following chapter builds on this discussion by articulating the thesis’ theoretical, 
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CHAPTER 10. CONTRIBUTION AND IMPLICATIONS 
10.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter confronted the empirical evidence with relevant theoretical approaches 
and developed answers to the thesis’ research questions. The outcomes of this discussion are 
threefold: 
First, the findings highlight the relevance of risk in business marketing research and provide 
a first step towards developing an alternative, uncertainty-based conceptualization of risk. This 
outcome emerges from adopting a multi-actor unit-of-analysis, which captures the 
embeddedness, interdependency and complexity of network interactions within which 
companies encounter and deal with risk.  
Second, the findings support the development of an institution-based explanation of how 
companies deal with risk. This explanation draws on the empirical evidence of companies 
using a combination of institutional devices, including industry standards, General Terms and 
Conditions, and contracts for dealing with risk in multi-actor settings. The heart of the 
institution-based explanation forms the causal mechanism of ‘rules’ that constitute the 
building blocks of institutional devices.  
Third, the findings concretize research on institutional devices by zooming in on the content 
and use of business artefacts-in-use as primary data from a methodological standpoint. 
Building on these findings, this chapter identifies how this thesis contributes to research on 
risk in business marketing in theoretical, methodological and practical terms. Theoretical 
contributions presented in Section 10.2 articulate how this research enhances our 
understanding of how companies deal with risk in business networks in light of existing 
research in this area. The methodological contributions presented in Section 10.3 focus on two 
ways in which this research enriches our understanding of how we research network 
phenomena. Finally, practical implications for marketing professionals and educators are 
discussed in Section 10.4. The final section, 10.5, identifies the thesis’ limitations and proposes 
directions for future research.  
10.2 Theoretical contribution 
The thesis generates two contributions that enhance our theoretical and conceptual 
understanding of how companies deal with risk in the field of business network research and 
the wider discipline of business marketing. 
First, this research draws attention to risk as an important empirical and conceptual problem 
for marketing scholars. Existent research appears to have consistently overlooked the 
relevance of risk in the context of business marketing, or has treated the phenomenon 
uncritically by adopting the conventional probability-based approach. However, closer 
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examination of seminal research on risk by early institutionalists (Knight, 1921; Hardy, 1923; 
Fisher, 1930) reveals that today’s widely accepted probability-based approach to risk in 
business and management research was severely questioned and known to make “no sense” 
(McGoun, 1995, p.514) once it was considered in a context of strategic, multi-actor 
interactions. In fact, the literature review (Chapter Two) reveals that probability-based 
approaches to risk originate from mid-20th Century mathematicians’ efforts to quantify 
economic phenomena, and later cemented its way into finance research, which became “the 
science of the quantification of uncertainty” (Boy, 2015a, p.6, emphasis in original), and “in the 
absence of a better approach” (Domar & Musgrave, 1944, p.393) became the conventional 
approach to risk adopted in wider business and management research.  
Taking the critique of probability-based approaches to risk seriously and substantiating this 
initial idea with empirical research results in this thesis proposing an alternative, uncertainty-
based conceptualisation of risk that more accurately reflects real-life manifestations of risk in 
business networks. In this regard, the thesis builds on the initial idea of uncertainty-based 
approaches to risk voiced by institutional scholars and develops this idea further by suggesting 
how we can possibly conceptualize an uncertainty-based approach to risk. The value of this 
conceptualisation is threefold:  
a) In suggesting an initial uncertainty-based conceptualisation of risk, this research 
addresses the frequently observed fallacy in existent research, which exposes the 
interchangeable use of the concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’. This fallacy is likely the 
product of recognizing that a purely probability-based approach does not do justice to the 
complexity of the phenomenon; and the simultaneous absence of a practicable alternative. 
Addressing this dilemma may yield the benefits of building a more systematic body of 
research on risk and generating research that more accurately reflects empirical 
manifestations of risk, and therefore is of greater relevance to managerial practice.  
b) While this thesis offers only an initial step towards developing an uncertainty-based 
conceptualisation of risk, it may provide a starting point for future research that may take 
up the challenge of generating a more accurate conceptualisation. Refining the 
conceptualisation of risk with the objective of providing an ‘instrument’ for future 
research to understand empirical phenomena in a more structured way is crucial to 
advance research on risk, as otherwise, researchers may be tempted to adopt a 
probability-based conceptualisation simply for reasons of convenience, conceptual 
measurability and ‘the absence of a better approach’. The initial success of probability-
based risk conceptualisations, despite the serious critiques, is likely to have emerged not 
only from the desire to use ‘quantifiable’ data to add ‘credibility’ to economic and business 
research on risk, but also from the absence of useful uncertainty-based conceptualizations. 
In other words, the critique was forgotten because it did not offer a viable alternative. After 
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almost a century of probability-based research on risk, it is time to not only reinforce the 
critique considering new empirical findings but also to suggest an alternative approach to 
risk in the context of business marketing research. 
c) Considering an uncertainty-based conceptualisation of risk is crucial for steering academic 
research alongside practical developments in this area in order to ensure the long-term 
relevance of research for marketing practice. For instance, the ISO Guide 73 on “Risk 
Management” (2009) recently replaced the probability-measure of risk by defining risk as 
“the effect of uncertainty on objectives” (emphasis added). Yet, almost six years past this 
change, the implications of this change have hardly resonated in academic research.  
The second theoretical contribution constitutes the development of an institution-based 
explanation of how companies deal with risk in business networks. This sheds light on the 
overlooked question of how companies deal with risk in webs of direct and indirect business 
interactions and emerges as a logical step from adopting an uncertainty-based approach to 
risk. In contrast to previous research founded in a probability-based approach to risk, and 
assuming the possibility of ‘risk management’ from a single actor’s perspective by way of 
unilateral action, this research assumes a different view. Specifically, this thesis develops an 
uncertainty-based conceptualisation of risk and examines how companies deal with risk in 
multi-actor settings of embedded direct and indirect business interactions. Theoretically, this 
research is informed by integrating network and institutional research. 
While research adopting the business network approach to markets provides the ontological 
and conceptual groundwork for a more accurate understanding of companies’ real-life 
environments by capturing companies’ embeddedness, institutional research offers an 
explanatory lens for examining how companies use institutional devices for dealing with risk 
in business networks. Both approaches share a critical set of assumptions, which is a 
prerequisite for “building theory by combining lenses” (Okhuysen & Bonardi, 2011) and for 
gaining a more accurate understanding of the empirical evidence.  
By developing this theoretical synthesis in synchronisation with the thesis’ empirical 
evidence, this research ventures to contribute to a recent and growing body of literature 
emerging at the intersection of network and institutional research (Owen-Smith & Powell, 
2008; Deligonul et al., 2013; Yang & Su, 2014). This step is aligned with the call to capitalize 
on theoretical integration by combining “multiple theoretical lenses to develop new 
explanations of management [and marketing] phenomena” (Okyhuysen & Bonardi, 2011, 
p.11). The outcome of this effort is the proposition to assume an institution-based approach to 
dealing with risk in business networks, which considers the use of institutional devices for 
dealing with risk in direct and indirect relationships. Such an institution-based explanation has 
not been suggested in business marketing research and even wider research in the field business 
and management studies to date. This approach draws attention to an alternative way of 
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dealing with risk that takes an uncertainty-based and multi-actor approach to risk seriously, 
and which allows us to address the under-researched question of how companies deal with 
risk in direct and indirect interactions.  
This thesis substantiates the institution-based explanation of how companies deal with risk 
with rich empirical evidence. The value of underpinning theoretical development with 
empirical research lies in the power of the analysis process, whereby empirical evidence 
informs further refinement and development of the theoretical synthesis. The outcome of this 
iterative process is the development of the integrated framework (Chapter Nine, Figure 9.7) 
depicting how companies use institutional devices for dealing with risk at three 
interdependent levels of interaction. This framework transforms the empirical insights of how 
companies deal with risk into theoretical terms: By combining the conceptual idea of multiple 
levels of network interactions with the adaptive use of institutional devices through 
codification, monitoring and enforcement activities, the framework articulates an institution-
based explanation of how companies deal with risk in business networks.  
The integrated framework contributes to the recent stream of research operating at the 
intersection of network and institutional research by mapping - for the first time - the use of 
institutional devices onto three, inter-dependent levels of network interactions: Network, focal, 
and dyadic interactions. The adaptive activities of codifying, monitoring and enforcing 
institutional devices were identified in a more fragmented way in previous institutional 
research, most prominently articulated by Elinor Ostrom (2009, p. 269), who developed a list 
of institutional principles of enduring institutions. Ostrom’s list provided an initial idea for 
analysing the use of institutional devices and has contributed to the development of the 
integrated framework. 
While previous research emphasized that “networks and institutions mutually shape one 
another” (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008, p. 594) and repeatedly advocated the importance of 
multi-level analyses of business interactions as essential for understanding the dynamics and 
embeddedness of business networks (Halinen et al., 1999; Ford & Håkansson, 2006), few 
studies ever ventured beyond conceptual advocacy. In this regard, this thesis makes an 
important contribution in fleshing out, empirically and conceptually, how institutional devices 
- manifested in the use of industry standards, GTC and framework contracts - play a key role 
in dealing with risk in direct and indirect business relationships, by spanning the levels of 
network, focal and dyadic interactions across time and space. 
In proposing an institution-based explanation, this research also demonstrates the relevance 
of conceptually integrating business artefacts as strategic, institutional devices into our 
understanding of how companies deal with risk in business networks (see Chapter Nine, 
Figure 9.7). In contrast to viewing standards and contracts as mere contexts for business 
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interactions, this thesis analyses the development and use of business artefacts-in-use as 
strategically designed institutional devices for dealing with risk.  
Analysis of the content and uses of business artefacts is limited and highly dispersed across 
several research streams that appear to progress on very different trajectories, often 
investigating contracting (Mouzas, 2006; Mouzas & Blois, 2013) in isolation from the use of 
industry standards (Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy, 2002) or GTC (Blois, 2006).  Apart from an 
isolated analysis of these institutional devices, it is even more surprising to observe that it is 
typical for such research to overlook relevant links to institutional research. Within both - 
network and institutional research - analysis of business artefacts and particularly of 
artefacts-in-use is rare and is typically performed in a way that does not allow for a contextual 
understanding of how these artefacts are used interdependently. Moreover, existent research 
on the use of business artefacts such as contracts or standards tends to provide a ‘snapshot 
view’ without considering how and why artefacts may change over time. In this respect, this 
thesis contributes to the fields of network and institutional research, as well as the broader 
discipline of business marketing, by introducing business artefacts as centre pieces into business 
interactions, and articulating for the first time how different business artefacts are used 
interdependently, spanning multiple levels of business interaction.  
This thesis moves beyond a static analysis of business artefacts-in-use by illuminating the 
dynamics of how and why institutional devices change over time. This analysis is 
substantiated, where possible, with accounts of how, why and who developed the institutional 
devices and how and why such devices are shared across the network and subjected to change 
over time. Specifically, the analysis of how business artefacts are shared and changed over 
time are, for the first time: 
a) Articulated at three levels of analysis, fleshing out the interdependency between how 
changes made at one level may influence changes at other levels; and  
b) Grounded in the analysis of artefacts alongside other primary empirical evidence. 
Finally, the thesis substantiates the institution-based explanation of how companies deal with 
risk by drawing on the critical realist understanding of ‘causal mechanisms’ (Sayer, 1992; 
Easton, 2010). Specifically, this research identifies ‘rules’ as a causal mechanism operating at 
the heart of the institution-based explanation. The researcher suggests examining the ‘causal 
powers’ and ‘liabilities’ inherent in rules, which form the building blocks of institutional 
devices. Identifying rules’ causal powers and liabilities enhances the value of the institution-
based explanation of how companies deal with risk in business networks by enabling this 
research to extrapolate its findings by way of analytical (or theoretical) generalization (Sayer, 
1992). Moreover, the ascription of causal powers to rules helps to clearly distinguish between 
two distinct concepts - rules and institutions - and in this way, contributes to advancing a 
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resolution of an ongoing debate regarding the similarity of these two concepts and several 
attempts to collapse the two concepts into one, or using the terms interchangeably (Jepperson, 
1991; Hodgson, 2006). 
Moving into the realm of a causal explanation helps to elevate this research beyond the 
descriptive scope. The identification of the causal mechanism of ‘rules’ emerged from 
deliberately analysing the content and use of institutional devices - including the use of 
standards, GTC and contracts – through the lens of institutional research. This is one of the few 
ventures in the field of business network research where the examination of business 
artefacts-in-use is linked to fundamental institutional concepts. Going back to the foundations 
of institutional research and revisiting progress on the ongoing debate about the differences 
between ‘rules’ and ‘institutions’ illuminated how, in fact, ‘rules’ possess inherent causal 
powers, which helps in explaining why institutional devices work in the way they do. 
10.3 Methodological contribution 
The thesis raises two methodological contributions of relevance to business network and 
marketing research: One contribution rests in the investigation of multiple, inter-dependent 
levels of business network analysis. The other contribution highlights the benefits to be gained 
from analysing sets of business artefacts-in-use as primary data sources to enhance our 
understanding of business networks.  
The first contribution rests on the acknowledgement of the limitations of research 
investigating network phenomena at one level of analysis and the active endeavour to move 
beyond researching dyadic, focal or network interactions as isolated, self-contained units-of-
analysis. The conceptual differentiation between these levels is an important device to make 
sense of otherwise exceedingly complex webs of relationships, and is invaluable in guiding 
data collection and creating conceptual representations of networks (Halinen & Törnroos, 
2005). However, such conceptual convenience seems to generate research ex-ante favouring 
one level of analysis, such as dyads (Holmlund, 2004), over other, potentially more complex or 
less accessible levels of analyses, and prevents us from understanding the interdependencies 
between these levels. Yet, there are few network phenomena that can be understood by 
artificially isolating one level of analysis which, in fact, is embedded and interdependent with 
a dynamic structure of other levels.  
In the context of this research, an isolated examination of how companies deal with risk at one 
level of analysis would have resulted in a one-dimensional view, which would deepen our 
understanding of the isolated use of contracting or standards at the expense of understanding 
how such activities are interconnected and dependent on each other for their effectiveness.  In 
other words, this research would have missed understanding how activities at one level of 
analysis influence and are influenced by activities occurring at a different level. Considering the 
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major asset of network research is founded in the ontology of markets that more accurately 
approximates real-life business environments (Tikkanen, 1998), it is logical to invest in 
methodological decisions that transfer the ontological implications into empirical research 
design. 
The importance of considering multiple levels of network analysis is not new and has been 
highlighted in existing conceptual network research (Halinen et al., 1999; Ford & Håkansson, 
2006) and institutional research (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008; Djelic& Quack, 2008). 
However, to date, in both fields, research remains largely conceptual and has been hardly 
empirically substantiated (Meyer, Brooks & Goes, 1990; Yang & Su, 2014). This thesis has 
made a first step towards demonstrating empirically and conceptually the benefits of a more 
nuanced, multi-level analysis of a network phenomenon. The integrated framework of how 
companies deal with risk (Figure 9.7) visualizes the adaptive process of how codification, 
monitoring and enforcement happens at three, inter-dependent levels of network analysis. 
The second methodological contribution consists of demonstrating the value of bringing 
business artefacts from the periphery to a more prominent position in business network 
research. 
Despite general appreciation for the advantages of combining different types of empirical 
evidence in qualitative research, the actual use of artefact analysis as primary empirical data 
in case study research has not yet done justice to fully reveal its potential. Specifically, the 
researcher observes four limitations in existent business networks and marketing research 
with regards to the use of artefacts: 
a) Business artefacts may not be considered equally relevant or rich sources of primary 
data compared to other types of evidence, such as interviews or notes from participant 
observation, in the first place.  
b) Business artefacts appear to be often subsumed into the category of ‘secondary’ data, 
with few clarifications as to how they contributed to informing the findings.  
c) Even studies considering the analysis of business artefacts appear to under-invest in 
the validity of consulted artefacts by drawing on template documents or publicly 
available versions of documents that may differ from actual documents-in-use.  
d) Research drawing on artefacts-in-use tends to either examine artefacts in isolation 
from other empirical evidence (such as interviews); and/or to examine the content and 
use of artefacts in isolation from other, relevant artefacts; and/or to study artefacts as 
‘static’, which neglects consideration of potential changes to artefacts over time. 
A paucity of published empirical and conceptual developments involving artefact-in-use 
analysis in network research appears to further ‘silence’ progress in understanding the 
contributions that can be derived from using artefacts as primary data. This materializes in 
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limited methodological advice available on accessing artefacts-in-use, the analysis and 
reporting of findings from different types of artefacts. In light of these observations, this thesis 
offers a first step towards uncovering the relevance of business artefacts for understanding 
network phenomena in the context of risk. Specifically, this research has highlighted: 
a) The challenges and limitations involved in gaining access to confidential artefacts-in-use; 
b) Why analysing artefacts-in-use is relevant to business marketing research; 
c) How the contextualised analysis of different artefacts, such as standards, GTC and 
contracts, may reveal important insights about the interdependency of interactions across 
network, focal and dyadic levels; 
d) The new insights that can be gained from triangulating artefact analysis with other 
sources of evidence, such as in-depth interviews and consultation of secondary data. 
In this way, this thesis addresses the imbalance in existing business marketing and network 
research that focuses predominantly on the use of contracts.  
10.4 Practical implications 
This research raises three implications for practice relevant to marketing managers and 
educators. These include: 
1) Illuminating to marketing managers the relevance of risk emerging beyond the 
‘horizon’ of individual companies; 
2) Suggesting an alternative approach to risk, which moves beyond the conventional, 
probability-based thinking about risk and risk-management systems; 
3) Drawing attention to the power of institutional devices, such as standards, GTC and 
contracts, in addressing uncertainty and impact of risk, which a company – depending 
on its network position– may design, adapt or be subjected to. 
The preceding chapters highlighted that companies interact in complex, idiosyncratic 
networks of relationships, where risk assumes a degree of uncertainty and where 
embeddedness and interdependency matter. The risks relevant to each actor in the business 
network, the available institutional devices and the freedom to adapt those devices depend on 
each actor’s specific network position. In light of this, this research does not assume the hubris 
of prescribing how companies should deal with risk. Instead, the value of this research rests in 
guiding marketing managers’ and educators’ thinking about risk, which deviates from the 
hegemony of probability-based risk management literature.  
By illuminating the relevance of dealing with risk for marketing managers, this thesis shifts 
focus from creating resources to protecting resources from risk impact. The thesis offers a first 
step towards raising marketing managers’ awareness for risk by encouraging the adoption of 
a ‘mega-scale view’ of a company’s embeddedness in direct and indirect relationships with 
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businesses, NGOs, governmental authorities, consumers, media and other actors. This view 
sensitizes practitioners towards risk that can: 
a) Migrate across webs of direct and indirect interactions, resulting in risk impact 
spreading to seemingly unrelated parts of the network, regardless of geographical, 
political or legislative borders; 
b) Occur simultaneously with other risks and prevent any one company from effectively 
dealing with risk unilaterally; 
c) Impact key resources of prime concern to marketing managers. 
Building on this alternative approach to risk, the second practical implication raised in this 
research broadens the understanding of devices available for dealing with risk by moving 
beyond the consideration of software systems. Technical, software-based systems rely on 
complex probability-based algorithms that provide increasingly accurate data on future 
events. There are inherent limitations to software-based approaches, as in order to function, 
risks are treated as a series of snapshot events, isolated from one another. This pre-empts the 
developing of a more accurate, dynamic view of risk, which considers how impact may migrate 
across direct and indirect business interactions and how co-occurrence of several risks at a 
time may result in synergy effects, exasperating or possibly limiting the impact of any one risk. 
Moreover, probability-based risk systems typically reinforce the illusions that risk can be 
‘managed away’ by one company and that thinking about risk can be externalized to a computer 
system, which follows more sophisticated data processes than an individual (marketing) 
manager could accomplish.  
Taking this alternative approach to risk seriously, the third implication consists of drawing 
marketing managers’ attention to the uses of institutional devices, such as standards, GTC and 
contracts for dealing with risk. The power of institutional devices lies in their capability to 
address not just one specific risk, but in providing a ‘modus operandi’ for a range of future 
contingencies that may or may not be known to all actors in advance. Moreover, institutional 
devices are parsimonious (compared to software-based forecasting systems) by comprising a 
maximum of five pages for GTC, possibly twenty pages for framework contracts and about 150 
pages for standard schemes. Adapting institutional devices to a company’s purposes based on 
its interactions and learning over time is more compatible with the cognitive capacities of 
(marketing) managers. Moreover, institutional devices respond to the real-life requirement of 
dealing with risk in interaction with multiple known and unknown actors across time and 
space. Consequently, institutional devices address the challenge of orchestrating a concerted 
effort when cross-company resources such as industry reputation, consumer confidence and 
freedom from regulations are at risk. Safeguarding these resources, which are of importance 
beyond any one company’s boundaries, can be achieved through the use of standard and 
contractual devices spanning whole industries. Equally, developing standards and contracts 
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may help tailoring these devices to protect a company’s own resources, such as product quality, 
intellectual property rights over brands, recipes or packaging, which may be impacted through 
product recall, compensatory payments or fines. The key mechanisms by which standards and 
contracts facilitate dealing with risk include: (a) Limiting uncertainty by way of addressing 
variability in direct and indirect interactions; and (b) limiting impact, by way of defining 
‘liability regimes’ for distributing risk impact among multiple actors. 
To function efficiently, companies must strike a balance between designing institutional 
devices that are flexible enough to allow for the discretion of individual companies and 
relevance to future unknown contingencies; and stable enough to limit variability in present 
and future interactions across multiple actors.  Moreover, this research highlights that 
institutional devices do not function in isolation from each other or in a ‘self-enforcing’ way. 
Instead, companies must invest in consistent and transparent monitoring and enforcement 
processes requiring continuous adaptations. The integrated framework for dealing with risk 
in business networks presented in Chapter Nine, Figure 9.7 may help practitioners locate and 
address weaknesses in existent uses of institutional devices. The following questions may 
further help practitioners to evaluate the use of institutional devices for dealing with risk: Are 
the ‘rules’ for dealing with risk clearly stated? Do the rules address risks that can originate 
from direct and indirect (business) actors? What monitoring practices are exercised? How are 
monitoring and enforcement of rules ensured in interaction with distant actors who are not 
directly accountable to the company? What are available enforcement practices and how do 
the exercised sanctions relate to those stated in respective legal regulations?  
It is impossible to ignore that power in business relationships plays a major role in a company’s 
capacity to develop, define and adapt institutional devices for dealing with risk (Rindt & 
Mouzas, 2015). Contract terms, GTC and standards are not an outcome of harmonious multi-
party consultations, but a highly contested process, where each party tries to inscribe rules 
for dealing with risk that are of benefit to itself and which typically result in defining the 
obligations of other parties. Thus, many companies are not confronted with the choice of how 
to design contracts, GTC or standards, but instead face the choice of accepting or leaving 
another company’s ready-made proposals. In that case, this research highlights the 
importance of reading and understanding the rules before deciding to accept the proposal. 
That is because both choices will impact the framework of rules within which a company will 
have to deal with risk in future interactions, and if that choice is made uninformed, it can 
increase a company’s exposure to risk. Hence, it is each company’s responsibility to 
understand not only the content and purpose of its own institutional devices but also the 
content and purpose of those it is subjected to, because these devices create and co-define the 
corset of rules available for dealing with risk. 
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To enhance the relevance of the above implications for marketing managers, it would be 
helpful to address the limited awareness towards risk in business marketing at an earlier 
stage, by updating marketing curricula on such modules as ‘Strategic Marketing’, 
‘International Marketing’ or ‘Business Marketing’, along with relevant handbooks, to consider 
relevant approaches to dealing with risk in business relationships. 
10.5 Limitations and directions for future research 
This research presents one of the few ventures aimed at enhancing our understanding of risk 
and how companies deal with risk in business networks by analysing the use of institutional 
devices such as industry standards, GTC and framework contracts. However, in the face of the 
complexity and dynamics of risk in a network context, this thesis merely taps into a rich and 
recent field for business network and marketing research that promises to open various 
avenues for future research. 
Surprisingly, research on risk within the streams of business network and institutional 
research, and even the broader discipline of business marketing, is in its infancy. This thesis 
offers an initial glance at the complex nature of risk in business networks and how companies 
codify, monitor, enforce and adapt institutional devices for dealing with risk at multiple levels 
of network interaction. Behind each of the concepts – risk, business networks, institutional 
devices, business artefacts – stands a rich body of literature, which had to be collapsed at 
times, like a hand-fan, to meet the scope of this project. Necessarily, the researcher is conscious 
of a range of limitations, the articulation of which may facilitate and guide future research. 
Specifically, the following paragraphs will identify the thesis’ theoretical, methodological and 
empirical limitations and derive respective future research suggestions. 
In theoretical terms, this thesis has highlighted the value of combining insights from network 
and institutional research: While the network approach to markets captures companies’ real-
life contexts of embeddedness and interdependency, institutional research contributes 
explanatory understanding of the devices that companies use for dealing with risk in 
networks. Combining two theoretical approaches presents a more nuanced conceptual basis 
for making sense of empirical data and ultimately may lead to developing and refining theory. 
However, this also involves necessary choices over what to include or exclude. Being aware of 
those choices allows playing a mind-game of how the research can unfold differently, based 
on an alternative set of theoretical underpinnings. Articulating these unexercised options may 
inspire future research to enrich our understanding of risk and how companies deal with risk. 
For example, due to the choice of the unit-of-analysis, which does not specifically investigate 
individual managers’ perceptions of risk and how perceptions are constructed and 
communicated, this thesis does not consider promising insights from research on network 
pictures (Henneberg, Naudé & Mouzas, 2010; Colville & Pye, 2010), which draws on 
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organisational sense-making research advanced by Weick (1995; 2005). Yet, as risk can be 
understood as a product of human perceptions of the future, it would be promising to invest 
in research at the individual level of network analysis. Moreover, research on network pictures 
can provide a valuable pathway for analysing the role business artefacts play in facilitating the 
development of shared network pictures within and across companies (Geiger & Finch, 2010).  
Another theoretical limitation originates from the researcher’s preference to adopt an 
integrative view of how companies deal with risk at multiple levels of network analysis, instead 
of researching in greater depth the use of institutional devices at one level of analysis. This has 
necessarily resulted in a brief treatment of a growing body of literature on the development 
and use of standards and transnational ‘soft law’ (Schanze, 2007; Djelic & Quack, 2008) in 
business interactions. While research on transnationalisation of (soft) law draws its strength 
from rich international empirical research, it tends to consistently proceed on a different 
trajectory from marketing research. However, considering our limited insights into the 
industry level of network analysis, research on transnationalisation of institutional systems 
can offer a relevant starting point to understand why certain actors invest in creating 
standards, how competing actors agree on sharing standards and how such initiatives are re-
negotiated over time.  
Building on the above limitation, this research has barely considered contributions of 
institutional research with regards to understanding the legitimization of institutional devices 
developed by business actors and the process of institutional entrepreneurship (Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008).  While this thesis contributes to the cross-fertilization between network and 
institutional research (see, for example, Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008), it has not elaborated on 
how dominant network actors proceed to invest institutional devices with legitimacy and how 
such devices drive the institutionalisation of interactions over time. Drawing on the concept 
of institutional entrepreneurship could illuminate which actors motivate the creation of 
institutional devices and how the interactive processes legitimising institutions and overcoming 
resistance to new institutional devices unfolds. Moreover, this research could illuminate how 
different sets of network actors advance institutional set-ups in competition with other sets of 
network actors.  
This present research has merely touched upon the resource of historical marketing research, 
such as literature on the banana trade in the early 20th Century (Buchelo, 2004) or the 
phenomenon of “Law Merchant” (Kadens, 2012). While this stream of research appears to be 
consistently neglected in informing our analyses of contemporary business interactions, it 
offers invaluable conceptual and empirical insights into the use of business artefacts as 
primary data informing empirical and conceptual research in business marketing. 
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The thesis’ methodological limitations originate from challenges associated with data access 
and meeting confidentiality requirements. The current state of research on risk in business 
networks would significantly benefit from future investigations where access to both sets of 
actors involved in direct and indirect interactions is granted. 
This research did not perform a comparative analysis of business artefacts-in-use over time. 
Since this research draws on recent and still valid standards, GTC and contracts, the analysis 
of changes is limited to those noted within the actual documents. However, it would be of 
benefit to perform a comparative study of different versions of artefacts-in-use over a longer 
period of time. For example, how did the content of framework contracts and GTC change 
between 1990 and 2015 (a period of significant changes to the German and European food 
laws)? While it may seem that accessing historical artefacts-in-use is easier than accessing 
current versions, the competitive nature of the food industry and investigations into the sector 
over the last decades by the German and European governments, on the grounds of collusion 
and unfair trading practices, challenged the researcher’s access. Yet, comparative analysis 
could yield important insights into how and why artefacts change and how changes influence 
the performance of business interactions.  
Another methodological limitation is grounded in the critical realist stance to analysing 
artefacts-in-use. While this approach is aligned with the research design, objectives and the 
researcher’s beliefs, it is intriguing to perform additional data collection and analysis, 
assuming an interpretivist approach. Adopting the social constructionist approach to 
analysing artefact content could generate relevant insights into how actors inscribe meaning 
and preferences into business artefacts and how such inscriptions can institutionalise power-
asymmetry in direct and indirect interactions. 
In terms of empirical limitations, the thesis relies on investigating one, albeit significant 
empirical setting in terms of industry and geography. Future research into how companies 
deal with risk in different empirical settings, with potentially different power structures and 
regulatory contexts, would significantly help in further developing the thesis’ theoretical 
contribution. The German business culture is significantly characterised by adherence to rules 
and taking business artefacts seriously. This may significantly influence the effectiveness and 
efficiency of using institutional devices. Moreover, Germany’s ‘civil law’ system strongly 
influences the content, framing and use of institutional devices for dealing with risk. A fruitful 
path for future research would involve a comparative investigation into the use of institutional 
devices in diametrically opposed empirical settings in order to highlight similarities and 
differences in patterns of interactions.  
To further enhance our understanding of the use of artefacts in business interactions, future 
research could investigate the degree of discrepancy and alignment between the agreements 
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codified in artefacts-in-use and the actual performance. This research has not investigated the 
degree of alignment between codified rules and performed (inter-) actions in nearly sufficient 
detail. Yet, research in the area of organisational studies has illuminated the importance of 
understanding ‘governance gaps’ between actors’ intended and realized performance (Becker 
& Zirpoli, 2008). While this research predominantly focuses on intra-organisational 
governance gaps, such insight would be invaluable in the context of dealing with risk in inter-
organisational settings. Researching ‘governance gaps’ in empirical terms ideally requires 
action research or participant observation of a sufficiently longitudinal nature. Nevertheless, 
such research is vital, particularly in the context of risk in the food industry, as discrepancy 
between codification and actual performance can have detrimental impact on human health 
and safety. Understanding how ‘gaps’ between codified rules and actual performance emerge, 
sustain or close may significantly enhance our understanding of the uses of institutional 
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
ID Organisation (anonymised) Current and relevant previous positions Interview date  
1 Global Soft Drink 
Manufacturer 
- District Manager/Head of regional KAM wholesale  
- Previously: Head of Customer Strategy at the (same) Global Soft Drink 
Manufacturer 
- Head of Channel Marketing “Home Market” at the Global Soft Drink 
Manufacturer 
- Senior Manager Market Strategy & Planning at Procter & Gamble Prestige 
(Phone) May 15, 2012, 4pm-
5pm 
 
2 Food Laboratory (470 clients 
from the food industry 
(primarily meat and dairy; 
3500 clients from water and 
beverages industry) 
Founder and Managing Director Berlin, Meeting at 
QUARISMA Conference, 
Berlin, June 11, 2013 (lunch 
break: 1-2pm) 
3 German Risk Consulting 
Agency (RCA) 
Consultant at RCA; area of expertise: Supply Chain Management, Supplier 
Screening; HACCP and Food Defence Accreditation, works with Grunewald, 
Alnatura, EDEKA 
Bonn, Almost daily 
conversations throughout 
period of participant 
observation from June 14, 
2013 to August 1, 2013. 
 
4 Retailer Delta Director of Compliance Hamburg, February 4, 2014, 
Telephone conversation 
5 German Federation of Edible 
Oil Processors and 
Manufacturers  
Head of Division for processing, manufacturing and trade of edible oils (area of 
expertise: palm oil) 
Berlin, August 22, 2013, 
10am-12. 
6 German Meat Co-operative  Head of Division for livestock and meat production (co-operation with Vion and 
Tönnies; two of Europe’s largest meat producers) 
Berlin, Meeting at 
QUARISMA Conference, 
Berlin, June 12, 2013  
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ID Organisation (anonymised) Current and relevant previous positions Interview date  
7 Farmer, self-employed Organic farmer and fruit and vegetable supplier to local food retailers Farm close to Wageningen, 
The Netherlands, August 29, 
2013, 10am-6pm 
8 Major German Insurance 
Company 
Director of Marketing (Insurance); previously: POS Marketing Manager for a 
major cosmetics manufacturer 
Cologne, July 3, 2012, 12-
2pm 
9 German Federal Institute for 
Risk Assessment (BfR) 
Head of Division for risk communication, prevention and impact evaluation (in 
B2B and B2C) 
Berlin, June 13, 2013, 1pm -
2pm 
10 Federation of German Food 
and Drink Industries (BVE) 
Managing Director; area of specialization: risk and crisis management projects in 
the German food and drink industries 
Berlin, July 12, 2012, 11am-
1pm 
11 Lancaster Centre for 
Forecasting 
Professor and Joint Director of Centre for Forecasting Lancaster (UK) April 18, 
2.15 pm -3.15pm 
12 German Federation for Food 
Law and Food Science (BLL) 
Managing Director and Lawyer; expert on German and European Food Law and 
Contracting Practices 
Berlin, June 7th, 2pm-4pm 
13 Legal Consulting Firm Leading lawyer in the German food and beverages industry (manufacturing & 
retail); Founder of the Food Lawyers Network Worldwide Association; member 
of the IFS Sanctioning Committee 
Gummersbach, September 6, 
2012, 11am-1pm 
14 Food Quality and Hygiene 
Management (self-employed) 
for several food suppliers, 
previously: PHW Group 
(biggest German poultry 
producer) 
Food Quality Manager Landesbergen, June 13, 
2013, 11am- 2pm 
15 Legal Consulting Firm Legal advisor in commercial and corporate law Cologne, July 11, 2012, 12-
1.30pm 
16 ‘Xion’ meat processing and 
manufacturing 
Food Safety Manager Berlin, June 12, 2013, 6pm-
7pm 
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ID Organisation (anonymised) Current and relevant previous positions Interview date  
17 Legal Consulting Firm Legal advisor in corporate and commercial law Hamburg, June 14, 2011, 
1pm -2pm 
18 German Federation of Edible 
Oil Processors and 
Manufacturers 
Head of Division for communications and coordination; Sustainability expert Berlin, August 22, 2013, 
10am-12. 
19 German Risk Consulting 
Agency (RCA) 
Management Consultant with areas of expertise in Compliance and Risk 
Management retailer supply networks (worked on Retailer Delta’s compliance 
initiative)  
Bonn, July 25th, 2013, 12-
2pm 
20 FMCG manufacturer Global Head of Brand-management & Communication; formerly employed at 
relevant food and FMCG manufacturers: Kattus Gourmet Foods; RJ Reynolds 
Tobacco; Reemtsma Tobacco; Mars Foods 
Duisburg, July 10, 2012, 
11am-1pm 
21 Manufacturer of own- and 
retailer-brand products 
Product Manager (with expertise in supplier management (actively involved in 
screening suppliers; setting up, changing and ending supplier relationships; as 
well as key account management for retail partners); distribution to all major 
German retailers [referred to as Manufacturer M2] 
June 11, 2011, 1pm-4pm 
22 Major European meat 
producing company  
Managing Director and Head of EU Sales and Marketing  Berlin, Meeting at Quarisma 
Conference, June 12, 
lunchtime 1pm-2pm 
23 German Risk Consulting 
Agency (RCA) 
Managing Director at RCA Bonn, multiple 
conversations throughout 
the period of participant 
observation (and sharing an 
office): June 14, 2013 and 
August 1, 2013. 
24 Leading German consumer 
protection group 
Project Manager; expertise in ‘investigative industry reports’ and media 
campaigning, area of expertise baby/child food products 
Berlin, July 13, 2012, 3pm -
3.30pm 
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ID Organisation (anonymised) Current and relevant previous positions Interview date  
25 German Industry Alliance for 
Food Safety 
Expert on feed production and trade; has been involved in regulatory projects 
following the dioxin contamination incident 
Berlin, Meeting at 
QUARISMA Conference, June 
13, Dinner 6pm -8pm, 2013 
26 German Risk Consulting 
Agency (RCA) 
Consultant at RCA with areas of expertise in cross-organizational sustainability 
management (in the food supply network); works with Deutsches Frühstücksei, 
Arla Foods, Müller Group and retailers DM, REWE. 
Bonn, multiple 
conversations throughout 
the period of participant 
observation (and sharing an 
office): June 14, 2013 and 
August 1, 2013. 
27 Globally operating 
accreditation and certification 
body 
Food Service Manager and Auditor, expert on risk and root-cause analysis; 
Auditor for IFS and other standards; expert on supply chain risks and food safety 
& packaging regulations 
Herne June 30, 2012, 6pm-
8pm 
28 German Food and Health 
Academy  
Independent interim manager  Braunschweig, May 16, 
2011, 2pm-4pm 
29 German Sugar and 
Confecteionary Industry 
Association 
Senior position in the division for Food Safety and Health; expertise on private 
standards; prior experience with major German confectionery manufacturer; co-
ordinated the acrylamide incident in Germany  
Bonn, July 3, 2012, 11am-
12.30. 
30 International Centre for Food 
Chain and Network Research 
Director of the International Centre for Food Chain and Network Research; 
involved in multiple cross-border projects (with Dutch, French, German and 
Scandinavian food companies); recent focus on integrated risk and quality 
management along the global food supply chain 
Two Conversations: 
- Phone conversation, 
May 30, 2013, 4-
4.30pm) 
- Meeting prior to 
QUARISMA Conference 
on June 11, 2013, 9-
10.30am 
31 International environmental 
NGO 
Project Leader for Sustainable Palm-Oil in Europe; Coordinator of Retailer-
Manufacturer-NGO and Consumer Interactions 
Berlin, June 13, 10am-12 
32 Major strategic consulting 
firm 
Director, Consulting Financial Services Communication through 
expert forum chat 
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ID Organisation (anonymised) Current and relevant previous positions Interview date  
September 3, 2012, 5pm-
6pm  
33 Institute for Comparative Law  Lawyer and expert on contract law and practices, international commercial 
transactions in B2B relationships 
Marburg/Lahn, June 30, 
2011, 2pm-5pm 
34 Owner of milk/dairy and 
poultry farm in Germany 
(Bavaria) 
As farm owner he has been involved in multiple certification and auditing 
processes; manages his own sourcing and distribution at a small scale 
conventional farming business 
Würzburg, May 1, 2013, 
10am-12. 
35 Independent IFS audit 
consultant 
Independent IFS Audit Consultant; operates the German “Lebensmittelforum”. Communication through 
Expert Forum chat, March 
5th 2014.  
36 Independent consultant Member of the Curatorium and special representative of The Hague Academy of 
International Law 
Munich, April 20, 2013, 
6pm-8pm 
37 Major strategic consulting 
firm 
Director Consulting Services; area of expertise in risk management Communication through 
Expert Forum chat May 3, 
2012, 5pm-6pm  
38 German Risk Consulting 
Agency (RCA) 
Senior consultant with areas of expertise in stakeholder management (coined 
‘perceived risk’ management), working with multiple clients from the German 
dairy industry, food supplements and beverages businesses (incl. beer, wine, 
juices, ‘novel’ food). 
Bonn, multiple 
conversations throughout 
the period of participant 
observation (and sharing an 
office): June 14, 2013 and 
August 1, 2013. 
39 Major strategic consulting 
firm 
Senior consultant, area of expertise: risk and contract management  Communication through 
expert forum chat May 3, 
2012, 5pm-6pm   
40 International environmental 
NGO 
Head of Division of Sustainable Biomass (dealing with sustainable sourcing of raw 
materials, including oils); apart from that: Deputy Managing Director and Auditor 
for Organic Farming at a German consulting firm; expertise in certification 
business for organic farming and sustainable biofuels 
Berlin, June 13, 10am-12 
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ID Organisation (anonymised) Current and relevant previous positions Interview date  
41 Federal Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture and Consumer 
Protection (BMELV). 
Senior Legal Secretary; Head of Safety in the Food Supply Chain Berlin, Meeting on June 11, 
2013 during QUARISMA 
Conference. 
42 Marketing and Product 
Innovation Agency 
Managing Director (expertise in product development and marketing with key 
retailers) 
Cologne, April 26, 2012, 
4pm-6.30pm 
 
